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Fairness, Copyright, and Video Games: 
Hate the Game, Not the Player 
Shani Shisha* 
 
Creative communities often rely on social norms to regulate the 
production of creative content. Yet while an emerging body of liter-
ature has focused on isolated accounts of social norms operating in 
discrete, small-scale creative industries, no research to date has ex-
plored the social norms that pervade the world’s largest content mi-
crocosm—the sprawling video game community. 
Now a veritable global phenomenon, the video game industry 
has recently grown to eclipse the music and motion picture indus-
tries. But despite its meteoric rise, the video game industry has pro-
voked little attention from copyright scholars. This Article is the first 
to explore the shifting role of copyright law in the gaming commu-
nity, where game developers are increasingly using a complex amal-
gam of legal and nonlegal tools to regulate creative output. Based 
on an in-depth analysis of the extralegal norms that govern creative 
content in the video game industry, this Article distills a richly de-
tailed account of the relationship between video game creators and 
consumers. It maps the intricate web of interests underpinning the 
relationship between game developers and consumers; identifies a 
rich cadre of fairness-driven social norms that permeate the gaming 
community; and considers the implications of these findings for 
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copyright law. The Article ultimately concludes that strong copy-
right protection is largely (though not entirely) inessential in areas 
where norms of fairness drive the production of creative content. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has ushered in a tectonic shift in the world of 
mass entertainment. From music aggregators to on-demand video 
streaming, content providers have been wrestling over the attention 
of consumers across a wide range of content services. But the inten-
sifying competition in the entertainment market has done little to 
temper the growth of the video game industry. Now a veritable 
global phenomenon, the video game market has recently grown to 
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eclipse the music and motion picture industries.1 In fact, video 
games now make up the largest entertainment market in the world 
by an order of magnitude.2 The most popular video game in the 
world, Fortnite by Epic Games, generated roughly three billion dol-
lars in 2018 alone, far surpassing the highest-grossing movie of all 
time.3 This is hardly surprising given the fact that Fortnite boasts 
some 250 million active players.4 These staggering figures paint a 
stark picture of an ever-changing world. As traditional forms of 
 
1 The film industry’s revenues in 2018 totaled $43 billion. See David Robb, U.S. Film 
Industry Topped $43 Billion In Revenue Last Year, Study Finds, But It’s Not All 
Good News, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (July 13, 2018), https://deadline.com/2018/07/film-
industry-revenue-2017-ibisworld-report-gloomy-box-office-1202425692/ [https://perma. 
cc/5R7G-QDLV]; Asit Sharma, The State of the Movie Industry in 2018, THE MOTLEY 
FOOL (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/09/19/the-state-of-the-
movie-industry-in-2018.aspx [https://perma.cc/HRL5-3P5T]. The music industry 
generated $9.8 billion in 2018. See RIAA 2018 YEAR-END MUSIC INDUSTRY REVENUE 
REPORT (2019), [https://perma.cc/7TNS-QAG9]. The video game industry has 
outperformed both industries, grossing more than $130 billion in 2018. See James 
Batchelor, Global Games Market Value Rising to $134.9bn in 2018, GAMES INDUSTRY 
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2018-12-18-global-games-
market-value-rose-to-usd134-9bn-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/48J6-FAAM] (noting that the 
video game industry has generated almost $135 billion in revenues); Kellie Ell, Video 
Game Industry is Booming with Continued Revenue, CNBC ONLINE (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/18/video-game-industry-is-booming-with-continued-
revenue.html [https://perma.cc/JX8S-EWVB] (reporting that the video game industry is 
projected to gross nearly $138 billion by the end of the year). 
2 Sheena Jordan, The Gaming Industry is Now Bigger than Hollywood, ECONOTIMES 
(July 19, 2019), https://www.econotimes.com/The-Gaming-Industry-Is-Now-Bigger-
Than-Hollywood-1558784 [https://perma.cc/YW2F-ELY3]. 
3 See, e.g., Jon Russell, Epic Games, the Creator of Fortnite, Banked a $3 Billion Profit 
in 2018, TECH CRUNCH (Dec. 27, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/27/epic-fortnite-
3-billion-profit/ [https://perma.cc/QL9Z-EWW5]. Fortnite reportedly generates millions 
of dollars a day. Aisha Hassan, Fortnite’s Creator Made $7 Billion This Year, QUARTZ 
(Dec. 31, 2018), https://qz.com/1512561/fortnite-developer-tim-sweeney-made-7-billion-
this-year/ [https://perma.cc/74HL-YFY4]. Strikingly, Fortnite made almost $300 million 
in the month of April 2018 alone. Nick Statt, Fortnite Made Nearly $300 Million in the 
Month of April, THE VERGE (May 24, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/24/173 
90004/fortnite-battle-royale-money-made-revenue-300-million-april-2018 [https://perma 
.cc/NA6E-64PT]. The highest-grossing movie of all time is Avengers: Endgame, which 
raked in $2.79 billion to date. Josh Jackson, The 20 Highest-Grossing Movies of All Time, 
PASTE MAGAZINE (Sept. 12, 2019), [https://perma.cc/Y2FT-ZLVP]. 
4 Ben Gilbert, How Big is ‘Fortnite’? With Nearly 250 Million Players, It’s over Two-
Thirds the Size of the U.S. Population, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.business 
insider.com/how-many-people-play-fortnite-2018-11 [https://perma.cc/WF48-MR55]. 
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mass entertainment remain stagnant,5 video games continue to 
thrive. In the U.K., for example, video games account for more than 
half of the entire entertainment market.6 And although video games 
largely cater to a younger audience, they are growing increasingly 
popular among older consumers.7 
Video games are also rapidly gaining traction as vehicles of cul-
tural currency. Games like Fortnite have become a mainstay of pop-
ular culture, with thousands of YouTube videos mimicking the ani-
mated dance moves featured in the game.8 A recent study also sug-
gests that some players think of Fortnite as their primary social me-
dia platform.9 Moreover, a recent poll found that a whopping 75% 
of Americans have at least one video game player in their house-
hold.10 Video games have likewise crept into other fora of mass 
 
5 See Press Release, IFPI Global Music Report, State of the Industry (2018), 
https://www.ifpi.org/ifpi-global-music-report-2018/ [https://perma.cc/H8MB-KZLE] 
(noting that despite three consecutive years of growth in the music industry, “revenues for 
2017 are still only 68.4% of the market’s peak in 1999”). 
6 VB Staff, With Record-Breaking Revenue, the U.K. Game Industry is Blowing Up, 
VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 18, 2019, 4:10 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/18/with-
record-breaking-revenue-the-u-k-game-industry-is-blowing-up/ [https://perma.cc/4LLK-
3N5D] (calling attention to the fact that “[i]n 2018, games accounted for more than half of 
the entire U.K. entertainment market, 51.3 percent, outselling music and video combined, 
for the first time”). 
7 See, e.g., Erin Lee, The Cultural Impact of Video Games, ODYSSEY (Nov. 30, 2015), 
https://www.theodysseyonline.com/cultural-impact-video-games [https://perma.cc/2SPW 
-6K8T] (observing that 44% of the people who play video games are aged 36 or older); 
Keith Stuart, Game Changers: How the Increasing Cultural Significance of Video Games 
is Reflected in Our Coverage, THE GUARDIAN (July 21, 2017), [https://perma.cc/SD7F-
YJ8A] (“Most modern surveys show the audience for games has an almost even gender 
split, and the average age of a player is around 35.”). 
8 See David Lumb, ‘Fortnite’ Wants to Put Your Dance in the Game, ENGADGET (Mar. 
30, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018-03-30-fortnite-boogiedown-put-your-dance-
in-game.html [https://perma.cc/S997-8LUS] (pointing out that professional athletes “won’t 
stop mimicking the game’s weird dances in real life”); Delaney Strunk, Watching These 
Professional Dancers Try The “Fortnite Dance Challenge” Will Actually Make Your Day, 
BUZZFEED (June 27, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/delaneystrunk/fortnite-dance-
challenge [https://perma.cc/4U2B-FQ72] (discussing the “new viral internet video 
challenge” known as the “Fortnite dance challenge”). 
9 NATIONAL RESEARCH GROUP, FORTNITE: THE NEW SOCIAL MEDIA? (2020), 
[https://perma.cc/3YEB-3UFD]. 
10 ENT. SOFTWARE ASS’N, ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT THE VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY (2020), 
https://www.theesa.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Final-Edited-2020-ESA_Essential_ 
facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN8W-6Y6W]. 
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media, and a growing cascade of movies and television shows are 
now premised on (or inspired by) video games11—a clear indication 
of the cultural force that drives the video game market. 
The explosive growth of the video game industry has drawn in-
creased scrutiny from third parties. A spate of recent lawsuits take 
aim at game developers for allegedly failing to support individual 
creators. Most notably, game developers have recently faced legal 
challenges involving claims of copyright infringement with respect 
to protected choreographies.12 Other controversies concern the like-
ness of professional athletes in sports video games.13 And a number 
 
11 See JACK LULE, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA AND CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO MASS 
COMMUNICATION 418 (2010) (suggesting that, unlike movies of the 1980s, modern-day 
movies are often derivative of preexisting video games). 
12 One such lawsuit was brought by Alfonso Ribeiro, former star of the show The Fresh 
Prince of Bel-Air. Ribeiro alleged that Fortnite’s creators misappropriated his famous 
dance routine from the show. Amir Vera & Chris Boyette, ‘Fresh Prince’ Star Alfonso 
Ribeiro Sues Fortnite Over Use of Dance His Character Carlton Popularized, CNN (Dec. 
18, 2018, 11:07 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/18/entertainment/carlton-sues-
fortnite-video-game/index.html [https://perma.cc/9U26-FCZ2]. Ribeiro subsequently 
withdrew his lawsuit following the Copyright Office’s refusal to register his copyright on 
the grounds that his dance moves were not elaborate enough to qualify as a choreography. 
Joe Price, Alfonso Ribeiro Drops Carlton Dance ‘Fortnite’ Lawsuit Against Epic Games, 
COMPLEX (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2019/03/alfonso-ribeiro-
drops-fortnite-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/Y876-9SKH]. Another lawsuit was brought by 
rapper Terrence Ferguson, known by his stage-name “2 Milly,” charging that Fortnite’s 
developers had used his “Milly Rock” dance in the game. Stefanie Fogel, Rapper 2 Milly 
Is Suing Epic Games over ‘Fortnite’ Dance Emote, VARIETY (Dec. 5, 2018, 7:33 PM), 
https://variety.com/2018/gaming/news/2-milly-epic-games-fortnite-lawsuit-1203080818/ 
[https://perma.cc/SM8J-VP67]. A third lawsuit was brought by the parents of Russell 
Redd, known as the “Backpack Kid,” who claims to have conjured up the dance move 
colloquially known as “The Floss.” See, e.g., Austen Goslin, Backpack Kid is Also Suing 
Epic Games over a Dance in Fortnite, POLYGON (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://www.polygon.com/fortnite/2018/12/18/18146770/backpack-kid-dance-fortnite-
epic-games-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/V5NB-SGSX]. 
13 Jason M. Bailey, Athletes Don’t Own Their Tattoos. That’s a Problem for Video Game 
Developers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/ 
style/tattoos-video-games.html  [https://perma.cc/935L-ZQGW]. As a general matter, 
people do not own the tattoos inked on their bodies; rather, tattoos are typically owned by 
the artists who created them. It thus remains unclear whether professional athletes, for 
example, can commercialize or license their likeness without obtaining permission from 
the tattoo artists who inked their bodies. Indeed, tattoo artists brought a number of recent 
lawsuits against video game developers for digitally recreating the likeness of professional 
athletes, including the tattoos displayed on their bodies. Id. And although the conventional 
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of high-profile trademark cases grapple with the use of marks in 
video games—consider cases like E.S.S. Entertainment v. Rock Star 
Videos, Inc., in which the owners of the Play Pen mark alleged that 
the defendant’s depiction of the “Pig Pen” strip club in the video 
game Grand Theft Auto infringed their rights.14 
These cases implicate a limited assortment of intellectual prop-
erty (“IP”) questions. But the intersection of copyright law and 
video games has thus far eluded scholarly attention. Copyright 
scholars have been loath to address many of the core questions that 
spring from the growth of video games.15 This omission is particu-
larly glaring in light of the emerging body of work devoted to ex-
ploring the relationship between IP and social norms. In recent 
years, IP scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the role 
of social norms in incentivizing innovation. The literature is awash 
in scholarly accounts of social norms operating in tandem with, or 
in opposition to, positive copyright law.16 Some norms inform 
 
wisdom is that people are implicitly authorized to display their tattoos in public, including 
in television interviews, it is debatable whether this implicit license extends to digitally 
recreated avatars in video games. Id. 
14 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008). 
15 Scholarly accounts of the relationship between copyright law and video games are 
few and far between. These accounts mostly focus on questions of infringement and 
substantial similarity. See, e.g., Thomas M.S. Hemnes, The Adaptation of Copyright Law 
to Video Games, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (1982); William K. Ford, Copy Game for High 
Score: The First Video Game Lawsuit, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2012); John Kuehl, Video 
Games and Intellectual Property: Similarities, Differences, and a New Approach to 
Protection, 7 CYBARIS 314 (2016); Steven B. McKnight, Substantial Similarity Between 
Video Games: An Old Copyright Problem in a New Medium, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1277 
(1983). 
16 See Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should 
Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121 
(2007); Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property 
Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 
2008); Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us 
About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651 (2006); 
Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer, 
in 16 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 97 (2005); Jacqueline D. Lipton, To ©  or Not to ©? Copyright and Innovation 
in the Digital Typeface Industry, 43 U.S. DAVIS L. REV. 143 (2009); Fiona Murray et al., 
Of Mice and Academic: Examining the Effect of Openness on Innovation, 8 AM. ECON. J. 
ECON. POLICY 212 (2008); Charles Cronin, Genius in a Bottle: Perfume, Copyright, and 
Human Perception, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 427 (2009). 
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judicial interpretation of the law.17 Others seek to dislodge the law 
altogether by introducing a competing, extralegal regime.18 And 
countless norms take on a complementary role, operating within the 
confines of the negative space of copyright law,19 i.e., in domains 
left partly or wholly ungoverned by the law.20 These norms perme-
ate creative industries that thrive despite, or perhaps because of, the 
lack of formal IP protection. Yet despite the flurry of recent work 
on norms-based governance of IP, no research to date has examined 
the social norms that pervade the video game industry. 
This Article is the first serious effort to analyze the social norms 
that govern creative content in the video game community. It maps 
the complex web of interests underlying the relationship between 
consumers and video game developers. It then draws out a number 
of social norms rooted in notions of fairness. In the context of video 
games, I understand fairness as a repository of three interrelated 
concepts: (1) competitive integrity, (2) wealth sharing, and (3) labor. 
First, I identify norms of competitive integrity.21 I show that  
a game’s commercial success largely turns on whether it appears  
to be competitively fair. Games are thought to be unfair when  
players are allowed to pay money—say, through in-game 
 
17 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual 
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1918–19 (2007). See also infra notes 162–173. 
18 Consider, for example, the social norms prevalent among web bloggers, who 
frequently republish (without obtaining consent) entire articles lifted from newspapers.  
Mark F. Schultz, Copynorms: Copyright and Social Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 201, 225–26 
(Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). These norms fly in the face of copyright law; although wholesale 
copying likely amounts to copyright infringement, bloggers and newspapers seem to accept 
that unlicensed copying in this context is (at least partially) tolerable. 
19 The term “negative space” was coined by Chris Sprigman and Kal Raustiala. See, e.g., 
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
1201, 1201–02 (2009) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox]; Elizabeth 
L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317 (2011). 
20 While copyright law does not effectively extend to jokes and recipes, comedians and 
top-end French chefs have fashioned a complex, extralegal system of community norms to 
regulate the unsanctioned use of these works. See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, 
There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and 
the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 (2008); Emmanuelle 
Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of 
French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187 (2008). 
21 See infra Section III.A. 
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microtransactions—to obtain a competitive in-game advantage.  
At bottom, modern video games are social enterprises: they are 
founded on the social experience that results from interactions  
between players. More importantly, modern games allow players to 
compete with and against each other. But in-game competition can 
only meaningfully arise if everyone stands an equal chance of  
competing. The success of a video game thus hinges on players’  
perception of fairness: they must believe that the game affords eve-
ryone an opportunity to compete on equal terms. This egalitarian 
ideal is defied when games permit players to buy competitive  
enhancements. Players often describe such games in terms of a 
“pay-to-win” scheme, where one’s odds of winning depend upon her 
ability or willingness to pay.22 As a result, players largely eschew 
video games that offer competitive (rather than cosmetic) enhance-
ments through in-game microtransactions. 
This account complements the conventional behavioral analysis 
of microtransactions. Behavioral economists point to systemic con-
sumer misperceptions to explain the proliferation of in-game pur-
chases. They suggest, broadly speaking, that consumers are myopic 
and over-optimistic, and are thus unlikely to appreciate the costs as-
sociated with microtransactions. I contend that systemic mispercep-
tions cannot fully account for the success (and occasional failure) of 
micropayments. Instead, I argue that a nuanced approach—marry-
ing behavioral economics and norms of fairness—can paint a more 
complete portrait of why and when microtransactions flourish. 
The Article then excavates a second layer of nonlegal norms in 
the gaming community: norms grounded in perceptions of wealth 
sharing.23 I suggest that gamers are positively inclined to support a 
game when they believe that a substantial portion of the game is 
offered for free. Fortnite, for example, is a free-to-play game; alt-
hough the basic version of the game itself is free, players can make 
in-game purchases of premium digital products.24 This business 
model proved successful in no small part because the game’s 
 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 186–223. 
23 See infra Section III.B. 
24 Elizabeth Matsangou, How Fortnite Became the Most Successful Free-to-Play Game 
Ever, THE NEW ECONOMY (Nov. 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/HN49-T858]. 
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developers appear to be sharing the wealth. They do so by offering 
the basic version of the game, stripped of many of its cosmetic ele-
ments, for free. I show that perceptions of wealth sharing can culti-
vate a reciprocal community of loyal players, thus increasing the 
likelihood of commercial success. 
Third, I argue that notions of fairness are particularly ubiquitous 
in online communities clustered around live gameplay streams on 
the website Twitch, the world’s largest hub for gaming streams.25 
Gamers guard forcefully against perceived misappropriations of 
their gameplay streams, although it is unclear whether gamers hold 
any rights to such streams. Still, members of the gaming community 
view such streams as instantiations of hard labor, expertise and (to 
some extent) artistry. And they consider any misappropriation to be 
an incident of illegitimate norm violation. I evaluate this anti-appro-
priation norm, demarcate its contours, and review the enforcement 
mechanisms that sustain it.26 
This study brings into focus three disparate norms of fairness. 
The first two—competitive integrity and wealth sharing—can be 
traced to the underlying business relationship between video game 
creators and consumers. These norms inform the prevailing free-to-
play pricing model employed by game developers. By contrast, the 
third set of norms—namely, norms grounded in labor—stem from 
interactions amongst fellow players. These norms do not directly 
implicate game developers, but rather govern the ways in which 
players engage with each other to protect the fruits of their labor, 
i.e., their gameplay streams. The Article contextualizes these ideas 
of fairness against the broader landscape of IP theory. And it con-
siders the literature on extralegal norms of fairness to explain how 
these norms might prove useful in thinking through some of the 
problems that have long marred copyright law. 
This extralegal realm carries implications for our understanding 
of the interplay between copyright law and ideas of fairness. The 
 
25 See Imad Khan, Why Twitch Is Still the King of Live Game Streaming, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/15/business/tech-video-game-
streaming-twitch.html [https://perma.cc/DCR5-T3H9]. See generally T.L. TAYLOR, 
WATCH ME PLAY: TWITCH AND THE RISE OF GAME LIVE STREAMING (2018). 
26 See infra Section III.C. 
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Article makes three principal contributions to the literature. First, it 
develops a rich account of fairness norms in the gaming community. 
In doing so, it brings to the fore a unique extralegal domain that lurks 
in the shadows of the world’s largest content industry. While an 
emerging body of literature has so far focused on isolated incidents 
of social norms operating in discrete, small-scale creative commu-
nities, this Article provides meaningful insights into the workings of 
the largest copyright microcosm in the world—the sprawling gam-
ing community. 
Second, this Article lends credence to the oft-invoked claim that 
copyright law is overbroad. I argue that norms of fairness can miti-
gate the risks associated with content creation so long as consumers 
regard as “fair” the content producer’s business model. Norms of 
fairness therefore counsel against strong IP protection: they mini-
mize the need for strong legal interventions in areas where fair-
ness—rather than the law—drives creativity. To be clear, I am not 
suggesting that copyright law is entirely redundant. Some measure 
of legal protection remains necessary to prevent wholesale copying 
by market competitors. Instead, this Article argues that, to better 
confront the realities of a fairness-driven world, we should pare back 
copyright’s scope and reach.  
Third, the norms associated with live gaming streams call into 
question the veracity of the labor theory. According to John Locke’s 
theory of labor, creators are entitled to natural rights in their works 
because they had labored to create these works. But norms of fair-
ness in the gaming community illustrate the difficulty of pinpointing 
what labor actually means in community-specific contexts. This Ar-
ticle ultimately concludes that, despite its salience in some quarters 
of the globe, the labor theory is ill-suited to shape or otherwise in-
form copyright law. 
Finally, I should say a few words about the limits of this enter-
prise. The broader scholarship on video games has identified a rich 
panoply of social norms that suffuse the gaming world—from 
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“subcultures of geeks,”27 to norms of video game modifications,28 
to norms of in-game creativity,29 to the political norms that prolifer-
ate among gamers.30 My inquiry expands upon this scholarship by 
shedding light on a unique species of norms—that is, norms linked 
to the regulation of business and content from an IP perspective. Far 
from offering an exhaustive account, this Article aims to jumpstart 
a conversation about the relationship between IP and video games 
more broadly. 
I should also clarify that my use of the term “fairness” here is 
descriptive rather than philosophical. The concept of fairness is it-
self contested and starkly indeterminate.31 My goal in this Article, 
therefore, is to chalk out an account of gamers’ subjective percep-
tions of fairness. I do not claim that these perceptions actually em-
body ideals of fairness. Nor am I adjudging these perceptions to be 
normatively desirable. My ambition is to develop a nuanced picture 
of these perceived notions of fairness in order to work out their 
broader implications for intellectual property. The norms detailed 
below—competitive integrity, wealth sharing, and labor—betray 
wildly divergent ideas of fairness. And so I do not advance a unified, 
 
27 LULE, supra note 11, at 418 (describing subcultures of “geeks” who find refuge in the 
“imaginary worlds” of videos games). 
28 William W. Fisher, The Implications for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1417, 1421–22 (2010) (observing that “purchasers of computer games routinely modify 
them”); Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563, 585 
(2016) (discussing modifications to Nintendo video games); see also Lewis Galoob Toys, 
Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the use of add-on 
software to modify the gameplay of Nintendo games does not infringe Nintendo’s rights). 
29 Much of the writing in this vein has focused on the video game Minecraft, where 
players engage with a digital world in which they use various 3D objects to shape their 
environment. See, e.g., UNDERSTANDING MINECRAFT: ESSAYS ON PLAY, COMMUNITY AND 
POSSIBILITIES (Nate Garrelts ed., 2014); Maria Cipollone, Catherine C. Schifter, & Rick A. 
Moffat, Minecraft as a Creative Tool: A Case Study, 1 INT’L. J. GAME-BASED LEARNING 1 
(2014); Greg Lastowka, Minecraft as Web 2.0: Amateur Creativity and Digital Games, in 
153 AMATEUR MEDIA: SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Dan Hunter et al. 
eds., 2012). 
30 See Lawrence Lessig on What MMOs Can Teach Us About Real Life Politics, SEED 
PROJECT, https://www.seed-project.io/post/lawrence-lessig-on-what-mmos-can-teach-us-
about-real-life-politics [https://perma.cc/SVF8-53AS]. 
31 See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright, 
97 B.U. L. REV. 1487, 1508–10 (2017) (discussing the concept of fairness as both a 
philosophical and subjective term, while noting the complexity that surrounds its 
application and theoretical elaboration). 
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overarching theory of fairness. I focus instead on describing with 
clarity the perceived ideas of fairness to which gamers subscribe. At 
the same time, I recognize that these ideas may fail to meet the 
threshold for a fully synthesized philosophical account of fairness. 
The argument proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces some of 
the themes central to the resurgence of the video game industry, fo-
cusing on the industry’s shift to a service-based, online business 
model. This review is necessarily cursory, but it provides important 
background for the broader argument. Part II then provides an over-
view of the literature on nonlegal copyright norms. Through the con-
fluence of business strategy and copyright norms, Part III next ex-
plores extralegal gaming norms that circle around notions of fair-
ness. Part IV considers the implications of this analysis for copyright 
law writ large. A brief conclusion follows. 
 
I. MODERN-DAY VIDEO GAMES 
This Part maps recent developments in the video game industry, 
focusing on the evolution of video games in the digital age. Specif-
ically, it suggests that the video game industry now relies on a ser-
vice-based business model—one that is geared toward cultivating 
long-lasting, online communities of loyal players. 
A. Digital Video Games 
The video game industry dates back to the 1970s, with the re-
lease of Pong by Atari in 1972.32 Rapidly morphing into a multibil-
lion-dollar industry, the world of video games has undergone two 
dramatic shifts in recent years. The first involves the transition to 
digital, online-driven games. The second concerns the shift from 
one-off transactions to a pricing model based on an ongoing service. 
And these shifts, in turn, have combined to produce two related 
 
32 See Henmes, supra note 15, at 171 (noting that “the earliest games appeared in the 
1970s”); Ford, supra note 15, at 1 (arguing that the video game industry first took shape in 
1972); Christian Genetski & Christian Troncoso, Copyright Industry Perspectives: The 
Pivotal Role of TPMS in the Evolution of the Video Game Industry, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
359, 359 (2015) (“Although there is considerable debate about the industry’s precise 
birthdate, most point to the early- to mid-1970s as the point at which video games entered 
into the mainstream consciousness.”). 
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phenomena: the growth of gameplay streaming and the advent of 
competitive gaming. I will take up these issues in turn. 
The first shift, from physical to digital, is emblematic of the 
world of content more broadly.33 The music and television indus-
tries, for example, have both shifted to consumption models that are 
insulated from physical albums (in the music industry) and physical 
devices (in the television industry).34 And the video game industry, 
too, has pivoted to a business model that is largely grounded in dig-
ital consumption.35 While brick-and-mortar stores still offer physi-
cal copies of video games, these games increasingly offer a wide 
range of features that are uniquely accessible online.36 
Think, for example, of popular video games such as Mortal 
Kombat, Tekken, and Street Fighter.37 In the 1990s, these games 
were all exclusively playable on coin-operated arcade cabinets.38 
 
33 Ido Kilovaty, Freedom to Hack, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 457 (2019) (discussing the 
technological shift from hardware to software and recognizing that “[p]hysical objects are 
being supplemented, and even replaced, by software”). 
34 Major changes in the way people consume television content have been attributed to 
the rise of Netflix. See Alex Haslam, How Streaming Services Are Changing the Television 
Industry, BESTTECHIE (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.besttechie.com/how-streaming-
services-are-changing-the-television-industry/ [https://perma.cc/JX86-8J6V]; Lanre 
Bakare, Netflix Has Forever Changed the Way We Consume Television, THE GUARDIAN 
(July 21, 2018), [https://perma.cc/6SXN-Q5FA]. In the music industry, streaming 
accounted for roughly 75% of industry revenues in 2018. See Madison Bloom, Streaming 
Made Up 75% of Music Industry Revenue in 2018, PITCHFORK (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/RIAA-2018-Year-End-Music-Industr 
y -Revenue-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PJJ-KX2P]. 
35 Riordan Zentler, Digital vs. Physical: How the Video Game Industry Learned from 
Microsoft’s Missteps, THE SPOKESMAN REVIEW (Apr. 30, 2020), [https://perma.cc/2ZQ3-
KGSC] (“For more than a decade, video games have been steadily shifting away from 
physical sales toward digital distribution, much the same as music and film.”); see also text 
accompanying infra notes 43–45. 
36  Zentler, supra note 35.  
37 These are the most popular fighting games in the world. See Brian Altano & Ryan 
Clements, Street Fighter vs. Tekken vs. Mortal Kombat, IGN (Sept. 24, 2012), 
https://www.ign.com/articles/2012/09/24/street-fighter-vs-tekken-vs-mortal-kombat-by-
the-numbers [https://perma.cc/6QWC-KPZE]. 
38 See Chin Osathanunkul, A Classification of Business Models in Video Game Industry, 
17 INT’L J. MGMT. CASES 35, 40 (2015). Arcade machines typically require players to pay 
a small amount, often as little as a dime, for a single play. David Murphy, Hacking Public 
Memory: Understanding the Multiple Arcade Machine Emulator, 8 GAMING & CULTURE 
43, 45 (2013). Charles Bernstein further reasons that arcade games are grounded in the 
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But even these games—that is, traditional offline games—have 
gravitated toward an online model where many of the games’ unique 
features are only accessible online. For example, consumers must be 
able to access online servers if they wish to get their hands on new 
cosmetic designs for existing characters in the game Tekken.39 Put 
another way, even games that one might purchase at a physical retail 
store are still very much “online”—though anchored in a physical 
copy, they are nevertheless bound up with digital servers. 
The shift toward digital games is perhaps best evidenced by the 
explosion of digital sales. Music has become increasingly digital,40 
as has the television industry.41 The same is true of the publishing 
industry, where Amazon Kindle books have radically transformed 
the publishing marketplace.42 But the pervasiveness of digital goods 
is most pronounced in the video game market; 80% of video game 
sales in the U.K., for example, stem from digital transactions.43 And 
in the U.S. market, the share of digital sales has increased from 20% 
in 2009 to an astounding 83% in 2018.44 Analysts similarly predict 
that by 2022 video games “will be 100% digital.”45 The picture is 
 
economy of time, where better players get to play longer games. Arcade games were thus 
designed to get players “to part, and keep parting, with their quarters.” Charles Bernstein, 
Play It Again, Pac-Man, in THE MEDIUM OF THE VIDEO GAME 155, 157 (Mark J. Wolf & 
Bernard Perron eds., 1991). 
39 See, e.g., Downloadable Content for Tekken 7, STEAM, https://store.steam 
powered.com/dlc/389730/TEKKEN_7/ [https://perma.cc/WL88-TRZ6] (listing different 
content packages that can be downloaded for the game Tekken 7). 
40 See Bloom, supra note 34. 
41 Id. 
42 Andrei Maxim & Alexandru Maxim, The Role of E-Books in Reshaping the 
Publishing Industry, 62 PROCEDIA–SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 1046 (2012); PWC, TURNING THE 
PAGE: THE FUTURE OF EBOOKS (2010); David Pierce, The Kindle Changed the Book 
Business. Can It Change Books?, WIRED (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/ 
can-amazon-change-books/ [https://perma.cc/9PPW-FJRQ]. 
43 Wesley Yin-Poole, UK Video Game Sales Now 80% Digital, EUROGAMER (Jan. 3, 
2019), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2019-01-03-uk-video-game-sales-now-80-perc 
ent-digital [https://perma.cc/742G-R9SU]. 
44 STATISTA RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, BREAKDOWN OF U.S. COMPUTER AND VIDEO 
GAME SALES FROM 2009 TO 2017, BY DELIVERY FORMAT (2019). 
45 Robin Burks, Video Games Will Be 100% Digital by 2022 Says Analysts, GAME NEWS 
(June 26, 2018), https://screenrant.com/video-games-digital-revenue/  [https://perma.cc/ 
G2UW-QFVJ]. Another report estimates that digital sales will account for 93% of the 
market by 2021. Chad Sapieha, Digital Sales to Account for Nearly 93% of All Video Game 
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clear: digital games have toppled physical-form games to claim do-
minion over the video game market. 
B. Video Games as a Service 
The growing popularity of digital games has inspired a related 
shift from a lump-sum pricing model to a service-based pricing 
scheme. Broadly speaking, game publishers rely on three pricing 
models: (1) a lump sum (flat fee) model; (2) a subscription scheme; 
and (3) a free-to-play model.46  
A lump sum model involves one-off transactions where the con-
sumer purchases a copy of the game, either digital or physical, in 
exchange for a single, fixed payment.47 By contrast, under a sub-
scription model, consumers make monthly payments in exchange 
for ongoing access to the game. Subscription models are most prev-
alent in the context of multiplayer online games.48 These are games 
in which multiple players engage with each other in a massive online 
world. To access these games, players must pay a monthly subscrip-
tion fee.49 And, unlike erstwhile games of the 1980s, multiplayer 
online games are meant to be played for years, not days or weeks.50 
Players establish “clans” or “guilds,” build communities, and foster 
long-lasting relationships.51 The online world that animates these 
games is rich. It consistently evolves through “expansion packages”: 
 
Sales by 2021: Report, FIN. POST (June 29, 2017), https://financialpost.com/ 
technology/gaming/digital-sales-to-account-for-nearly-93-of-all-game-sales-by-2021-rep 
ort [https://perma.cc/J6M7-KYE4]. See also Robert Workman, Digital Game Sales Reach 
All Time High During Black Friday Weekend, COMICBOOK (Dec. 2, 2018), https://comic 
book.com/gaming/news/digital-game-sales-all-time-high-cyber-monday-black-friday/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4GU-888T]; Jessica Conditt, Console Gaming is at a Crossroads, 
ENGADGET (Apr. 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/7XZD-DL5Y] (observing that 2013 was “the 
first year that digital video game sales overtook physical, claiming 54 percent of the 
market”). 
46 Kuehl, supra note 15, at 324–28. 
47 Id. at 324–25. 
48 Id. at 325. 
49 Id.  
50 Stuart, supra note 7 (observing that “[t]he last five years have also seen the emergence 
of games designed to be played, not just for a few days, but for years”). 
51  Helena Cole & Mark D. Griffiths, Social Interactions in Massively Multiplayer 
Online Role-Playing Gamers, 10 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 575, 575 (2007) 
(finding that multiplayer games provide opportunities to form strong relationships, with 
“high percentages of gamers making life-long friends…”). 
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periodic updates that inject additional content (such as plotlines or 
characters) into the game’s preexisting digital world, thus generat-
ing a constant stream of new content to keep consumers engaged 
over time.52 
This subscription model mirrors the broader move toward ser-
vice-oriented transactions. Indeed, digital contents are increasingly 
licensed to consumers in the guise of a service—an ongoing, long-
term commercial relationship where consumers pay a monthly fee 
in exchange for a license to access information goods. Similar trends 
have emerged in the music industry, for example, where consumers 
pay monthly fees to access enormous content libraries offered by 
aggregators such as Apple Music or Spotify.53 
Nonetheless, the service-oriented revolution of the digital era 
runs counter to the romantic vision of copyright law, which contem-
plates a standalone artist selling her work through one-off transac-
tions.54 The shift toward service-like transactions is troublesome 
from a consumer perspective. For one thing, consumers must rely 
on the content provider for continued access to the licensed content. 
Consumers might lose access to such content if, say, the content pro-
vider changes its business model, goes out of business, revokes the 
consumers’ subscription, or is otherwise forced to remove certain 
contents from its library.55 Indeed, in a number of recent high-profile 
 
52 OSCAR CLARK, GAMES AS A SERVICE: HOW FREE TO PLAY DESIGN CAN MAKE BETTER 
GAMES 7 (2014) (pointing out that free-to-play games require “a commitment long after 
the release of the game to sustain it with new content, events, and features.”). 
53 Apple Music, for example, commands a catalogue of some 70 million songs—with a 
monthly subscription fee ranging from $5 to $15. See Apple Music, APPLE, 
https://www.apple.com/apple-music/ [https://perma.cc/N9PB-CN2R]. 
54 See Martin Kretschmer, Digital Copyright: The End of an Era, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 333 (2003); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
“Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L. J. 455 (1991); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the 
Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author”, 17 
EIGHTEEN CENTURY STUDIES 425 (1984). 
55 Consider, for example, Amazon’s decision to remotely delete purchased copies of 
George Orwell’s book NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR following a dispute with the publisher of 
Orwell’s books. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18am 
azon.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QZZ3-5HLN]; see generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & 
JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 
(2016). 
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instances, video game developers have banned players for allegedly 
violating the terms of service.56 
Service providers can similarly limit the ability of consumers to 
make full use of licensed contents. Although many consumers wish 
to download copies of the contents they consume,57 service provid-
ers routinely cap the number of copies, if any, that consumers may 
retain.58 And consumers are also restricted in their capacity to access 
content on third-party platforms. For example, while Apple allows 
consumers to download copies of Apple Music songs, these copies 
can only be accessed on Apple-approved platforms.59 
To be sure, consumers often fail to discern the difference be-
tween ownership and licensing.60 An oft-neglected reality of the dig-
ital age is that consumers rarely acquire title to the digital contents 
 
56 See Mallory Busch, World of Warcraft Bans ‘A Large Number’ of Players, TIME (May 
15, 2015), https://time.com/3860623/world-warcraft-ban/ [https://perma.cc/RT7L-7SKQ]; 
Robert N. Adams, World Of Warcraft Bans Issued for Players Who Exploited Leveling 
Potions, GAMEREVOLUTION (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.gamerevolution.com/news/ 
514191-world-of-warcraft-bans-draught-of-ten-lands  [https://perma.cc/N89N-74RS]; 
Blog, All Reasons for Which You Can Get Banned from WoW, UNBANSTER  (July 8, 2018), 
https://unbanster.com/reasons-banned-from-wow/ [https://perma.cc/QPD6-RTY7] 
(reporting that revocations of accounts in World of Warcraft usually “come in waves”); 
Daniel Terdiman, ‘World of Warcraft’ Bans Raise Players’ Ire, CNET (Mar. 22, 2007), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/world-of-warcraft-bans-raise-players-ire/ [https://perma.cc/ 
MG8E-QLDR]; Jon Fingas, Epic Banned over 1,200 ‘Fortnite’ World Cup Players for 
Cheating, ENGADGET (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019-04-20-epic-bans-
1200-fortnite-world-cup-players.html [https://perma.cc/6KFB-VVUY]. 
57 Surveys show that consumers are particularly troubled by the prospect of being 
prevented from making private copies of various digital goods. NICOLE DUFFT ET AL., 
INDICARE, DIGITAL VIDEO USAGE AND DRM, RESULTS FROM A EUROPEAN CONSUMER 
SURVEY 26–28 (2006). 
58 Netflix, for example, limits the number of copies that consumers may download. 
Downloading TV Shows and Movies on Netflix—Help Center, NETFLIX, 
https://help.netflix.com/en/node/54816 [https://perma.cc/J9VZ-PG8Y]. 
59 How to Play Apple Music on Windows Media Player, M4VGEAR, 
[https://perma.cc/DL84-K3GA] (explaining that Apple Music songs are in M4P format 
with Apple FairPlay DRM protection, which restricts one from playing Apple Music on 
common media players, such as Windows Media Player, Plex, and VLC Media Player). 
60 See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy when We 
Buy Now, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (2017). Perzanowski and Hoofnagle suggest that 
consumers are oblivious to the significance of the distinction between licensing and 
ownership. This misconception is reinforced by sellers like Amazon that employ “Buy 
Now” banners to mislead consumers into thinking they are purchasing digital goods, 
despite the fact that they are merely obtaining a limited license to access these goods. 
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they consume. Instead, they obtain a limited license to access such 
contents. One example is Amazon’s Kindle service. Consumers are 
largely unaware that by “purchasing” books via Kindle they are 
merely obtaining a revocable license to access these books.61 A li-
censing regime of this sort confers on consumers only a limited ar-
ray of rights, subject to various limitations. For instance, consumers 
are often contractually prevented from reselling, lending or other-
wise transferring contents they had licensed.62 And, of course, con-
sumers also face the risk of losing access to such contents if, say, 
the content provider revokes their license or is forced to remove cer-
tain contents from its library.63 
 
61 Suw Charman-Anderson, Amazon Ebooks Are Borrowed, Not Bought, FORBES (Oct. 
23, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/suwcharmananderson/2012/10/23/amazon-
ebooks-are-borrowed-not-bought/ [https://perma.cc/8JXT-C8LP]; Joel Johnson, You 
Don’t Own Your Kindle Books, Amazon Reminds Customer, NBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/technolog/you-dont-own-your-kindle-books-amazon-reminds-
customer-1C6626211 [https://perma.cc/SS9B-ALPK]; Michael Hiltzik, E-Book 
Restrictions Leave ‘Buyers’ With Few Rights, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2012), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-xpm-2012-dec-22-la-fi-hiltzik-20121223-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/BU9X-5HD8]. 
62 Copyright law entitles consumers to resell copies of protected works without 
permission from the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). This entitlement arises under the 
longstanding first sale doctrine, grounded in the principle that the owner’s rights are 
exhausted upon the first sale of a copy, thus allowing subsequent consumers to transfer 
copies as they see fit. Nonetheless, the first sale doctrine does not apply to consumers of 
the sort described above. Rights provided under Section 109 of the Copyright Act 
specifically attach to “the owner of a particular copy.” Licensees are therefore excluded 
from the reach of Section 109. See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital 
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 901–07 (2011) (discussing the marginalization of 
copyright exhaustion in the age of digital distribution). Consistent with principles of 
copyright exhaustion, Section 117 of the Copyright Act similarly authorizes consumers 
who own copies of software programs to make adaptations of that software. 17 U.S.C. § 
117(a). In this context, too, licensees are barred from making adaptations according to the 
language of Section 117 . 
63 Another troubling case is that of Linn Nygaard, an IT consultant from Norway who 
woke up one day to find that her entire Amazon Kindle library had been wiped clean. Citing 
“abuse of [] policies,” Amazon informed Nygaard that her account had been revoked. An 
avid Kindle consumer, Nygaard was understandably distraught; she received no prior 
warning and was never given a reason for the revocation of her account. Her entire library, 
encompassing dozens of books, inexplicably evaporated overnight. See, e.g., Michelle 
Jaworski, Amazon Restores Kindle User’s Mysteriously-Deleted Account, Still No 
Explanation, THE DAILY DOT (Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.dailydot.com/news 
/amazon-linn-nygaard-deleted-account-restored/  [https://perma.cc/65GA-AQKM]. 
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This discussion homes in on two pricing models: lump-sum and 
subscription models. And yet these models have been gradually dis-
placed by a third pricing scheme: free-to-play games. A case in point 
is Blizzard’s World of Warcraft (WoW).64 At its zenith, WoW was 
the most popular subscription-based video game in the world, with 
a consumer base of ten million active players and 100 million regis-
tered accounts in 2009.65 By 2017, the game banked just shy of ten 
billion dollars, making it the most successful video game franchise 
of all time.66 In recent years, however, WoW’s popularity has been 
dwindling. Analysts predict that the number of WoW subscribers 
will fall to 4.5 million players by 2023.67 And WoW’s demise is 
attributable to a larger trend: subscription models are largely ceding 
ground to free-to-play games. 
Free-to-play games, also known as “freemium” games,68 have 
grown immensely popular in recent years. These games typically 
span multiple ecosystems69 and can be downloaded and accessed 
online.70 Freemium games are particularly abundant on 
 
64 See Hilde G. Corneliussen & Jill Walker Rettberg, Introduction, in DIGITAL CULTURE, 
PLAY, AND IDENTITY: A WORLD OF WARCRAFT READER 1, 5 (Hilde Corneliussen & Jill 
Walker Rettberg eds., 2008). 
65 Samit Sarkar, Blizzard Reaches 100M Lifetime World of Warcraft Accounts, POLYGON 
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.polygon.com/2014/1/28/5354856/world-of-warcraft-100m-
accounts-lifetime [https://perma.cc/C69C-6Z4T]. 
66 Jonathan Leack, World of Warcraft Leads Industry with Nearly $10 Billion In 
Revenue, GAMEREVOLUTION (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.gamerevolution.com/features/ 
13510-world-of-warcraft-leads-industry-with-nearly-10-billion-in-revenue [https://perma. 
cc/NB4M-G5HF#/slide/1]. 
67 See Statista Research Department, Number of World of Warcraft (WoW) Subscribers 
from 2015 to 2023 (In Millions), STATISTA (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.statista.com/ 
statistics/276601/number-of-world-of-warcraft-subscribers-by-quarter/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YF9L-QNLA]. 
68 Elizabeth Evans, The Economics of Free: Freemium Games, Branding and the 
Impatience Economy, 22 CONVERGENCE: THE INT’L J. OF RSCH. INTO NEW MEDIA TECHS. 
563 (2015). 
69 Whitson Gordon, PlayStation or Xbox: Which Game Console Should You Gift?, NBC 
NEWS (Oct. 28, 2020, 11:40 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/shopping/tech-gadgets/new-
ps5-xbox-series-x-n1245059 [https://perma.cc/XH7X-MPBS] (noting that, although some 
games are available exclusively on specific platforms, “most video games come out for 
both PlayStation and Xbox (as well as desktop PCs)…”). 
70 See Eva-Maria Scholz, Business Models for Digital Goods: Video Games (Free-To-
Play Games), IPDIGIT (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.ipdigit.eu/2015/03/business-models-
for-digital-goods-video-games-free-to-play-games/ [https://perma.cc/6SR9-BTFU]. 
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smartphones, with Candy Crash Saga being the most prominent ex-
ample.71 And while these games are technically free, they generate 
revenue through premium (optional) in-game purchases, often la-
beled microtransactions.72 Tellingly, in-game purchases are far 
more lucrative, on balance, than pre-paid games. In-app purchases 
“generated ten times more revenue than advertising for games and 
substantially more than pre-paid games.”73 
The costs of developing a top-tier video game are comparable to 
those of producing a feature film74 and so developers have tradition-
ally resisted the idea of giving away content for free. But that may 
be changing. In fact, recent freemium games have proven stagger-
ingly profitable. Games like Fortnite and Apex Legends, the two 
largest free-to-play games in the world as of 2019, have remained 
firmly atop the sales charts for months.75 
 
71 Dean Takahashi, Candy Crush Saga: 2.73 Billion Downloads in Five Years and Still 
Counting, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 17, 2017, 9:15 AM), https://venturebeat.com/ 
2017/11/17/candy-crush-saga-2-73-billion-downloads-in-five-years-and-still-counting/ 
[https://perma.cc/9SP2-BKAY]; Matt Kamen, Five Years On, How Does Candy Crush 
Keep on Crushing It?, WIRED (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/king-
candy-crush-anniversary [https://perma.cc/KHB6-7GCX]; Stuart Dredge, Why is Candy 
Crush Saga So Popular?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2014/mar/26/candy-crush-saga-king-why-popular [https://perma.cc/6DT 
T-2DS6]. 
72 Nenad Zoran Tomić, Economic Model of Microtransactions in Video Games, 1 J. 
ECON. SCI. RSCH.17, 18 (2019) (“In gaming terminology, games that are basically obtained 
free are called free-to-play games, or freemium games, and all purchases that are 
subsequently performed are called microtransactions.”). 
73 Kuehl, supra note 15, at 327 (citing Alexandra McDonald, Jason McDonell, & 
Caroline Mitchell, Mobile Apps: Redefining the Virtual California Economy and the Laws 
That Govern It, 24 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 86, 88 
(2015)). 
74 See, e.g., Luke Villapaz, ‘GTA 5’ Costs $265 Million to Develop and Market,  
Making It the Most Expensive Video Game Ever Produced: Report, INT’L BUS.  
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013), https://www.ibtimes.com/gta-5-costs-265-million-develop-market-
making-it-most-expensive-video-game-ever-produced-report [https://perma.cc/NAW3-
BT4Y]. 
75 Phil Hornshaw, Fortnite vs. Apex Legends: Comparing Two Titans of Battle Royale, 
GAMESPOT (Apr. 5, 2019, 4:49 PM), https://www.gamespot.com/gallery/fortnite-vs-apex-
legends-comparing-two-titans-of-b/2900-2569/ [https://perma.cc/5V5N-V9PA] (reporting 
that while Fortnite is still the most popular free-to-play game, Apex Legends is quickly 
catching up and has drawn 50 million players in its first month). 
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Framed in economic terms, in-game purchases are profitable be-
cause they are not salient. The net effect is that consumers tend to 
believe that free-to-play games cost less than what they actually 
do.76 Consumers hence fail to fully account for the costs of in-game 
microtransactions. Behavioral economists have long recognized that 
consumers are beset by a battery of systemic failures, most notably 
myopia and over-optimism.77 Sellers respond to these shortcomings 
by (a) crafting extraordinarily complex contracts, and (b) relying on 
deferred cost schemes.78 Complex contracts offer multidimensional 
benefits and charge multidimensional prices. Credit card contracts, 
for example, are markedly complex: they offer annual fees, basic 
interest rates, default interest rates, late fees, cash-advance fees, con-
venience and service fees, and so forth.79 By offering multidimen-
sional prices, credit card issuers make it nigh impossible for con-
sumers to accurately assess the costs of engaging in the transac-
tion.80 And so consumers are only able to ascertain salient price di-
mensions—usually, the low “teaser” rates—while overlooking other 
price dimensions. These low introductory (up-front) teaser rates 
serve to obscure higher rates that are typically tucked into the 
backend of the contract. The upshot is that consumers take note of 
 
76 See Kuehl, supra note 15, at 327 (“What makes in-app purchases interesting is that 
many consumers believe the game costs less than in normal circumstances even though it 
is actually more expensive.”). 
77 Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The Card Act and Beyond, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 975–77 (2012) (discussing myopia and optimism as cognitive biases 
that limit consumers’ capacity to observe future costs). 
78 OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS 6–10, 17–23 (2012) (suggesting that sellers draft contracts in 
response to consumers’ systemic cognitive biases). 
79 Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 77. 
80 Id. at 1005–07. As Bar-Gill and Bubb observe:  
[t]he behavioral theory posits that issuers offer teaser interest rates to 
lower the perceived price of a given contract. Teaser rates lower the 
perceived price to consumers because many of them are optimistic 
about their ability to pay off an accumulated balance at the expiration 
of the introductory period and consequently underestimate the 
probability that they will continue to carry a positive balance after the 
introductory period expires. 
Id. at 1006. See also BAR-GILL, supra note 78, at 18–21 (recognizing that “[s]ellers design 
contracts in response to systematic biases and misperceptions of imperfectly rational 
consumers. In particular, they reduce the total price, as perceived by consumers, by 
decreasing salient prices and increasing non-salient prices.”). 
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the former (salient teaser rates) while glossing over the latter (non-
salient backend costs). 
At the same time, consumers also tend to systemically underes-
timate the probability that future, seemingly far-removed costs 
would apply to them. In the credit card example, consumers are 
likely to assume, often despite evidence to the contrary, that they 
wouldn’t incur late fees. Because consumers are overoptimistic and 
myopic, they are prone to misjudge the likelihood that contingent, 
deferred costs would befall them. And they tend to discount the 
probability of incurring future costs or triggering contingent penal-
ties. These systemic shortcomings limit consumers’ capacity to as-
sess the costs arising out of a given transaction, and sellers respond 
by making it harder still to understand the overly complex contracts 
that govern these transactions. Sellers do so, in part, through the use 
of a multilayered pricing scheme. 
The use of microtransactions falls squarely within this behav-
ioral framework. Though free-to-play games are technically free, 
they offer optional features—typically, cosmetic enhancements—
that consumers can purchase with in-game currency. There are two 
ways to obtain in-game currency: players can either buy it or instead 
play the game and earn in-game currency by completing in-game 
challenges. But, as a practical matter, the possibility of earning in-
game currency through actual gameplay is elusive. Players often 
have to spend months playing the game to earn only a negligible 
amount of in-game currency.81 The process is slow and frustrating, 
and many players ultimately prefer to simply purchase in-game cur-
rency. Elizabeth Evans has argued that developers are leveraging 
“the economics of impatience,”82 taking advantage of players’ im-
patience by offering them a shortcut—players can simply purchase 
 
81 See Prateek Agarwal, Economics of Microtransactions in Video Games, INTELLIGENT 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/microtransactions/ 
[https://perma.cc/U9F4-YPNW] (noting that game developers make in-game rewards 
particularly hard to collect, primarily because these games are ultimately designed “for 
people to spend money”). 
82 Evans, supra note 68, at 576–77. See also MIA CONSALVO, CHEATING: GAINING 
ADVANTAGE IN VIDEOGAMES 162 (2007) (“For many players, there isn’t enough time in 
their schedules to play as much as they’d like, or they are in a hurry to acquire items or 
skill levels as soon as possible—sooner than normal gameplay allows.”). 
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in-game currency, thus sidestepping the arduous process associated 
with earning currency through lengthy gameplay. 
This dynamic is fueled by consumer psychology. Microtransac-
tions are not salient to consumers. Indeed, while the up-front price 
of a video game is salient, down-the-line microtransactions are not. 
People fail to fully consider future microtransactions when they 
make the decision to download the game and start playing it. And 
even when future costs do figure into this initial calculus, consumers 
tend to underestimate how often they would actually make in-game 
purchases over an extended period of time. And the fact that players 
can technically earn in-game currency by simply playing the game 
is likely to further compound this problem by creating the initial im-
pression that microtransactions can be avoided altogether. Further, 
microtransactions typically take the form of small increments, with 
each transaction averaging only a few dollars.83 This again clouds 
the aggregate costs associated with microtransactions in the long 
run. People are myopic and are thus unlikely to accurately assess the 
aggregate amount of money they will spend on in-game purchases 
over an extended period of time. 
Finally, as discussed before, game developers deploy a system 
of in-game currency to further mask the true costs of acquiring in-
game goods.84 Consumers are less likely to appreciate how much 
money they are actually spending when they feel as if they are 
spending digital, rather than real, money.85 The conversion rate be-
tween real-world and in-game currency also fluctuates frequently, 
depending on various “seasonal deals” offered to consumers.86 The 
 
83 Tomić, supra note 72, at 18 (“[M]ost of the applications for mobile operating systems 
are sold at a price that falls under the category of micropayment—usually only a few 
dollars.”). 
84 Vanshika Dhyani, The Psychology of Freemium Games, UX PLANET (June 8, 2020), 
https://uxplanet.org/the-psychology-of-freemium-games-69024d80273b [https://perma.cc 
/K3MZ-595K]. 
85 Id. (observing that “games use a virtual equivalent of real money (coins, gems, hearts, 
etc.) to create a psychological barrier between virtual spending and real currency spent”). 
86 Geoffrey Goetz, Why Free-To-Play App Pricing is So Effective, and What You Can 
Do About It, GIGAOM (Aug. 24, 2013), https://gigaom.com/2013/08/24/why-free-to-play-
app-pricing-is-so-effective-and-what-you-can-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/J65J-HUGT]. 
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use of multiple conversion rates between real-world money and in-
game currency serves to foster the illusion of getting a better deal.87  
In sum, free-to-play games are attractive to consumers because 
their salient price appears to be low—much lower than it actually is. 
They generate revenues, therefore, through their nonsalient price di-
mensions, namely in-game microtransactions. 
A note on the scope of the preceding analysis. First, this inquiry 
is merely explanatory. I do not mean to suggest that free-to-play 
games are normatively undesirable. While freemium games differ 
meaningfully from pre-paid games, a full exploration of their merits 
is beyond the scope of this Article. It’s also important to note that, 
ultimately, players seem to derive a great deal of utility from the 
premium digital contents they acquire. One recent study found that 
78% of those who had spent $50 or more on in-game purchases felt 
like they had received “their money’s worth” and were generally 
pleased with their experience.88 Second, although I certainly find 
this behavioral account persuasive, I argue that other factors are also 
at play. As I suggest below, ideas of fairness are equally important 
when considering the commercial success of free-to-play games and 
the viability of the business strategy that underlies them. 
Third, as this discussion illustrates, free-to-play games consti-
tute an ongoing service. In the case of free-to-play games, the rela-
tionship between consumers and video game makers is ongoing: to 
fully access all of the game’s features, including any additional “pre-
mium” cosmetic designs, players must buy into the provider’s ser-
vice by constantly making in-game purchases. Video game creators, 
for their part, also view these games as part of a long-term service, 
and work to regularly release new (premium) digital contents that 
would keep consumers engaged for a sustained period of time. The 
critiques levelled against subscription models therefore apply with 
equal force to free-to-play games. In particular, players must 
 
87 Id. 
88 Matthew Diener, Exclusive: 78% of Mobile Gamers Spending $50+ on IAP Say 
They’ve Received ‘Their Money’s Worth’, POCKET GAMER (Aug. 19, 2013, 6:30 PM), 
https://www.pocketgamer.biz/news/53063/exclusive-78-of-mobile-gamers-spending-50-
on-iap-say-theyve-received-their-moneys-worth/ [https://perma.cc/NF2C-QB4K]. 
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shoulder the potential risk of losing access to the game, say, when 
they allegedly violate its terms of service. 
Fourth, this discussion is somewhat perfunctory. It does not con-
sider alternative revenue streams for game makers. Indeed, some de-
velopers collect and sell data about consumer habits,89 while others 
rely on advertisements.90 Moreover, my analysis does not engage 
with the concerns that attend the exploitative nature of in-app pur-
chases in games marketed at children.91 Finally, this discussion does 
not account for the differences between games played on mobile 
phones and those played on other platforms;92 rather, it focuses on 
the most conspicuous aspects shared by both. 
C. Pro Gaming and Gameplay Streaming 
Equipped with an understanding of the industry’s prevailing 
pricing structure, we can now explore two related phenomena: com-
petitive gaming and gameplay streams. 
Competitive gaming is an ascendant trend. Competitive gamers, 
often called “professional gamers,” are video game players who reg-
ularly participate in gaming tournaments.93 They compete for pro-
fessional prestige, intra-community recognition, and money: gam-
ing tournaments offer hefty monetary prize pools, sometimes to the 
 
89 McDonald, McDonell, & Mitchell, supra note 73, at 88 (“Apps can access a mobile-
device-user’s contacts, text messages, photos and videos, credit card information, and even 
facial features. They can then combine user data with the mobile device’s unique ID, 
wireless signals, and geolocation history to create a down-to-the-minute profile of any user, 
whether or not an app is open or in use.”). 
90 Id. at 87. 
91 A number of class actions have been brought against Apple and Google for promoting 
games that facilitate in-game purchases by minors. See, e.g., In re Apple In-App Purchase 
Litig., 855 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Imber-Gluck v. Google, Inc., No. 5:14-
01070-RMW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98899 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2014). Both cases are 
referenced in McDonald, McDonell, & Mitchell, supra note 73. 
92 See Anna Tobin, Is Mobile Phone Gaming Taking Over From Console Gaming?, 
FORBES (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:41 AM), [https://perma.cc/HY8E-EABA] (observing that a 
number of factors—including ease of use, lower prices, and interoperability—have 
contributed to the popularity of mobile games as compared to traditional video games). 
93 Juho Hamari & Max Sjöblom, What Is Esports and Why Do People Watch It?, 27 
INTERNET RSCH. 211, 211 (2017). 
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tune of millions of dollars.94 Many tournaments are held at massive 
convention centers that accommodate a diverse crowd of players, 
game developers, and spectators.95 Tournaments are frequently pro-
moted as part of a professional “tour” or “series,” where players can 
win ranking points and qualify for the tour finals. The 2019 Fortnite 
tour finals, for example, boasted a stunning prize pool of $100 mil-
lion.96 In the past few years, gaming tournaments have been 
streamed regularly on YouTube and Twitch, and occasionally aired 
on ESPN.97 These tournaments have attracted millions of viewers.98 
At times, gaming tournaments have overshadowed some of the big-
gest sporting events in the world, such as the NCAA finals.99 
The analogy between competitive gaming and professional 
sports strikes a familiar chord. Competitive gaming has long been 
stylized as a form of “eSports,” or electronic sports. Juho Hamari 
and Max Sjöblom define eSports as “a form of sports where the pri-
mary aspects of the sport are facilitated by electronic systems.”100 
Michael Wagner marshals a more substantive definition that turns 
on the unique skills that competitive players possess. He defines eS-
ports as “an area of sport activities in which people develop and train 
mental or physical abilities in the use of information and communi-
cation technologies.”101 
 
94 Sam Nordmark & Jerome Heath, The Top 10 Highest Prize Pools in Esports, DOT 
ESPORTS (Jan. 18, 2021), https://dotesports.com/general/news/biggest-prize-pools-esports-
14605 [https://perma.cc/JX6Y-SR9P]. 
95 See David Bloom, Esports Stadiums Are Popping Up Everywhere, FORBES (May 31, 
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dbloom/2019/05/31/esports-stadiums-are-popping-
up-everywhere/?sh=305a38f92521 [https://perma.cc/YA7K-W4Q8]. 
96 Jordan Crook, Fortnite Goes Big on Esports for 2019 with 100 Million Prize Pool, 
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 22, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/22/fortnite-goes-big-on-
esports-for-2019-with-100-million-prize-pool/ [https://perma.cc/C8JX-UXP6]. 
97 Steven Impey, Most-Watched Esports Events Record 190.1m Streaming Hours, 
SPORTSPRO (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/esports-tournaments-
record-live-streaming-hours [https://perma.cc/57Y4-HZL6]. 
98 See id. 
99 Jennifer Booton, 27 Million Watched This Video Game Tournament—Matching 
NCAA Final Audience, MARKET WATCH (July 29, 2015), https://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/a-new-sports-industry-is-blossoming-online-and-its-already-worth-billions-2015-05 
-29 [https://perma.cc/PND3-S2DS]. 
100 Hamari & Sjöblom, supra note 93, at 211. 
101 Michael G. Wagner, On the Scientific Relevance of Esports, INT’L CONF. ON INTERNET 
COMPUTING 437, 440 (2006). 
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What motivates gamers to become competitive players? Jo 
Bryce and Jason Rutter claim that the upsurge in competitive gam-
ing springs from the social qualities of gaming. They observe that, 
“[i]f public gaming events were only about gaming,” we would see 
“a diminishment of [public gaming] events” following the rise of 
online games.102 Donghun Lee and Linda Schoenstedt contend that 
competitive drive is one of the principal motives that galvanize peo-
ple to engage in eSports gaming.103 For eSports gamers, they ex-
plain, “it is important…to be better than others, to win over others, 
and to be faster and more skilled in their game experience.”104 Other 
commentators have likened competitive gamers to chess players, 
suggesting that professional gamers need to “demonstrate persis-
tence, discipline, and intelligence; perform with extraordinary com-
petence under intense pressure and scrutiny; work cooperatively 
with fellow workers or teammates; and achieve a high level of fi-
nancial success.”105 
But competitive gaming is not just about competition. It’s also 
about the social experience that results from interactions between 
fellow gamers. “Part of the attraction of public gaming events,”106 
Bryce and Rutter note, “is not just to be challenged and compete but 
to be seen to do so.”107 Indeed, it is about the underlying impulse to 
“make eye contact with other members of the gaming commu-
nity.”108 Relatedly, some commentators have tried to understand 
why people watch competitive gaming. Hamari and Sjöblom, for 
example, point to a number of factors that play a role in stimulating 
eSports viewership.109 They claim that escapism, the urge to acquire 
 
102 See Jo Bryce & Jason Rutter, In the Game— In the Flow: Presence in Public Computer 
Gaming (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at [https://perma.cc/7NDD-QRVV]. 
103 Donghun Lee & Linda J. Schoenstedt, Comparison of eSports and Traditional Sports 
Consumption Motives, 6 ICHPER-SD J. RSCH. 39 (2011). 
104 Id.  
105 Kyle Faust et al., Competitive and Professional Gaming: Discussing Potential 
Benefits of Scientific Study, 3 INT’L J. CYBER BEHAV. PSYCH. & LEARNING 67, 67 (2013). 
106 Bryce & Rutter, supra note 102. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Hamari & Sjöblom, supra note 93, at 214–17.  
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knowledge about the games being played, novelty, and athlete ag-
gressiveness all have a positive impact on eSports viewership.110 
The emergence of competitive gaming has occasioned yet an-
other related phenomenon: live gameplay streaming. Gameplay 
streams are live (real-time) videos of people playing video games.111 
These streams are typically run by the players themselves; in fact, 
players can stream directly from a variety of gaming consoles (such 
as PlayStation or Xbox) without access to an actual computer.112 
The most popular platforms for live gaming streams are Twitch.tv 
and YouTube.113 The former, a subsidiary of Amazon,114 is the more 
popular of the two.115 Introduced in 2011, Twitch grew into a mas-
sive streaming behemoth almost instantaneously.116 The website 
was the fourth largest source of peak Internet traffic in the United 
States in 2014, ahead of such industry giants as Facebook and 
Hulu.117 Millions of people stream on Twitch monthly, and millions 
more watch these streams. With an average of 6.9 million monthly 
streamers and almost 2.1 million concurrent viewers at any given 
 
110 Id. at 211. 
111 Keith Stuart, Fights, Camera, Action: The Beginner’s Guide to Streaming Video 
Games, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/games/ 
2020/aug/17/beginners-guide-to-streaming-video-games [https://perma.cc/G5Y5-RMBL] 
(“Streaming a game means broadcasting yourself via the internet while you play, so that 
other people can watch you on their computer, phone or games console.”). 
112 Id. 
113 Jurre Pannekeet, More People Are Streaming on Twitch, but YouTube Is the Platform 
of Choice for Mobile-Game Streamers, NEWZOO (Feb. 14, 2019), 
https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/more-people-are-streaming-on-twitch-but-youtube-
is-the-platform-of-choice-for-mobile-game-streamers/ [https://perma.cc/LB4L-6JB6]. 
114 See Eugene Kim, Amazon Buys Twitch for $970 Million in Cash, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 
25, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-buys-twitch-2014-8 [https://perma. 
cc/G8N2-3U5K]. 
115 Steve Boxer, Youtube Live Makes Inroads into Twitch’s Streaming Domination, 
GREEN MAN GAMING (Apr. 23, 2019), [https://perma.cc/TN64-N7RX]. 
116 David Hoppe, The Rise and Importance of Twitch in Esports, GAMMA LAW (June 9, 
2018), https://gammalaw.com/the_rise_and_importance_of_twitch_in_esports/ [https:// 
perma.cc/62SD-46N7]. 
117 Emanuel Maiberg, Twitch Ranked 4th in Peak Internet Traffic, Ahead of Valve, 
Facebook, Hulu, GAMESPOT (Feb. 9, 2014, 2:34 PM), https://www.gamespot.com/ 
articles/twitch-ranked-4th-in-peak-internet-traffic-ahead-of-valve-facebook-hulu/1100-64 
17621/ [https://perma.cc/E37G-AABM]. 
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moment,118 Twitch is one of the most widely watched platforms in 
the world, surpassing most television networks. 
Twitch allows players to launch their own streaming channels. 
Viewers can subscribe to these channels by paying a modest 
monthly fee.119 This enables subscribers to obtain access to a range 
of customized emojis, called “emotes.”120 Each channel features an 
active chat session, a “stream chat,” where casual viewers, follow-
ers, and subscribers can interact.121 The stream chat typically inhab-
its a rectangular pane that stretches across the right side of the 
screen. These channels—and their stream chats—are home to di-
verse subcommunities that bind together members of various gam-
ing communities. As I explain in greater detail below, Twitch effec-
tively serves as a global locus for vibrant gaming communities. 
To illustrate, consider the Twitch channel run by notable Fort-
nite streamer Tyler Blevins, most commonly known by his online 
alias “Ninja.”122 Having launched his Twitch channel in 2009, 
Blevins initially streamed various multiplayer online games before 
switching over to Fortnite shortly after the game’s launch in 
2017.123 His popularity quickly soared. As of June 2019, he is the 
most widely followed streamer on Twitch, with over fourteen mil-
lion followers.124 He streams daily, typically for stretches of up to 
 
118 Twitch Statistics & Charts, TWITCH TRACKER, https://twitchtracker.com/ 
statistics [https://perma.cc/UXK6-BDLL]. 
119 Brad Stephenson, Twitch Subscriptions: How They Work, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 11, 2020), 
https://www.lifewire.com/twitch-subscriptions-4147319 [https://perma.cc/VEL9-7WBS]. 
120 See Preston Byers and Gökhan Çakır, A Guide to the Most Popular Twitch Emotes, 
DOT ESPORTS (Mar. 29, 2020), https://dotesports.com/culture/news/twitch-emotes-
meaning-guide-23140 [https://perma.cc/4L93-Q8HK]. 
121 Sarah Perez, Twitch Launches Always-On Chat Rooms for Channels, TECH CRUNCH 
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/15/twitch-launches-always-on-chat-
rooms-for-channels/ [https://perma.cc/6S67-9A2L]. 
122 Natalie Jarvey, Superstar Gamer Tyler “Ninja” Blevins Sets a Course for Hollywood, 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (July 31, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6TFU-2R7E]. 
123 Timothy J. Seppala, ‘Fortnite’ Streamer Ninja Is the First to 10 Million Twitch 
Followers, ENGADGET (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018-08-03-ninja-10-
million-twitch-followers.html [https://perma.cc/R57Z-TLVE]. 
124 Kevin Webb, Ninja Wants to Be More Than Just ‘The Fortnite Guy,’ But the World’s 
Most Popular Gamer is Headed into Uncharted Territory, BUS. INSIDER (June 2, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/ninja-fortnite-guy-pro-gamers-streamers-2019-5 [https: 
//perma.cc/R66K-WA9W]. 
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twelve hours at a time.125 Seizing on the popularity of Fortnite, 
Blevins has become something of an Internet sensation and was the 
first eSports player featured on ESPN The Magazine.126 Blevins also 
maintains a YouTube channel where he uploads daily “highlights” 
videos extracted from his Twitch streams.127 His YouTube channel, 
following in the wake of his successful Twitch channel, is steadily 
expanding and has already amassed twenty-two million subscrib-
ers128 and almost two billion views to date.129 
Blevins’ story is one of perseverance and success. And it is also 
the story of a powerful cultural phenomenon: people love watching 
gameplay streams, and do so en masse. Gameplay streamers like 
Belvins have thus become modern-day celebrities. I investigate the 
world of streaming in greater depth in Part III.C. below, where I ex-
amine the social norms that govern interactions between gameplay 
streamers, community members, and game developers. 
D. Recap 
This Part provided background on emergent trends and contem-
porary business models in the video game industry. It first explored 
the shift from physical games to digital, online-exclusive games, fo-
cusing on the various pricing models employed by game developers. 
It then considered the resultant business model: modern video 
games are developed, marketed, and sold on the basis of an ongoing 
 
125 Kevin Webb, This New Video Shows How the World’s Most Popular Gamer Turned 
His Basement into a Mind Blowing State-Of-The-Art Studio, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 12, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/video-ninja-red-bull-home-streaming-studio-absolutely-
amazing-2018-11 [https://perma.cc/YTH7-97VF]. 
126 Elaine Teng, Living The Stream, ESPN THE MAGAZINE (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/24710688/fortnite-legend-ninja-living-
stream [https://perma.cc/3LUA-EQZ9]; Stefanie Fogel, Ninja: First Esports Player 
Featured on ESPN Magazine Cover, VARIETY (Sept. 18, 2018), https://variety.com/ 
2018/gaming/news/ninja-espn-magazine-cover-1202947409/ [https://perma.cc/F3HA-
L7HV]. 
127 Tom Gerken, Twitch: How Ninja was Unseated as Most-Subscribed Streamer, BBC 
NEWS (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-47305665  [https://per 
ma.cc/84ZJ-R96W]. 
128 Brittany Vincent, Twitch Streamer ‘Ninja,’ One of the Biggest Names in Fortnite, Is 
Abandoning the Platform, NBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2019), [https://perma.cc/4MCK-RPTZ]. 
129 Ninjashyper YouTube Stats, Channel Statistics, SOCIAL BLADE, https://social 
blade.com/youtube/user/ninjashyper [https://perma.cc/VRH8-85AZ]. 
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service, rather than a singular, one-off transaction. Finally, the dis-
cussion tracked two recent trends in the video game community: the 
rise of competitive gaming and the emergence of gameplay stream-
ing. In what follows, I take a step back to review the broader litera-
ture on social norms and copyright law, laying the groundwork for 
my substantive analysis of extralegal gaming norms in Part III. 
 
II. SOCIAL NORMS: AN ONGOING INQUIRY 
A sophisticated body of literature grapples with the prevalence 
of social norms in creative industries.130 In the past fifteen years, 
scholars have studied the extralegal norms that govern communities 
of high-end French chefs,131 stand-up comedians,132 roller derby 
skaters,133 drag queens,134 bloggers,135 fan fiction writers,136 fans of 
 
130 By “social norms” I mean social conventions (rules of behavior) that (1) emerge from 
decentralized processes, (2) are regularly followed out of a sense of duty, (3) and are 
policed through the use of social sanctions. See Jack P. Gibbs, Norms: The Problem of 
Definition and Classification, 70 AM. J. SOC. 586 (1965); Richard H. McAdams, The 
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997); Eric 
A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996); 
JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 99 (1989); Eduardo M. 
Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1919–29 (2005); H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 90 (1994); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Obligations and the Internal 
Aspect of Rules, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229 (2006). 
131 See Buccafusco, supra note 16. See also Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 20. 
132 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 20. 
133 See David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing 
Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012). 
134 See Eden Sarid, Don’t Be a Drag, Just Be a Queen—How Drag Queens Protect their 
Intellectual Property Without Law, 10 FIU L. REV. 133 (2014). 
135 See Schultz, supra note 18, at 225–26. 
136 See Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2007); see generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi 
Sunder, Everyone’s A Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as Fair 
Use, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 597 (2007). 
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jambands,137 hackers,138 documentary filmmakers,139 magicians,140 
tattoo artists,141 perfumers,142 typeface designers,143 adult entertain-
ers,144 nineteenth century publishers in the U.S.,145 software devel-
opers,146 clowns,147 graffiti artists,148 and even Hebrew authors op-
erating in Mandate Palestine.149  
A significant subset of studies focus on areas where copyright 
law appears to provide little or no protection. A survey of the litera-
ture further suggests that social norms are frequently developed, di-
rected, and inculcated by creative producers, namely authors.150 
 
137 See Schultz, supra note 16. 
138 See STEVEN LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION (2001); Tim 
Jordan & Paul Taylor, A Sociology of Hackers, 46 SOCIO. REV. 757 (1998); see generally 
Peter T. Leeson & Christopher J. Coyne, The Economics of Computer Hacking, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 511, 517–524 (2005); Orly Turgeman-Goldschmidt, Meanings that 
Hackers Assign to their Being a Hacker, 2 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 382 (2008). 
139 See Patricia Aufderheide, How Documentary Filmmakers Overcame Their Fear of 
Quoting and Learned to Employ Fair Use: A Tale of Scholarship in Action, 1 INT’L J. 
COMM. 26 (2007); Kristin Thompson, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Society for 
Cinema Studies, “Fair Usage Publication of Film Stills,” 32 CINEMA J. 3 (1993); ASS’N OF 
INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST 
PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), http://archive.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/fair_use_ 
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S6E-U67S]. 
140 See Loshin, supra note 16. 
141 See Aaron Perzanowski, Tattoos & IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511 (2013). 
142 See Cronin, supra note 16. 
143 See Lipton, supra note 16. 
144 See Kate Darling, IP Without IP? A Study of the Online Adult Entertainment Industry, 
17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 655 (2014). 
145 See ROBERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, PUBLISHING, AND THE PUBLIC 
DOMAIN (2013). 
146 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Economics 
of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 99 (2005). 
147 See David Fagundes & Aaron Perzanowski, Clown Eggs, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1313 (2019). 
148 See MARTA ILJADICA, COPYRIGHT BEYOND LAW: REGULATING CREATIVITY IN THE 
GRAFFITI SUBCULTURE (2016). 
149 See MICHAEL D. BIRNHACK, COLONIAL COPYRIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
MANDATE PALESTINE (2012); Michael D. Birnhack, Hebrew Authors and English 
Copyright Law in Mandate Palestine, 12 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 201 (2011). 
150 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, When Are IP Rights Necessary? Evidence 
from Innovation in IP’s Negative Space, in 1 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 309, 314 (Peter S. Menell & Ben Depoorter eds., 2019) 
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While there is a great deal of variance across different creative com-
munities, a few examples might prove illustrative. One example is a 
study by Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von Hippel on the social 
norms that govern communities of gourmet French chefs.151 They 
find that French chefs use three extralegal norms to protect their in-
terests: an anti-appropriation norm that prevents chefs from pre-
cisely copying others’ recipes; a norm that prevents a chef from 
passing on recipe-related information that was disclosed to her by a 
peer; and a norm against the use of a recipe without crediting its 
original author.152 This system of social ordering materialized de-
spite—and, indeed, because of—the lack of copyright protection for 
culinary recipes.153 So the norms embraced by French chefs com-
plement (or perhaps subvert) the law by extending effective protec-
tion to creative works that are otherwise non-copyrightable. 
A second example involves stand-up comedians. Copyright law 
protects comedy to a limited extent. The fundamental problem is 
that jokes often turn on a core premise or structure—an idea—and 
are thus susceptible to sophisticated copying. Fellow comedians can 
copy a joke by putting their own spin on it. They can do so by cop-
ying the joke’s core idea while expressing it in a different way.154 
 
[hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, When Are IP Rights Necessary?] (“These social norms 
are almost exclusively producer norms, and typically reflect a shared sense of professional 
or artistic identity that allows such norms to develop and become entrenched.”). 
151 Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 20. 
152 Id. at 192–94. 
153 Id. at 187–88. Indeed, U.S. courts have resisted attempts to recognize recipes as 
copyrightable on the grounds that recipes constitute processes or methods of operation. The 
Seventh Circuit, for example, has opined that recipes are not copyrightable because they 
merely “describe a procedure by which the reader may produce many dishes.” Publ’ns 
Int’l, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “there can be 
no monopoly in the copyright sense in the ideas for producing certain foodstuffs”). 
154 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 20, at 1801–05. There are at least two additional reasons 
for copyright’s lackluster protection of jokes. First, jokes are often not fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression. Sometimes jokes evolve—namely, come into existence—as a result 
of an exchange with members of the audience during a comedy show. Second, joke theft 
poses a substantial evidentiary challenge: to mount a successful legal claim, the author 
must establish that the joke was indeed stolen, rather than independently conceived by the 
alleged misappropriator. Jokes generally draw on (and are closely enmeshed in) common, 
identifiable life experiences. That is what makes them funny. And it is for this reason that 
different comedians might often craft jokes that share similar characteristics or a common 
starting point, without necessarily “stealing” from one another. See id. 
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And, because copyright law does not extend to ideas,155 joke “theft” 
would often fall outside the law’s positive space. As a result, in-
fringement claims are both costly and difficult to prove. Focusing 
on this low-IP environment, Dotan Oliar and Christopher Sprigman 
describe the development of a complex system of social norms de-
signed to address copying, authorship, and joke transfer.156 These 
norms are enforced through myriad extralegal sanctions, such as 
group boycotts (where fellow comedians and comedy clubs refuse 
to work with an infringing comedian)157 and, in extreme cases, even 
violence.158 
Along similar lines, Eden Sarid has studied the extralegal norms 
that govern the world of drag queens. Sarid documents a system of 
self-ordering that encompasses various intellectual goods: drag per-
sonae, live drag “numbers,” “signature songs” (that is, songs closely 
associated with particular performers), jokes performed during a 
live number, and non-signature songs.159 As Sarid explains, this 
nonlegal system allows drag queens to protect a wide repertoire of 
intellectual assets, including ideas and concepts.160 
In short, extralegal copyright norms are largely producer-driven. 
They operate within the negative space of copyright law and are usu-
ally reinforced through interactions between community members 
in close-knit communities, such as those of high-end French chefs 
 
155 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (excluding from copyright protection “any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery”). See 
also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (noting that under copyright law, “protection is 
given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself”). 
156 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 20. 
157 Id. at 1817–18 (“A number of interviewees told us of instances where they made clear 
to comedy club booking agents that they would not appear in the same evening’s lineup 
with someone they believed either had stolen their material or had a reputation of stealing 
jokes… Intermediaries—club owners, booking agents, agents, and managers—sometimes 
also refuse to deal with thieves.”). 
158 Id. at 1819–20. 
159 Sarid, supra note 134, at 148–51. 
160 Id. at 150 (“Perhaps the most notable distinction between IP law and the drag domain 
is the lack of distinction in the drag domain between ownership of an idea or concept [e.g., 
a signature singer] and ownership of its expression [the dance performed to the sounds of 
that signature singer’s songs]. Both receive similar protection in the drag domain.”). 
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and stand-up comedians.161 These norms also typically permeate 
creative spaces in which the costs of innovation are relatively low. 
Jokes, recipes, and drag personae are materially cheap to produce. 
By contrast, industries in which innovation is costly (like the phar-
maceutical industry) require significant pecuniary incentives to en-
sure optimal levels of innovation. Such industries are unlikely to 
spur high levels of innovation through social norms alone. 
Further, while social norms are often limited to the negative 
space of IP, some norms map onto the positive space of copyright 
law, specifically under the fair use doctrine. There are different as-
sumptions about what constitutes fair use in different communities. 
Attempts to concretize these assumptions often take shape under the 
guise of codes of best practices—that is, codex-like documents that 
purport to set forth principles of best practices for reproducing 
works within a particular community.162 These documents, in turn, 
serve as a baseline against which courts assess whether a particular 
defendant has made fair use of a copyrighted work.163 Take, for ex-
ample, the Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying.164 
This agreement aims to provide guidance on the reproduction of pro-
tected contents for the purpose of teaching or research.165 And courts 
have occasionally taken this agreement to represent prevalent indus-
try standards for reproduction, holding that noncompliance with the 
guidelines might bar a defendant’s claim for fair use.166 
Creative communities can also enlist such formalized tools to 
fend off third-party lawsuits. A prime example is the Statement of 
 
161 Raustiala & Sprigman, When Are IP Rights Necessary?, supra note 150, at 316 
(“[M]any of these industries [in which social norms emerge] are small, though not all are. 
Modest size appears to help create the sort of community of interest and sense of shared 
professional identity that can originate and perpetuate robust social norms.”). 
162 See Aufderheide, supra note 139. 
163  See id. 
164 See Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational 
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, in UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS BY EDUCATORS AND LIBRARIANS 6, 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ21.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9JV-C96R] [hereinafter 
“Agreement on Classroom Copying”]; see also Rothman, supra note 17, at 1918–19. 
165  Agreement on Classroom Copying, supra note 164. 
166 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–91 
(6th Cir. 1996). But see Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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Best Practices in Fair Use crafted by independent documentary 
filmmakers.167 Most notably, the Statement suggests that, as a gen-
eral matter, filmmakers should be allowed to capture “copyrighted 
media content in the process of filming something else.”168 Under 
this standard, material that was captured incidentally while filming, 
like a poster displayed in the background of a shot, constitutes fair 
use.169 And filmmakers have been able to invoke compliance with 
these practices as evidence of fair use.170 As these examples make 
clear, some creative communities have successfully harnessed social 
norms—written down and codified as statements of best practices—
as a shield against third-party rightsholders. 
Clearance norms present yet another example of social norms 
that sometimes seep into the fair use analysis.171 These norms, which 
are especially ubiquitous in traditional media industries, compel 
those who wish to use a work to obtain a license for doing so. And 
these norms apply even when it is unclear whether the work in ques-
tion is protected or whether using it would be permissible as fair use. 
In Ringgold v. Black, for example, the Second Circuit reasoned that 
the defendants cannot make a fair use claim because they failed to 
comply with clearance norms by obtaining a license.172 The court 
admonished the defendants for failing to pay the “customary price” 
for the work, thus adversely affecting its licensing market.173 
 
167 See DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), 
https://cmsimpact.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Documentary-Filmmakers.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/36T2-3GKF]. 
168  Id. at 5. 
169  Id. 
170 See Aufderheide, supra note 139, at 30–31; Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Untold 
Stories: Creative Consequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary 
Filmmakers, FINAL REP. TO CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA 4, 4, 26 (2004); Thompson, supra note 
139; ASS’N OF INDEP. VIDEO & FILMMAKERS ET AL., supra note 139. 
171 Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 17071; Rothman, supra note 17, at 1911–16. 
172 Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, 126 F.3d 70, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1997). 
173 Id. at 81. The widely spread practice of licensing, even in situations where using 
protected works might constitute fair use, has resulted in an increasingly narrow 
interpretation of fair use as courts have come to treat the practice of licensing as part of the 
works’ “potential market.” See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in 
Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887 (2007). See also Matthew Africa, The 
Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and 
the Courts, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1145, 1160–61, 1164 (2000). 
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Some scholars have offered a more systematic treatment of ex-
tralegal copyright norms. One example is the work of Jennifer Roth-
man. Focusing on a wide tranche of social norms, Rothman draws a 
distinction between aspirational norms and litigation avoidance 
norms.174 Aspirational norms aim to effectuate changes with respect 
to the allocation of IP rights, while litigation avoidance norms seek 
primarily to avoid or mitigate the risk of litigation.175 Rothman also 
offers a vivid analysis of the ways in which courts treat social 
norms—as evidence of market effects; as a proxy for what should 
be done; as a proxy for what is reasonable; as evidence of what is 
generally done; and as evidence of what the parties intended.176 
Mark Schultz provides another excursion into the realm of non-
legal copyright norms. Schultz argues that social norms might prove 
fruitful in combating online piracy.177 Because conventional strate-
gies of deterrence and legal enforcement have largely failed, Schultz 
endorses an alternative strategy consisting of educational efforts to 
shape social norms. He posits that social norms, properly conceived, 
can in fact drive compliance with copyright law.178 
Finally, a recent contribution by Amy Adler and Jeanne Fromer 
sheds light on the extralegal sanctions that routinely accompany 
community norms.179 Adler and Fromer draw attention to two cate-
gories of self-help remedies: shaming and retaking of the (infring-
ing) copy.180 Particularly fascinating is their exposition of retaking 
norms—for example, the brand Suicide Girls responded to an art-
ist’s unauthorized use of Suicide Girls photographs by “retaking” 
the infringing photographs and then selling them at a low price to 
undercut the infringer’s market.181 Interestingly, Adler and Former 
appear to assume that this mechanism for extralegal enforcement 
can arise “without the backdrop of a single close-knit community, 
 
174 Rothman, supra note 17, at 1909. 
175 Id. at 1909–11, 1924. 
176 Id. at 1931–46. 
177 Schultz, supra note 18. 
178 Id. at 228–35. 
179 Amy Adler & Jeanne Fromer, Taking Intellectual Property into Their Own Hands, 
107 CALIF. L. REV.  1455, 1457 (2019). 
180 Id. at 1459–92. 
181 Id. at 1463. 
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which legal scholars tend to see as a prerequisite to enforcing extra-
legal norms.”182 
The preceding discussion, while not exhaustive, should offer a 
glimpse into the voluminous literature on social norms and copy-
right law. It begins by reviewing a number of extralegal norms that 
populate the negative space of copyright law, and then turns to ex-
plore the interplay between social norms and positive copyright law, 
focusing on the fair use doctrine and the courts’ deference to state-
ments of best practices. Finally, it takes note of three overarching 
accounts that seek to make sense of social norms as a larger phe-
nomenon in the context of copyright law.  
 
III. FAIRNESS 
This Part advances a tripartite argument about norms of fairness 
in the video game community. First, I argue that the success of a 
game is largely dependent on its widespread perception as being 
competitively fair. Second, I claim that notions of fairness are also 
baked into the concept of wealth sharing that informs free-to-play 
games; these games offer a fully playable—though somewhat skel-
etal—version of the game for free, and thus generate the impression 
that the game’s developers are sharing their wealth. Third, gameplay 
streamers frequently cite ideas of labor in claiming ownership over 
their gameplay streams. Specifically, they contend that misappropri-
ation cuts against the time, effort, and skill that went into producing 
these gameplay streams. I take up each of these issues in turn. 
A. Competitive Integrity 
The first cluster of fairness norms center on notions of competi-
tive integrity in video games. Modern games are social enterprises 
that derive from, and are rooted in, communities of gamers. This 
also explains in part the surge in competitive gaming and gameplay 
streaming. But the social aspects of video games are not entirely 
 
182 Id. at 1457. This assessment is objectionable. Adler and Fromer discuss a number of 
decentralized, largely digital communities. But these communities are no less close-knit 
than traditional communities. After all, digital communities often rely on robust, online 
networks of dispersed members. The gaming case study is further proof that dispersed 
individuals can weave meaningful relationships on the basis of thick communitarian ties. 
732 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:694 
 
distinct from their competitive qualities. Players typically form so-
cial bonds against the backdrop of some sense of communal belong-
ing that is grounded in a desire to compete with others, and to be 
seen doing so.183 And, as I suggest in what follows, the competitive 
impetus that drives gaming communities is closely entangled with 
the concept of fairness. 
What does “fairness” mean in this context? Simply put, I argue 
that a game’s commercial success is dependent on its perception as 
being competitively fair. In the eyes of video game players, games 
are unfair or exploitative when players can pay money—say, 
through in-game microtransactions—to obtain a competitive in-
game advantage. In a sense, this view is informed by the egalitarian 
notion that a player’s ability to compete in the game should turn 
solely on her skill, not her ability to pay.184 In a world where video 
game players have come to think of themselves as “electronic ath-
letes,” concepts of meritocracy are especially poignant. The notion 
of competitive meritocracy proceeds from the proposition that eve-
ryone should get the chance to prove their worth, no matter their 
financial standing. 
To video game players, skill matters. Composure matters. Hard 
work matters. Yet none of these qualities, however desirable, are 
fully attainable when players can simply pay money to get a head-
start in the game. This is because modern games are ultimately com-
munity-based enterprises by their very nature—they are meant to be 
experienced by multiple players interacting with each other.185 So in 
situations where some players can simply purchase an in-game ad-
vantage, others are denied the opportunity to fairly engage with 
them on a level playing field. This scenario is often described by 
gamers in terms of a “pay-to-win” scheme, where one’s odds of win-
ning (or competitively engaging with others) are contingent upon 
 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 105–108. 
184 This is not to say that perceptions of in-game meritocracy reflect normative ideals of 
fairness. Developing one’s in-game skills requires time—and time is a scarce resource for 
many. Hence, it’s important to note that these perceptions rest on a narrow conception of 
meritocracy; one that may not be “fair” when considered in a broader context. 
185 The same is true of modern single-player games as well. These games give rise to 
robust communities of players who talk about the game, help each other master it, and 
ultimately experience it together. 
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her capacity or willingness to pay in order to obtain an advantage. 
As the discussion below makes evident, pay-to-win is a persistent 
(and often fatal) trope within the gaming community.186 
A rash of recent cases buttress this point rather markedly. A cen-
tral example is the video game Star Wars Battlefront II. Launched 
in 2017, Battlefront II was a successor to the game’s immensely suc-
cessful first iteration.187 Though the game features a single-player 
playing mode, its centerpiece is a multiplayer online mode where 
dozens of players populate a Star Wars-themed digital world and 
engage each other in combat.188 The players are sorted into two 
teams, each consisting of players who must work in concert to 
achieve a strategic goal by killing members of the opposite team.189 
The characters are all drawn from the larger Star Wars universe: Jedi 
Knights and rebels on the one side, Sith Lords and imperial troops 
on the other.190 Jedi Knights (and related characters) are labeled “he-
roes” while Sith Lords (and related characters) are dubbed “vil-
lains.”191 All characters in the game are customizable and can be 
 
186 See Kati Alha et al., Free-to-Play Games: Professionals’ Perspectives (2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.digra.org/wp-content/uploads/digital-
library/nordicdigra2014_submission_8.pdf [https://perm a.cc/XF4D-J42L] (reporting that 
one of most common critiques of free-to-play games is directed at what gamers call “pay-
to-win, which means that the players with the most money to use get unfair advantage over 
players who do not use money”). See also Eustance Huang, Americans Largely Won’t Pay 
to Win a Video Game—But Chinese Gamers Will, CNBC (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/30/pay-to-win-video-games-differences-between-us-and-
chinese-gamers.html [https://perma.cc/9A85-PU2C]; Jason McKinnon, The Biggest 
Problem with Video Game ‘Pay To Win’ Business Models, NERD INFINITE (Oct. 13, 2017), 
http://www.nerdinfinite.com/the-biggest-problem-with-video-game-pay-to-win-business-
models/ [https://perma.cc/RXG6-5W8U]; Natalya Pomeroy, Effort Alone Isn’t Enough for 
Victory with The Pay-To-Win System, STUDY BREAK (Jan. 30, 2018), https://studybreaks 
.com/culture/pay-to-win/ [https://perma.cc/JAJ8-SRRR]. 
187 The original game, Star Wars Battlefront, was released in 2015. See Star Wars 
Battlefront, ELEC. ARTS, https://www.ea.com/games/star-wars/star-wars-battlefront 
[https://perma.cc/2A5K-L9LZ].  
188 Jason Nichols, Star Wars: Battlefront II—Game Modes Explained, SCREENRANT 
(May 31, 2020), https://screenrant.com/star-wars-battlefront-game-modes-explained/ 
[https://perma.cc/22NT-JWFU]. 
189 Id. 
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equipped with various capabilities that enhance their effectiveness 
in battle.192 Yet these capabilities are not randomly dispersed 
amongst players; instead, they are bundled together in the form of 
random “loot crates” that players can purchase with in-game cur-
rency.193 Further, some of the characters themselves were initially 
locked off upon release and could only be unlocked with in-game 
currency as well.194 Each loot crate held the promise of unlocking 
some capabilities, characters or cosmetic designs.195 
Battlefront II has been under siege from the outset. Despite be-
ing one of the most coveted franchises in the world—cast under the 
umbrella of the lucrative Star Wars universe—the game’s initial 
launch proved disastrous. While Battlefront II’s design was lauded 
as a “monumental achievement that could only have come out of the 
modern AAA studio system,”196 the game’s launch was ridiculed as 
“chaotic,”197 with some suggesting it was reminiscent of “a plane 
crashing into the side of the mountain.”198 Virtually every review of 
the game pointed out that it was afflicted by “significant, sustained 
 
192 See Ability, STAR WARS BATTLEFRONT WIKI: FANDOM, https://battlefront.fan 
dom.com/wiki/Ability [https://perma.cc/JQ7N-MFFT]. 
193 See Tom Regan, DICE is Taking a ‘Good, Hard Look’ and ‘Reassessing’ Battlefront 
2’ Loot Crates, FANDOM (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.fandom.com/articles/dice-
battlefront-2-loot-crate-interview [https://perma.cc/76LZ-QWSV]. 
194 See Jason Schreier, EA Defense of Star Wars Battlefront II Becomes Most Downvoted 
Reddit Comment Ever, KOTAKU (Nov. 13, 2017), https://kotaku.com/ea-defense-of-star-
wars-battlefront-ii-becomes-most-dow-1820396527 [https://perma.cc/P4LQ-MBZ8]. 
195 Some critics assert that the practice of requiring payment for loot boxes amounts to a 
form of gambling. See generally Mark D. Griffiths, Is The Buying of Loot Boxes in 
Videogames a Form of Gambling or Gaming?, 22 GAMING L. REV. 52 (2018); Marcus 
Carter, ‘Loot Boxes’ and Pay-To-Win Features in Digital Games Look a Lot 
Like Gambling, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 26, 2017), [https://perma.cc/L6JR-R79P]. 
196 Dave Thier, ‘Star Wars Battlefront 2’ Review: The Empire Screws Up, FORBES (Nov. 
21, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/games/2017/11/21/star-wars-battlefront-2-
review-the-empire-screws-up/?sh=2d0661746e3a [https://perma.cc/3ZZU-89GB]. 
197 See Daniel Chamberlin, What Battlefront II Means for Game Monetization, 
GAMASUTRA (Nov. 29, 2017), [https://perma.cc/5TS7-6X4F]. 
198 See Thier, supra note 196. 
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criticism,”199 amounting to nothing short of a total “disaster[].”200 
But the vitriol visited upon Battlefront II concerned neither its price 
nor design; rather, it focused on its system of microtransactions. 
As is the case with most online games today, in-game currency 
in Battlefront II can be earned in one of two ways: players can either 
purchase it with real-world money, or simply play the game and 
(gradually) earn it. The latter option, consistent with standard in-
game currency schemes, is notoriously slow and arduous. Some crit-
ics have estimated that, on average, players would have to play the 
game—or “grind it,”201 as it were—for 40 hours to earn only a mi-
nute amount of in-game currency. 
This microtransaction structure differs from the one described in 
Part I in two meaningful ways. First, Battlefront II was not a free-
to-play game; copies of the game sold for $60,202 on par with other 
big-feature video games. This was somewhat unusual because most 
microtransaction-based games are free-to-play. I return to this point 
in Part III.B. below. Second, the premium content offered to con-
sumers was itself different—while many freemium games limit in-
game purchases to cosmetic enhancements (new designs or new 
“skins” for existing characters), Battlefront II broke with this con-
vention by offering in-game competitive enhancements; i.e., unique 
capabilities that can attach to specific characters. For instance, the 
character known as Emperor Palpatine, one of the game’s principal 
villains, can be equipped with a lightning strike attack. In-game en-
hancements, however, can make this attack last longer and inflict 
 
199 See, e.g., Matt Wales, EA Admits It “Got It Wrong” over Star Wars Battlefront 2 
Loot Boxes, EUROGAMER (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2018-04-
16-ea-admits-it-got-it-wrong-over-star-wars-battlefront-2-loot-boxes [https://perma.cc/W 
65P-KKQ4]. 
200 See Gita Jackson, A Guide to The Endless, Confusing Star Wars Battlefront 
II Controversy, KOTAKU (Nov. 21, 2017), https://kotaku.com/a-guide-to-the-endless-
confusing-star-wars-battlefront-1820623069 [https://perma.cc/HFY2-R8K2]; Sean 
Buckley, After Battlefront II Mess, EA Admits It Has an Image Problem, CNET (Apr. 13, 
2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/after-battlefront-ii-ea-admits-to-image-problem/ 
[https://perma.cc/BQ4Y-TYHX]. 
201 “Grinding” is defined by Techopedia.com as “playing time spent doing repetitive 
tasks within a game to unlock a particular game item or to build the experience needed to 
progress smoothly through the game.” Grinding, TECHNOEDIA https://www.techo 
pedia.com/definition/27527/grinding [https://perma.cc/746F-BW7D]. 
202 See Chamberlin, supra note 197. 
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greater damage on opponents.203 A “maxed-out” Palpatine, armed 
with all available enhancements, could easily overwhelm oppo-
nents—especially those who have not yet acquired premium en-
hancements.204 Further, and perhaps more puzzlingly, Battlefront II 
also offered premium characters that were accessible through in-
game microtransactions.205 In particular, Darth Vader, the most 
well-known character in the franchise, could only be accessed 
through in-game currency.206 
Players were incensed. Given the game’s multiplayer mode, the 
decision to offer purchasable competitive advantages struck many 
players as an act of disrepute and greed.207 The response was swift 
and acute. Players felt deceived, many labeling the game a pay-to-
win scheme.208 As a result, sales for the game failed to meet early 
projections.209 Scores of players turned to Reddit to bemoan the 
game’s microtransaction system. One commenter protested that the 
character Darth Vader remained inaccessible even to consumers 
who had paid for a Deluxe Edition of the game.210 Others estimated 
that players would have to play the game for thousands of hours in 
order to earn enough in-game currency to unlock all of the game’s 
 
203 Palpatine’s lightning attack has been described as “game-breaking” given its 
effectiveness in battle. Heather Alexandra, Battlefront II’s Emperor Palpatine Was Quietly 
Removed from the Game, KOTAKU (July 10, 2018), https://kotaku.com/battlefront-iis-
emperor-palpatine-was-quietly-removed-f-1827489522 [https://perma.cc/HN9V-7942]. 
204 Id. 
205 See Jeff Grubb, Star Wars: Battlefront II Publisher Reduces Time to Unlock Heroes 
like Darth Vader by 75%, VENTUREBEAT (Nov. 13, 2017), [https://perma.cc/3BPV-
3ULU]. 
206 Id. 
207 See, e.g., Alex Volkrijk, Star Wars Battlefront 2: Did EA’s Corporate Greed Ruin a 
Perfect Game?, RENEGADE REP. (Dec. 18, 2017), [https://perma.cc/AP9A-RTNU]. 
208 See Bill Lavoy, Is Star Wars Battlefront 2 Pay to Win?, SHACK NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.shacknews.com/article/102157/is-star-wars-battlefront-2-pay-to-win [https:// 
perma.cc/8ESL-7JTW]; Oscar Dayus, Star Wars Battlefront 2’s ‘Pay-To-Win’ Complaints 
Are “Hard To Dodge,” Says Dev, GAMESPOT (Oct. 20, 2017, 3:11 AM), 
https://www.gamespot.com/articles/star-wars-battlefront-2s-pay-to-win-complaints-are/ 
1100-6454189/ [https://perma.cc/A8XH-PYD6]; see also sources cited in supra notes 195–
197. 
209 Imran Khan, EA Misses Star Wars: Battlefront II Target, Plans to Reintroduce 
Microtransactions Soon, GAMEINFORMER (Jan. 30, 2018), [https://perma.cc/3YM8-J58M]. 
210 See Schreier, supra note 194. 
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optional content.211 The game’s publisher, Electronic Arts (EA), is-
sued a response on the website—yet that response sparked even 
greater opprobrium and is now the most down-voted post in Reddit 
history.212 EA’s stock value soon plummeted.213 The game’s aver-
age consumer score on the ratings platform Metacritic was a measly 
0.9 out of 10.214 
The various strands of criticism that sprung up following the 
game’s release shared one common theme: an unqualified rejection 
of the game’s microtransaction structure. Players were displeased 
that the game offered competitive, rather than cosmetic, enhance-
ments for consumers who were willing to shell out a few dollars. 
The message, simply put, was that pay-to-win games are not com-
petitively fair. EA relented shortly thereafter: it did away with  
microtransactions altogether yet promised that an overhauled sys-
tem for microtransactions would be introduced in the future.215 
Moreover, in the aftermath of the controversy surrounding Battle-
front II, a U.S. Senator introduced a bill to ban “loot boxes” and pay-
to-play microtransactions.216 
 
211  Derek Stauffer, Spend 4528 Hours or $2100 to Unlock Star Wars: Battlefront II 
Content, SCREENRANT (Nov. 15, 2017), https://screenrant.com/star-wars-battlefront-2-
content-unlock-time/ [https://perma.cc/A8JB-NKZU].  
212 Schreier, supra note 195. See also Zach Zwezen, EA Received a Guinness World 
Record for Most Downvoted Comment in Reddit History, KOTAKU (Sept. 7, 2019), 
https://kotaku.com/ea-received-a-guinness-world-record-for-most-downvoted-
1837955807 [https://perma.cc/BU4L-9XCE]. 
213 Tae Kim, EA’s Day of Reckoning is Here After ‘Star Wars’ Game Uproar, $3 Billion 
in Stock Value Wiped Out, CNBC (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/28/eas-
day-of-reckoning-is-here-after-star-wars-game-uproar.html [https://perma.cc/4ZE9-7U 
AB]; Jasmine Henry, Electronic Arts Stock Drops in Value by $3.1 Billion, GAME RANT 
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://gamerant.com/electronic-arts-stock-drop-battlefront/ [https:// 
perma.cc/629N-SRGH]. 
214 Jimmy Donnellan, Metacritic Users Review Bomb Star Wars Battlefront 2, CULTURED 
VULTURES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://culturedvultures.com/metacritic-users-review-bomb-
star-wars-battlefront-2/ [https://perma.cc/WN4R-9MAP]. 
215 Eddie Makuch, Disney, Lucasfilm Respond to Star Wars: Battlefront 2 
Microtransaction Controversy, GAMESPOT (Nov. 20, 2017), [https://perma.cc/QYG4-
4QM9]. 
216 Jason Schreier, U.S. Senator Introduces Bill To Ban Loot Boxes and Pay-To-Win 
Microtransactions, KOTAKU (May 8, 2019), https://kotaku.com/u-s-senator-introduces-
bill-to-ban-loot-boxes-and-pay-1834612226 [https://perma.cc/V47R-6SWQ]. 
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The ordeal that blighted Battlefront II is by no means an isolated 
incident. In the past few years, a polyphony of different games faced 
vociferous criticism for allegedly running pay-to-win schemes. A 
non-exhaustive catalogue includes games such as Dungeon 
Keeper,217 Fallout 76,218 Borderlands 3,219 Black Desert Online,220 
and ArcheAge,221 to name just a few. And a recent study conducted 
by a data research company likewise concluded that: 
the concept of micropayments is not fundamentally 
flawed in and of itself, as only 2.4% of gamers would 
rather pay for everything upfront; rather, it is the con-
text in which the system is deployed that determines 
each gamer’s response. For example, more than two-
thirds of gamers (68.6%) explained that ‘cosmetic 
only’ micropayments are ‘okay’—i.e. they have no 
problem with individual players making in-game 
purchases as long as they don’t alter the core param-
eters of the game. As echoed by dozens of respond-
ents, if microtransactions allow a player to make 
their character or property look better, without 
 
217 Jim Sterling, Dungeon Keeper Mobile Review—Wallet Reaper, THE ESCAPIST (Feb. 
2, 2014, 4:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/L9BD-R54W] (condemning the game for hiding 
“behind the mask of ‘free to play,’” while in fact requiring players to pay in order to 
advance in the game). 
218 Lou Contaldi, Fallout 76 Stirs More Controversy in Alleged Pay-to-Win 
Microtransactions, DUAL SHOCKERS (Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.dualsh 
ockers.com/fallout-76-repair-kit-microtransactions/ [https://perma.cc/5TMF-CE6H] 
(reporting that “Fallout 76 courts ‘utility’ microtransactions with new Repair Kits, that 
strays from their original promise of keeping the Atomic Shop cosmetic only”); see also 
Jester Valdez, Fallout 76 Update Brings Controversial ‘Pay-To-Win’ Repair Kits into 
Play, TECH TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.techtimes.com/articles/241222/ 
20190410/fallout-76-update-brings-controversial-pay-to-win-repair-kits-into-play.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3A39-C934]. 
219 To deflect initial pre-release reports that the game would feature pay-to-win 
microtransactions, the game’s developers released a statement clarifying that the game 
would only feature cosmetic in-game purchases. See Asher Madan, Borderlands 3 Doesn’t 
Feature Pay-To-Win Microtransactions Says Gearbox’s Randy Pitchford, WINDOWS 
CENT. (May 1, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9FFX-ACR8]. 
220 Jennifer Locke, Is Black Desert for Xbox One Pay-to-Win?, WINDOWS CENT. (Mar. 6, 
2019), https://www.windowscentral.com/black-desert-xbox-one-pay-win [https://perma. 
cc/4W3M-8T42]. 
221 See Qunit Lyn, Trion Responds to Player Pay-To-Win Concerns Regarding ArcheAge 
Progression Servers, MMOBOMB (Apr. 5, 2018), [https://perma.cc/WSX2-LU4V]. 
2021] FAIRNESS, COPYRIGHT, AND VIDEO GAMES 739 
 
altering capabilities or gameplay, the overarching 
sentiment is that this presents no issue.222 
Elizabeth Evans has suggested, in keeping with this theme, that 
“[a]ccessing rewards that are otherwise only available via skill and 
perseverance via non-gaming means is seen within much of games 
culture as an antithesis to gameplay.”223 This again points to the con-
cept of fairness and, in particular, fair gameplay. While players are 
not necessarily hostile to the idea of in-game purchases as such, they 
resoundingly dismiss in-game purchases that provide competitive 
advantages. 
But if norms of competitive integrity are well-entrenched, why 
have so many game developers attempted to flout them? Why have 
we seen so much friction around pay-to-win games in recent years? 
The answer is that norms of competitive integrity metastasized 
quickly, and some developers were likely caught off-guard by the 
rapid evolution of these norms among players. So, while developers 
were initially slow to catch up, the escalating discord over in-game 
fairness eventually impressed upon them the need to comply with 
now-familiar norms of in-game integrity. 
What lessons might be extracted from this analysis? The most 
important insight is that perceptions of fairness attach to games that 
appear to be competitively fair. Games are thought to be competi-
tively fair when they allow players to compete on a level playing 
field. By contrast, games are deemed unfair when they offer com-
petitive advantages via microtransactions. While players seem will-
ing to accept cosmetic enhancements as legitimate, the same cannot 
be said for competitive enhancements. Games that provide compet-
itive enhancements are often maligned as pay-to-win schemes. And, 
in a world abuzz with norms of competitive integrity, players decry 
pay-to-win games as unfair. These games deny players the oppor-
tunity to engage with each other on equal terms. They thus cut 
against the competitive instinct that underlies the gaming commu-
nity. Players want to compete with and against each other. But 
 
222 QUTEE, GAMING TODAY: A REPORT BY QUTEE INTO HOW PLAYERS REALLY FEEL 
ABOUT GAMING IN 2018, available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/qutee-reports/Qutee-
Gaming-Today-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4RY-9MMB]. 
223 Evans, supra note 68, at 574. 
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meaningful competition can only arise when players feel like every-
one stands an equal chance of competing, irrespective of one’s abil-
ity or willingness to pay. 
This fairness-driven account complements my discussion of be-
havioral economics. It explains why in-game transactions can, at 
times, provoke harsh criticism from community members.224 In-
deed, this brief overview demonstrates that microtransactions can 
prove deleterious when they provide competitive, rather than cos-
metic, advantages. Accordingly, while behavioral misperceptions 
explain why in-game purchases are largely profitable,225 norms of 
competitive integrity can enrich our understanding of why, in some 
instances, the inverse is true. 
The next subpart explores a second layer of norms, premised on 
the business model of freemium games and the ways in which they 
embody (concrete or illusory) ideals of wealth sharing. 
B. Wealth Sharing 
Freemium games are lucrative because of their pricing model. 
As discussed above, a number of related factors contribute to the 
popularity of these games.226 First, freemium games are successful 
in part because in-game purchases are not salient to consumers, who 
tend to systemically underappreciate the likelihood of making future 
micropayments. Second, premium contents can only be purchased 
with in-game currency, which can be earned, technically, by playing 
the game. This gives rise to the impression that players can avoid 
spending real-world money. Third, this system of in-game currency 
serves to further camouflage the real costs associated with micro-
payments; to assess how much they are spending on the game over 
time, players must convert real-world currency to in-game currency. 
Fourth, game developers deploy a system of dynamic pricing. They 
offer ever-shifting seasonal deals and bundle packages, thereby 
changing the conversion rate between real-world and in-game cur-
rency on a regular basis. As a result, players are more likely to feel 
like they are getting a good deal. 
 
224 See text accompanying supra notes 76–88. 
225 See Kuehl, supra note 15, at 327. 
226 See text accompanying supra notes 76–88. 
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Combined, these pricing techniques are particularly effective. 
Yet their effectiveness hinges not only on consumer behavioral mis-
perceptions, but also on perceptions of wealth sharing. Fortnite, the 
most popular game in the world today, provides a vivid illustration. 
Released by Epic Games (“Epic”) in 2017, Fortnite has taken 
the world by storm.227 Widely recognized as the most popular game 
in the world, Fortnite has broken a dizzying array of sales records 
and has attracted millions of fans. But Fortnite was hardly Epic’s 
first success story. Years before the game’s release, Epic was prin-
cipally known in the industry as the company behind the Unreal En-
gine228—a game engine that drives dozens of the most successful 
video games in the industry.229 For years, the Unreal Engine has 
been leveraged to develop, power, and run a bevy of successful 
games from third-party developers. In fact, the licensing market for 
the Unreal Engine has traditionally been Epic’s primary source of 
revenue.230 
In 2012, Epic made the decision to move away from its tradi-
tional role as a licensor and publisher of boxed, marketing-driven 
games. Instead, Epic sought to mutate into to a leaner company will-
ing to give away much of its content for free.231  Initially, Fortnite 
 
227 Kim Key, Why Fortnite Was in Beta for So Long, SCREENRANT (July 9, 2020), 
https://screenrant.com/fortnite-beta-early-access-years-long-time-why/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Z439-NCW9]. 
228 Brian Crecente, ‘Fortnite’ Dance Lawsuits: The Carlton, the Floss, the Milly Rock, 
What Is Going On?, VARIETY (Dec. 18, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/ 
gaming/news/fortnite-dance-lawsuit-1203092141/ [https://perma.cc/PK24-HE67]. 
229 Daniel Kayser, Dozens of Games to be Featured in the Unreal Engine Booth at GDC 
2019, UNREAL ENGINE (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.unrealengine.com/en-
US/blog/dozens-of-games-to-be-featured-in-the-unreal-engine-booth-at-gdc-2019 [https: 
//perma.cc/26YP-3RR4]. A game engine is a software-development environment. It 
enables developers to create games using the engine’s rendering utility, physics engine, 
and a collection of other software elements, including sound, animation, networking, 
artificial intelligence, streaming, memory management, scene graph, and cinematics. See 
Jeff Ward, What is a Game Engine, GAME CAREER GUIDE (Apr. 29, 2008), 
https://www.gamecareerguide.com/features/529/what_is_a_game_.php [https://perma.cc/ 
5536-BUDZ]; Michael Lewis & Jeffrey Jacobson, Game Engines in Scientific Research, 
45 COMMS. OF THE ACM 27 (2002); Eike Falk Anderson et al., The Case for Research in 
Game Engine Architecture (unpublished manuscript), available at [https://perma.cc/6U6N-
5LKP]. 
230 Crecente, supra note 228. 
231 Id. 
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was developed in-house as a side project. Epic soon realized, how-
ever, that it would make good sense to release Fortnite as a free-to-
play, ever-expanding (service-based) game. In describing that deci-
sion, Epic CEO Tim Sweeney recalled: “I would describe it as see-
ing the writing in the wall…. There was an increasing realization 
that the old model wasn’t working anymore and that the new model 
was looking increasingly like the way to go.”232 At the same time, 
an influx of cash from a deal with an investment company allowed 
Epic to drop the monthly fee it was charging for use of its game 
engine, instead extracting a royalty cut from anything created with 
the engine.233 In the summer of 2017, a paid beta version of Fortnite 
was released.234 A year later, in September 2018, Epic announced it 
would be releasing a new, free-to-play mode called “Fortnite Battle 
Royale.”235 Similar to the multiplayer mode of Battlefront II, the 
Battle Royale mode was essentially a digital “sandbox” in which 
100 players were engaged in combat, each vying to be the last sur-
viving team or player. The free-to-play mode was an instant sensa-
tion. In just two weeks, it drew 10 million players.236 Within a year, 
45 million players were playing the game.237 As of March 2019, as 
many as 250 million gamers play the game on a regular basis.238 
 
232 See Daniel Liberto, How Tencent Changed ‘Fortnite’ Creator Epic Games’ Fortunes, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/news/how-tencent-
changed-fortnite-creator-epic-games-fortunes/ [https://perma.cc/V44L-4ZQJ]. 
233 See id. (“Epic used Tencent’s cash injection to drop the monthly charge for its game 
engine and give it away to anyone who wanted to use it”); Tyler Wilde, Unreal Engine 
Games No Longer Owe Royalties on Their First $1M in Revenue, PC GAMER (May 13, 
2020), https://www.pcgamer.com/unreal-engine-games-no-longer-owe-royalties-on-their-
first-dollar1m-in-revenue/ [http://perma.cc/N8MJ-SF9M] (describing the current royalty 
scheme for Epic’s Unreal Engine). 
234 Matt Brian, The Rise and Rise (and Rise) of ‘Fortnite’, ENGADGET (Mar. 17, 2018), 
https://www.engadget.com/2018-03-17-fortnite-battle-royale-record-breaker.html [https:// 
perma.cc/7G3M-UYUG]. 
235  Id. 
236 Eddie Makuch, Fortnite: Battle Royale Has Hit 10 Million Players in Two Weeks, 
GAMESPOT (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.gamespot.com/articles/fortnite-battle-royale-has-
hit-10-million-players-/1100-6454008/ [https://perma.cc/57Q4-GXGS]. 
237 Scott Duwe, Fortnite: Battle Royale Has Hit a Milestone of 45 Million Players, 
GAMEPUR (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.gamepur.com/news/fortnite-battle-royale-45-
million-players [https://perma.cc/2VF8-LUXM]. 
238 Gilbert, supra note 4. 
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The monetization scheme of Fortnite is straightforward. As a 
freemium game, players need not spend a single dime to download 
the game and play it. Fortnite offers players a completely free mul-
tiplayer experience.239 However, similar to other free-to-play games, 
players can choose to purchase a variety of optional, premium digi-
tal goods. One example is the Battle Pass, which provides players 
with access to a variety of premium costumes (“skins”), stickers, and 
emotes (animated dance moves).240 Players can alternatively pur-
chase most of the premium content separately.241 To make an in-
game purchase, players must use V-Bucks, the in-game currency. 
They can buy V-Bucks with real-world money or slowly earn V-
Bucks by playing the game.242 
The conversion rate between V-Bucks and real-world currency, 
however, is far from straightforward: $1 is worth 100 V-Bucks, 
though the more one buys, the better the deal. So, for example, a 
player who spends $100 on V-Bucks would be getting 13,500 V-
Bucks (instead of 10,000).243 Various limited deals are also on offer 
at different times, as players can buy, say, a bundle of 2800 V-Bucks 
for $20 (instead of $28).244 The Battle Pass runs 950 V-Bucks and 
unlockable items usually go for 200 to 800 V-Bucks.245 
Part of the secret to Fortnite’s success is that the game relies on 
popular culture, primarily through the use of emotes—animated 
dance moves derived from hip hop culture. Unsurprisingly, some 
commentators have criticized the use of popular culture in Fortnite 
as an attempt to profiteer from black culture. Notable hip-hop artist 
Chance the Rapper, for instance, argued that “[b]lack creatives cre-
ated and popularized these dances but never monetized them. 
 
239 Crecente, supra note 228 (“‘Fortnite Battle Royale’ is a free-to-play game. That 
means you don’t have to spend a penny to get the game.”). 
240 See Battle Pass, FORTNITE WIKI: FANDOM, https://fortnite.fandom.com/wiki/ 
Battle_Pass [https://perma.cc/Z7BA-YLSN]. 
241 Crecente, supra note 228. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 See Buy Fortnite—2,800 V-Bucks, MICROSOFT STORE, [https://perma.cc/QXK4-
2Y82]. 
245 See Battle Pass Season 5, EPIC GAMES STORE, https://www.epicgames.com/ 
fortnite/en-US/battle-pass/season-9 [https://perma.cc/25HL-DFVE]. 
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Imagine the money people are spending on these Emotes being 
shared with the artists that made them.”246 
So far, the discussion moved along well-trodden lines, illustrat-
ing that Fortnite’s success can be explained on the basis of behav-
ioral economics and a strong appeal to popular culture. Still, the core 
ambition of this subpart is to bring out a previously underexplored 
aspect of the game’s popularity; namely, perceptions of wealth shar-
ing that arise among Fortnite players. In short, I argue that percep-
tions of fairness, couched in ideas of wealth sharing, account for 
much of the success of Fortnite’s business model. As it turns out, 
players have little qualms about paying for (non-competitive) digital 
goods. This is largely because players feel that it’s fair: the publisher 
charges nothing for the actual game—thus giving away a huge por-
tion of its content for free—and instead charges a premium for in-
game digital goods. In other words, Fortnite’s business model 
proved successful because the developers appear to be sharing their 
wealth. They do so by offering the basic version of the game, 
stripped of many of its cosmetic elements, for free. 
To clarify, I do not mean to suggest that players never complain 
about Fortnite’s in-game transactions; quite the contrary, they often 
bristle at what they consider too high a price for a particular in-game 
design. But, importantly, these complaints are almost always iso-
lated: players rarely, if ever, contest the practice of using in-game 
microtransactions as such. 
Messages posted to the Fortnite forum on Reddit underscore this 
point. One user posted a message titled “V bucks are too expensive,” 
challenging the price of the Battle Pass while at the same time ex-
plaining: “I feel pride in supporting the developer for once. I don’t 
feel like the battle pass is a rip off or anything like that.”247 And 
while that user—and other users commenting on that post—felt that 
some of the unlockable designs were overpriced, they all largely 
agreed that the use of in-game microtransactions is itself justified. 
 
246 Jordan Darville, Chance the Rapper Calls on Fortnite to Pay Rappers for Their 
Animated Dances, THE FADER (July 13, 2018), https://www.thefader.com/2018/ 
07/13/chance-the-rapper-fortnite-rappers-emotes [https://perma.cc/M2SJ-TMM2]. 
247 See V Bucks Are Too Expensive, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/FortNite 
BR/comments/86dgup/v_bucks_are_too_expensive/  [https://perma.cc/M9SX-WVBN]. 
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Moreover, many invoked the idea of “support” and were positively 
inclined to support a developer whom they trust and consider fair. 
Another user responded to a different post by similarly acknowl-
edging that “[cosmetic costumes] are 100% optional and provide no 
competitive advantage. The game itself is free [ . . . ] so a lot of peo-
ple want cool cosmetics as well as supporting the developers for do-
ing an amazing job.”248 A recurring theme here is the desire to sup-
port the developers of the game. And in this context, too, players 
seem to recognize the idea of competitive fairness—the notion that 
no competitive advantages should be provided through micropay-
ments. Equally important is the emphasis on the fact that the game 
is free. Players appear to believe that it’s fair for the publisher to 
charge money for premium designs when the publisher has no other 
streams of revenue. As one player put it: 
If these cosmetics are the only way that the [Fortnite] 
devs are bringing in a profit, then it would make 
sense that they be priced by how much it costs to de-
velop the game as a whole. A game like [Fortnite], 
with over 100 devs, has to cost a good bit of money, 
therefore justifying a ‘high’ price. The whole ‘I 
would buy skins if they were cheaper’ argument is 
based on the false assumption of their worth. Cos-
metics are merely an avenue for players to support 
the further development of a great game.249 
Similar sentiments have been echoed in many comments on the 
Fortnite forum on Reddit.250 In fact, virtually every message 
 
248 See Unfair V-Buck Prices for Europe, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/Fort 
NiteBR/comments/7qztn1/unfair_vbuck_prices_for_europe [https://perma.cc/87T6-3G 
9V]. 
249 See Skin Prices: Why I Think They MAY Be Fair, REDDIT, https://www.red 
dit.com/r/FortNiteBR/comments/7gmzer/skin_prices_why_i_think_they_may_be_fair/ 
[https://perma.cc/G7UF-3DD6] (italics removed). 
250 A search for terms such as “expensive,” “pricy,” “skins,” or “V-Bucks” will reveal 
countless comments pressing a similar point in response to complaints about prices. For 
some of the most popular Fortnite subreddits, see FORTNITE: BATTLE ROYALE: REDDIT, 
https://reddit.com/r/FortNiteBR/ [https://perma.cc/2MCK-HJEC], FORTNITE 
COMPETITIVE: REDDIT, https://reddit.com/r/FortniteCompetitive/ [https://perma.cc/LYH2-
V5DS], and FORTNITE: REDDIT, https://reddit.com/r/FORTnITE/ [https://perma.cc/KUF8-
PU5J]. 
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contesting microtransaction prices is met instantaneously with re-
spondents advising that in-game microtransactions are fair, even if 
excessive at time, because no money is charged for playing the 
game.251 And these ideas collectively draw on the trope of “support-
ing the devs” to offer a powerful endorsement of microtransactions. 
What stems from these accounts is a fairly nuanced picture. Sev-
eral ideas come to the fore. First, it is fair to charge a premium for 
in-game designs given the fact that Fortnite is a free-to-play game. 
Second, players express a need or desire to “support the developers” 
for their perceived contribution or service to the community. Third, 
and relatedly, the idea of loyalty figures prominently in players’ dis-
cussions of in-game purchases. In responding to complaints about 
high prices, players often profess a sense of loyalty or commitment 
toward the game’s developers. 
I argue that these themes can be coherently bound together by 
reference to the overarching idea of fairness as an incident of wealth 
sharing. The crux of the argument is that players are engaging in 
reciprocal behavior: they believe the developers to be sharing the 
wealth (by not charging money for the game itself), and thus recip-
rocate by “supporting the devs” and displaying “loyalty” through 
their embrace of in-game microtransactions. 
The notion of reciprocity has roots in behavioral theory. Behav-
ioral scientists have long touted reciprocity as a major force driving 
human behavior. At first blush, the notion of reciprocity seems to 
fly in the face of traditional assumptions that inform economic anal-
ysis: that is, that people seek to further self-regarding interests. But 
this picture is incomplete. While some studies find that people often 
behave in selfish ways under some circumstances, scholars widely 
 
251 See I Feel Skins Are a Bit Pricey, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/ 
r/FortNiteBR/comments/7ip61w/i_feel_skins_are_a_bit_pricey/ [https://perma.cc/U6FR-
VB47]; Skin Prices and the “It’s a Free Game” Excuse, REDDIT, 
https://www.reddit.com/r/FortNiteBR/comments/8wcqzl/skin_prices_and_the_its_a_free
_game_excuse/ [https://perma.cc/62ZY-P68S]; Nothing in This Game is Exclusive, Stop 
Complaining About It, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/FortNiteBR/comments/ 
8bf03k/nothing_in_this_game_is_exclusive_stop/ [https://perma.cc/ND4S-YQXT]; see 
also sourced cited in supra notes 247–249. 
2021] FAIRNESS, COPYRIGHT, AND VIDEO GAMES 747 
 
agree that people are also meaningfully attentive to considerations 
of fairness and, in particular, ideas of reciprocity.252 
This literature has yielded interesting insights. What might ex-
plain the disparity between selfish and fairness-driven behavior? 
Scholars believe that the notion of reciprocity can account for indi-
viduals’ willingness, or lack thereof, to engage in fairness-driven 
behavior.253 People are likely to repay the actions of others by acting 
in a similar fashion.254 Researchers describe reciprocity as an en-
trenched, almost innate, behavioral trait.255 People can tap into this 
reciprocal impulse when faced with a choice about how to interact 
with others.256 Specifically, as some studies have found, people are, 
at core, “conditional cooperators”—they are hard-wired to cooper-
ate, if only they perceive others to be acting in a like-minded man-
ner.257 People tend to think of fairness in relational terms. Their ac-
tions are dependent on the actions and intentions of others. And re-
cent studies suggest that people would go to great lengths to 
 
252 Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 
114 Q. J. OF ECON. 817, 818 (1999). One could argue that, in a sense, reciprocity is in fact 
about promoting one’s self-interests; you scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours. This 
argument comports with the conventional wisdom that reciprocity is one of the primary 
principles animating international law; namely, the idea that reciprocity promotes self-
regarding goals by facilitating international cooperation. See, e.g., Francesco Parisi & Nita 
Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 93 (2003). But 
while reciprocity can be explained on the basis of self-interest, it is decidedly informed by 
ideas of fairness that are largely germane to people’s perceptions of their social 
interactions. I say more on this in the remainder of this subpart. 
253 Schultz, supra note 16, at 698–701. 
254 See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity, 14 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 159, 159–60 (2000). See also Golnaz Tabibnia, Ajay 
B. Satpute & Matthew D. Lieberman, The Sunny Side of Fairness: Preference for Fairness 
Activates Reward Circuitry (and Disregarding Unfairness Activates Self-Control 
Circuitry), 19 PSYCH. SCI. 339 (2008) (arguing that ideas of fairness and reciprocity are 
enforced by neural mechanisms). 
255 See, e.g., LIXING SUN, THE FAIRNESS INSTINCT: THE ROBIN HOOD MENTALITY  
AND OUR BIOLOGICAL NATURE, 99 (2013) (suggesting that fairness evolved as an 
evolutionary trait). 
256  See Linda Bloom & Charlie Bloom, Honoring the Rule of Reciprocation, PSYCH. 
TODAY (Oct. 10, 2015), [https://perma.cc/XM6M-Y9WC]. 
257 Schultz, supra note 16, at 699 (observing that “[p]eople are thus conditional 
cooperators. They are willing to cooperate, but their continuing cooperation depends on 
what others are doing, the intentions of others, and how well others are doing (for better or 
worse) relative to themselves”). 
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vindicate their sense of fairness or reciprocity. Some would even be 
willing to take on risks—or sustain losses—in order to “punish” oth-
ers whom they perceive to have wronged them.258 Reciprocity, it 
seems, is almost a fact of human nature. 
As this discussion suggests, reciprocity is an incident of fairness. 
People engage in reciprocal behavior because they believe that to be 
fair. They do so in a host of social contexts and, most relevant to our 
discussion, in their interactions with content creators. A case in point 
is Mark Schultz’s study of jambands.259 Schultz investigated the so-
cial norms that pervade fan communities of jambands, such as 
Grateful Dead or Phish. These bands, Schultz argues, support and 
even encourage free copying and distribution of their music from 
live shows, while demanding that other performances, like recorded 
studio sessions, be legally purchased.260 This practice has powerful 
implications for the relationships between content creators and con-
sumers. By allowing some shows to be freely copied, these bands 
are thought to be “sharing the wealth.”261 And this practice, in turn, 
gives rise to a perception of fairness as fans believe that these jam-
bands are treating them fairly, unlike other commercial bands. 
Schultz thus suggests that fan communities of jambands are recip-
rocal and hence engender loyalty.262 
The themes identified in Schultz’s study—reciprocity, fairness, 
loyalty, and wealth sharing—all play a role in the gaming commu-
nity. As discussed above, players often enlist ideas of loyalty, fair-
ness, and wealth sharing (as a manifestation of reciprocity) in their 
interactions with game developers and fellow community members. 
Perceptions of wealth sharing abound among players. And these per-
ceptions, I argue, account for at least some of Fortnite’s success, 
 
258 Id. at 700 (referencing Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 252, at 818) (“People will 
cooperate and incur a cost in order to punish others—for example, socially snubbing 
somebody who violates community norms or taking a risk to steal from an employer who 
is perceived as unfair.”). 
259 Id. at 653, 668.  
260 Id. at 668–91. 
261 Id. at 714 (quoting a fan as saying: “While I have never seen the band, I have heard 
them many times through this site….These types of bands are small and not wealthy but 
let us listen to their music for free.”). 
262 Id. at 688–89. 
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because they legitimate the game’s microtransaction structure and 
catalyze players to “support the devs” and display loyalty. 
C. Labor 
The third subset of fairness norms arise out of gameplay streams. 
As discussed above, gameplay streams are self-produced, live vid-
eos of people playing video games. The most popular platform for 
gameplay streams is Twitch, where players can set up their own 
channels, amass throngs of followers, and solicit donations.263 
Gameplay streams on Twitch are accompanied by concurrent live 
“stream chats,” where viewers can interact both with each other and 
with the streamer.264 Some streamers, though not all, superimpose a 
graphic “overlay” on their videos: an overlay is a graphic feature 
that usually displays the streamer’s name and logo, as well as vari-
ous design elements that the streamer finds desirable.265 Streamers 
can also design custom emojis, called emotes, to be used by sub-
scribers in the stream chat. Gameplay streams often stretch for hours 
on end—it’s not at all uncommon for a popular streamer to stream 
for eight hours straight.266 In addition, streamers are expected to in-
teract with their audience, so they must play the game while remain-
ing fairly responsive to messages posted to the stream chat.267 
This subpart explores the norms of fairness underlying gameplay 
streams. It begins by examining the norm against perceived misap-
propriation of gameplay streams. It then delimits with greater 
 
263 How Twitch.tv Works and Its Business Model, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest 
opedia.com/articles/investing/082115/how-twitchtv-works-and-its-business-model.asp 
[https://perma.cc/SF3M-DWA7]. 
264 See text accompanying supra notes 118–124. 
265   The demand for graphic Twitch overlays has ballooned in recent years, with hundreds 
of websites and designers offering overlay design services for pay. See, e.g., TWITCH 
OVERLAY, http://twitchoverlay.com [https://perma.cc/55F6-HAEB]; STREXM, 
http://strexm.tv [https://perma.cc/HLR6-34N3]; STREAMLABS, http://streamlabs.com 
[https://perma.cc/S6VV-GTDS]; STREAMPLAY, http://streamplaygraphics.com [https:// 
perma.cc/SGT7-R95Q]. 
266 See infra Section III.C.5. 
267 See William A. Hamilton, Oliver Garretson, & Andruid Kerne, Streaming on 
Twitch: Fostering Participatory Communities of Play Within Live Mixed Media, PROC. OF 
THE SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 1315, 1316 (Apr. 2014), 
https://ecologylab.net/research/publications/streamingOnTwitch.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7 
QZ-PAKW]. 
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precision the contours of that norm, betraying some of the ambiguity 
and nuance associated with its application. It next outlines the mech-
anisms used to enforce that norm, before turning to consider the 
workings of copyright law, explaining why the law is only partly 
calibrated to protect gameplay streams. 
1. Misappropriation Norm 
Streamers often take direct steps to deter against misappropria-
tion of their gameplay streams: they frequently submit takedown no-
tices268 or bring claims via YouTube’s Content ID system.269 They 
also take to Twitter and other platforms to shame alleged infringers 
and call attention to infractions of their perceived rights. 
The prototypical case of infringement involves YouTube: in-
fringers often record, in whole or in part, Twitch gameplay streams 
and then repost them on YouTube.270 One notable streamer, for ex-
ample, posted a message to Twitter announcing that he had success-
fully taken down a YouTube video featuring contents lifted from his 
Twitch streams.271 Another streamer posted a message suggesting 
he had similarly been able to take down an infringing YouTube 
video, labeling the purported infringer a “leech.”272 And even some 
of the biggest streamers in the world, such as Richard Blevins, have 
previously intimated that they would not hesitate to take down “in-
fringing” videos.273 Moreover, many streamers affix ominous copy-
right notices to their streams. These notices typically caution against 
 
268 See text accompanying infra notes 325–327. 
269 See Rebecca Tushnet, All of This Has Happened Before and All of This Will Happen 
Again: Innovation in Copyright Licensing, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1447, 1457–78 (2015) 
(reviewing YouTube’s Content ID system). 
270 See, e.g., Luke Winkie, That Highlight Channel You Love Isn’t Exactly Legal, But It 
Isn’t Going Anywhere Either, DOT ESPORTS (Sept. 12, 2016, 09:12 AM), 
https://dotesports.com/hearthstone/news/twitch-youtube-highlight-channels-legality-3872 
[https://perma.cc/YC2S-A929] (describing the work of a famous YouTube channel whose 
contents consist of clips lifted from Twitch and other YouTube channels). In the balance 
of this Section, I will outline a number of other prominent examples. 
271  Curtis McCall (@RewindNV), TWITTER (Feb. 20, 2019, 6:40 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/RewindNV/status/1098366880480251905 [https://perma.cc/Z25W-E57S]. 
272 Ryan Amaechi (@SylverRye), TWITTER (June 3, 2019, 9:01 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
SylverRye/status/1135713144427483137 [https://perma.cc/ Z3L2-72W9]. 
273 H3 Podcast Highlights, Ninja Addresses Jake Paul Clickbaiting Him, YOUTUBE (Apr. 
23, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7QT6-2R2H] (starting at 1:45). 
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the copying or “stealing” of streaming content. One such notice, 
posted by a prominent Twitch streamer, warned that “[a]ny channel 
that post[s] this stream content other than [the streamer] on 
YouTube…infringes upon rights to my content [and] will be penal-
ized accordingly.”274 Another streamer appended to his channel a 
brief notice pleading “[d]on’t steal my content, you shady YouTube 
channels.”275 Yet another popular streamer quipped, “[s]weet, now 
we got people stealing footage. Copyright strikes going out.”276 
Some streamers voice concern over the technological means by 
which copying of streams in made possible. A notable streamer of 
Mortal Kombat, for example, decried the game’s recording function, 
which allows players to access in-game recordings of matches 
played by others.277 Players can enable automatic recording of their 
in-game matches, and these recordings are then generated and stored 
on the game’s servers.278 This feature has allowed alleged infringers 
to lift contents (namely, gameplay footage) directly from the game’s 
servers. Thus, to reproduce a player’s gameplay video, potential in-
fringers need not access the player’s Twitch stream: they can simply 
access the recordings stored on the game’s servers.279 
 
274 See Screenshot of Twitch Stream Hosted by KHTX_Scar on March 13, 2019 (on file 
with author). 
275 See Screenshot of Twitch Stream Hosted by LTH_BigD on March 13, 2019 (on file 
with author). 
276 Carl White (@PerfectLegend), TWITTER (Mar. 18, 2019, 12:13 AM), 
https://twitter.com/PerfectLegend/status/1107495324594176000 [https://perma.cc/Y44Z-
S4BM]. 
277 Destroyer (@DestroyerFGC), TWITTER (Apr. 29, 2019, 9:45 AM), 
https://twitter.com/DestroyerFGC/status/1122859447360065536 [https://perma.cc/2ENS-
DA2S.] 
278  Andrew Burnes, Mortal Combat 11 Adds NVIDIA Ansel and Highlights On PC, 
NVIDIA (May 17, 2019), https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/geforce/news /mortal-kombat-
11-pc-nvidia-ansel-highlights/ [https://perma.cc/SN4A-BSCV]. 
279 Why would potential infringers try to avoid lifting contents from a player’s Twitch 
stream? The answer is that, while it is unclear whether gameplay streams are themselves 
protected, they typically feature other protected elements: a graphic overlay as well as a 
recording of the streamer’s voice. As a result, potential infringers are able to minimize their 
legal exposure by directly extracting gameplay videos from the game’s online servers, thus 
sidestepping the need to record Twitch streams (and their accompanying overlays and 
voice recordings). I say more on the legal protection of gameplay stream in Part III.C.4 
below. 
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Many streamers describe the unauthorized use of one’s streams 
in terms of “theft” or “stealing.” Some even suggest that the unau-
thorized use of streams is comparable to the widespread practice of 
file-sharing in the music industry.280 To illustrate, consider the cru-
sade launched by two famous streamers, known by their online 
pseudonyms Pokimane and ZeRo, against what they call “content 
theft.”281 ZeRo, whose real name is Gonzalo Barrios, is a popular 
streamer of the game Super Smash Bros., attracting thousands of 
viewers every night on Twitch. In a lengthy message posted to Twit-
ter, Barrios complained that “people…tak[e] chunks of [his] 
stream[s] and put[] them on YouTube to make money them-
selves.”282 He further clarified that this practice regularly takes the 
shape of compilation-like “highlights” videos based on various clips 
lifted from his stream, or specific matches cropped out of his stream 
and uploaded to YouTube as distinct videos.283 Denouncing such 
appropriations as “wrong,” Barrios warned that he will take steps to 
remove infringing videos and further asked that fans alert him to 
future violations.284 
Another probative example is the controversy surrounding pop-
ular streamer Pokimane, whose real name is Imane Anys.285 After a 
YouTube user uploaded a video consisting of clips from Pokimane’s 
channel, she hastily placed a copyright strike on the user’s channel, 
exclaiming that she will not tolerate perceived misappropriations of 
her streams.286 These sentiments are reflective of the deeply held 
 
280 Brant McCaskill (@Bambamguitar), TWITTER (June 6, 2019, 12:24 PM), 
https://twitter.com/bambamguitar/status/1136670299024429058 [https://perma.cc/SX5S-
R9VQ]. 
281 Steven Asarch, Twitch Streamers Pokimane and ZeRo Fight Against Content Theft, 






286 Id. Some high-profile streamers believe that Pokimane’s frequent use of the copyright 
strike system is excessive or otherwise abusive. See, e,g., Virginia Glaze, KEEMSTAR 
Accuses Pokimane of Abusing YouTube’s Copyright System, DEXERTO (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://www.dexerto.com/entertainment/keemstar-accuses-pokimane-of-abusing-
youtubes-copyright-system-266637/ [https://perm a.cc/9DJY-BBPK] [hereinafter “Glaze, 
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views of streamers and fans in the gaming community. A user on 
Reddit, for instance, castigated alleged violators as “thieves,” assert-
ing that YouTube needs to do more to combat “content stealers” who 
profit from “stolen videos.”287 The user then listed a number of 
“compilation channels” known for lifting streamers’ content.288 
In sum, streamers guard against perceived misappropriations of 
their streams. Community members view gameplay streams as pro-
prietary intellectual goods owned by streamers. Accordingly, al-
leged violators are often chastised as “thieves” or “content stealers” 
worthy of rebuke. 
2. Defining Misappropriation 
The norm against misappropriation of gameplay streams is 
somewhat nuanced. Though framed in broad terms, it is subject to 
several contested limitations. First and foremost, many streamers 
appear to hold the view that appropriation of their streams is permis-
sible to the extent that it is transformative—namely, that it adds 
value to the original stream.289 One can add value to the original 
stream by editing, slashing, or mixing stream content with other con-
tent. Transformative use of gameplay streams must also reflect, gen-
erally speaking, the appropriator’s own creative voice. So, to escape 
infringement, alleged appropriators need to make significant 
changes to the lifted stream, either by mixing it with some other 
content or by editing it in a way that would mirror the appropriator’s 
own voice. 
 
Keemstar Accuses Pokimane”]; Virginia Glaze, PewDiePie Calls Out Pokimane for Copy 
Striking Smaller YouTube Channels, DEXERTO (Jan. 11, 2019), [https://perma.cc/29EE-
W473] [hereinafter Glaze, PewDiePie Calls Out Pokimane]. 
287 u/TexBoo, @YouTube why are Twitch compilation channels allowed to Monetize 
content? They are nothing more than content stealers and there are multiple posts, videos 
and forum threads about this. Even large Youtubers with millions of subscribers are talking 
about it. Yet you allow it?, REDDIT (Sept. 16, 2018, 4:13AM), https://www.reddit.com/ 
r/youtube/comments/9g7rze/youtube_why_are_twitch_compilation_channels/ [https://per 
ma.cc/6VBW-GFWW] [hereinafter Twitch Compilation Channels]. 
288 Id. 
289  Willie Clark, The (Still) Uncertain State of Video Game Streaming Online, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 28, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2018/01/to-stream-or-not-to-
stream-how-online-streaming-game-videos-exist-in-an-ip-world/ [https://perma.cc/BW9G 
-QKCL]. 
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Much like gameplay streamers, courts also look to transforma-
tive use in excusing copyright infringement. They do so under the 
fair use analysis. Fair use is the principal defense to copyright in-
fringement.290 Whether a particular use is fair is assessed against 
four factors.291 The first and arguably most important factor involves 
the character and purpose of the use—courts are asked to consider 
whether the use is commercial and, more importantly, whether it is 
transformative.292 This requirement aligns with the notion of trans-
formative use embraced by steamers; it recognizes as transformative 
any use that adds “something new, with a further purpose or differ-
ent character, altering the first [work] with new expression, mean-
ing, or message.”293 
But while many streamers seem to accept that transformative use 
is permissible in theory, few agree on what this actually means in 
practice. Let us consider again the two cases described above—the 
incidents involving Twitch streamers Pokimane and ZeRo. 
Pokimane herself was quoted as recognizing that copying her 
streams would be permissible if “you edit videos and actually put 
effort into it and make it more entertaining for the viewer.”294 Con-
tent from Pokimane’s stream, recall, was used by another YouTube 
user. Yet, strikingly, the video in question did not involve wholesale 
 
290 Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub, Copyright’s Framing Problem, 64 UCLA L. REV. 
1102, 1141 (2017) (“The most important defense to copyright infringement is fair use.”). 
291 The fair use doctrine is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted 
work…is not an infringement of copyright.”). See William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1662 (1988); see generally Pamela 
Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815 (2015); Clark D. Asay et 
al., Is Transformative Use Eating the World?, 61 B.C.L. REV. 905 (2020). 
292 Asay et al., supra note 291, at 906.  
293 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). As the court 
explained,  
[a]lthough such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a 
finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the 
arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. 
Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee  
of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more 
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of  
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of  
fair use. 
Id.  
294 See Asarch, supra note 281. 
2021] FAIRNESS, COPYRIGHT, AND VIDEO GAMES 755 
 
copying on the part of the alleged infringer; rather, it offered com-
mentary on controversies in which Pokimane was embroiled at the 
time.295 In his video, the alleged infringer included cropped-out 
Pokimane clips intermixed with clips and screenshots of another 
YouTuber with whom Pokimane was supposedly feuding.296 And, 
as other notable streamers emphasized, this sort of use surely quali-
fies as transformative by community standards.297 The purportedly 
infringing video was heavily edited and no doubt involved effort and 
commentary on the part of the secondary user. Thus, lofty ideals 
aside, Pokimane appeared willing to recognize transformative use 
as permissible in theory, but grappled with applying this concept in 
practice, at least when her own content was at issue.298 
Similar lessons might be gleaned from the incident involving 
Gonzalo Barrios, known by his online pseudonym ZeRo.299 As ex-
plained previously, Barrios published a widely discussed Twitter 
post complaining that his Twitch streams are frequently lifted and 
reposted on YouTube.300 But, in keeping with community norms, 
Barrios nonetheless acknowledged that subsequent transformative 
use would not be offensive to his (perceived) rights. He noted that 
he does not necessarily object to any secondary use of his Twitch 
streams, claiming that it would be “great to see” videos in which 
third parties provide commentary on matches they had played 
 
295 See Bowblax, Keemstar vs. Pokimane Twitter Fight—Bullying SSSniperWolf Fanboy, 
YOUTUBE (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9qhlsHrA50 [https://per 
ma.cc/RGL7-538W]. 
296  Id. 
297 See Glaze, Keemstar Accuses Pokimane, supra note 286; Glaze, PewDiePie Calls Out 
Pokimane, supra note 286. 
298 Josh Katzowitz, YouTuber Pokimane Defends Herself Against PewDiePie’s 
Copyright Criticism, THE DAILY DOT (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.dailydot.com/ 
upstream/pokimane-pewdiepie-youtube-copyright-claims/ [https://perma.cc/HWV3-
7XHA]. Pokimane’s response likely betrayed the true reason behind her decision to take 
action against the alleged infringer—the latter’s video painted an unfavorable picture of 
her, and Pokimane therefore wanted to remove the video to protect her reputation. “That 
video was getting a lot of traction at the time,” she said, “and being completely honest, I 
kind of wanted to be over with all the petty drama.” Id. 
299 Andrew Cohen, Facebook Gaming Signs Super Smash Bros. Star Gonzalo ‘ZeRo’ 
Barrios, SPORTTECHIE (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.sporttechie.com [https://perma.cc/ 
EQ8R-7GV3]. 
300 See Asarch, supra note 281. 
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against him.301 Barrios intuited that, in such cases, he might see 
value in contributing his work to someone else’s project and further 
asked that secondary users directly inquire with him about the use 
of his videos.302 This view is seemingly consonant with the general 
approach to transformative use in the streaming community; 
namely, that secondary use is permissible insofar as it adds some-
thing new to the original video. 
That said, this view also risks narrowing the scope of transform-
ative use by mandating that any secondary use—including ostensi-
bly permissible transformative use—be subject to clearance by the 
owner of the original video stream. Should Barrios be the one to 
make the ultimate determination as to whether the use is transform-
ative? On this view, the task of adjudicating transformative use is 
entrusted to the owner of the original video, and her alone. This pro-
cedural limitation is alarming because (perceived or actual) 
rightsholders are naturally predisposed to find that secondary uses 
are non-transformative more often than not. 
In addition to transformative use, a number of other limitations 
cabin the scope of the anti-appropriation norm identified above. One 
such limitation stems from the nature of online games—players typ-
ically face off against other players. As a result, it is commonly ac-
cepted that, if a streamer engages with another player online, the 
latter is herself allowed to upload a self-recorded video depicting her 
match (or set of matches) with the streamer.303 
Another extenuating factor circles around the question of 
whether the original streamer uploaded her contents to YouTube. 
The issue recently came to a head in a lengthy Twitter discussion 
ignited by a notable streamer who complained about his Twitch vid-
eos being lifted and reposted to YouTube.304 Though most com-
menters sympathized with the streamer, a substantial subset of the 
comments pointed out that the streamer had not uploaded his 
streams to YouTube; as one commenter suggested, the alleged 
 
301 Id. 
302 Id. (“ZeRo has asked those that want to use his content to email him first….”). 
303 Id. (recognizing that other players may upload videos of matches they had played 
against the streamer). 
304 See Amaechi, supra note 272. 
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copier was actually doing the streamer a favor—by reposting the 
streamer’s video on YouTube, the copier helped him gain “extra fol-
lowers.”305 Others noted that the streamer himself does not operate 
a YouTube channel, hence suggesting that such infringers in fact 
take on the role of “good marketing managers [who are] boost[ing] 
[the streamer’s Twitch] channel.”306 Still other commenters ob-
served that, while community members would rather watch “offi-
cial” videos uploaded by steamers themselves, “availability is 
huge.”307 Put another way, people hunger for high-quality streaming 
content and will watch “unofficial” content ripped from streamers if 
no “official” content is available.308 And while some users conceded 
that the streamer could potentially profit from posting his videos 
himself, others countered that the infringer is generating “coverage 
and exposure”309 from which the streamer might benefit. In doing 
so, the infringer is providing access to content that is otherwise in-
accessible. The implication is that the original streamer does not 
maintain a YouTube channel himself and therefore cannot claim to 
be harmed by alleged infringers. 
This episode tees up rather elegantly the potential limitations of 
a broad anti-appropriation norm: if the original Twitch streamer 
does not post her contents to YouTube, others might be justified in 
doing so. This view can be explained on the basis of monetary harm. 
Because the original streamer does not monetize gameplay streams 
by uploading them to YouTube, the streamer wouldn’t be harmed 
by unauthorized third-party uploads. Alternatively, this view can 
also be motivated by the desire to ensure public access to gameplay 
streams: by uploading streams to YouTube, alleged infringers are 
 
305 See comment by Nazeyr (@TheVezc), TWITTER (June 3, 2019, 9:04 PM), 
https://twitter.com/TheVezc/status/1135713830170812416 [https://perma.cc/EXQ8-
BLBQ]. 
306 See comment by Ejyptian (@Ejyptian), TWITTER (June 4, 2019, 2:10 AM), 
https://twitter.com/Ejyptian/status/1135790789643132928 [https://perma.cc/8VZV-
V596]. 
307 See comment by Zachary T. (@PrismoNasty), TWITTER (June 3, 2019, 9:14 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Prismonasty/status/1135716500504027142 [https://perma.cc/9U4P-
Y9TH]. 
308 See id. 
309 See comment by Ravishing Rick (@Longfut_), TWITTER (June 4, 2019, 4:34 PM), 
https://twitter.com/LONGFuT_/status/1136008352373313536 [https://perma.cc/RG4C-
MH7W]. 
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facilitating wider dissemination of such works. Indeed, people de-
rive a great deal of pleasure from watching gameplay streams.310 
And so community members are less likely to take issue with al-
leged infringements when such infringements implicate streamers 
who never, or practically never, post on YouTube themselves. 
Taken together, these considerations correspond closely to the 
underlying balance that copyright law seeks to strike between incen-
tives and access.311 The law embodies a measured tradeoff between 
two competing considerations: providing sufficient incentives to 
creators and ensuring that works of authorship ultimately become 
accessible to society at large. These concerns mirror the debate over 
whether the streamer is required to post her own contents to 
YouTube.  By failing to do so, she might prevent the dissemination 
of her work, thus limiting its accessibility. And failure to post 
streaming content on YouTube might also suggest that YouTube 
monetization plays little role in incentivizing the original creator.  
To put it more concretely, these policy considerations—incen-
tives and access—both pull in the same direction. They support a 
finding of non-infringement when the streamer failed to inde-
pendently post contents to YouTube. They arise out of a system of 
community norms yet appear to comport with the broader policy 
goals underpinning copyright law. 
Discussions along these lines are fairly common. Most gamers 
agree that streamers hold rights to their gameplay streams, but there 
remains a significant minority of community members who appear 
to believe that misappropriations can be excused where the original 
streamer fails to post her contents to YouTube.312 These observa-
tions are consistent with the literature on the psychology of copying. 
Scholars have found that, although people often view copying as in-
herently wrong, they are also inclined to consider a host of fairness-
driven factors in excusing infringement, such as whether the copier 
 
310 See text accompanying supra notes 102–103. 
311 See infra Section IV.A.  
312  See text accompanying supra notes 304–309. 
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benefited from the copying, what the copier’s intent was, and so 
forth.313 
In short, the norm against misappropriation of gameplay streams 
is subject to one principal qualification:  transformative use. Apart 
from transformative use, community members recognize two addi-
tional checks on streamers’ rights:  (i) a player who directly engages 
in-game with the streamer is allowed to monetize her self-recorded 
matches with the streamer; and (ii) whether the streamer herself up-
loaded her contents to YouTube might be relevant in considering 
infringement, though it appears that community members are di-
vided on this score. 
3. Enforcement 
Players communicate about repeat infringers. They identify, 
name, and shame known offenders. And they often help other 
streamers detect infringing videos by policing the YouTube and 
Twitch channels run by such repeat infringers.314 In one case, a 
prominent streamer took to Twitter to acknowledge that a fellow 
streamer had notified him of an alleged misappropriation of his 
stream.315 And consider again the case of Gonzalo Barrios, whose 
now-famous Twitter post impassionedly implored community 
members to assist him in an effort to combat stream “stealing.”316 
These cases illustrate that norm enforcement is often a collective 
undertaking: community members and streamers work together with 
an eye toward policing norm violators. 
Gamers frequently identify repeat infringers.317 Condemning 
such infringers as “leeches” or “vultures,”318 gamers respond to 
norm transgression by invoking social sanctions—that is, by inflict-
ing reputational harm through the use of negative campaigns and 
 
313 Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright 
Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2466 (2016). 
314 See, e.g., Twitch Compilation Channels, supra note 287. 
315 See H3 Podcast Highlights, supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
316 See Asarch, supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
317 For example, consider the case described in the text accompanying supra notes 287–
288 (a Reddit post providing a long list of infringing YouTube channels to assist streamers 
with identifying norm contravention). 
318 Id. 
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shaming.319 The gaming community is surprisingly tight-knit; dif-
ferent sub-communities typically emerge around different video 
games.320 These communities are often divided into two classes of 
players: casual and professional. Professional gamers, as opposed to 
casual ones, engage in competitive gaming.321 And, perhaps more 
importantly, competitive gamers occupy a position of visibility 
within the community—they have a large audience on social media 
and are widely recognized as community leaders.322 Thus, they 
wield considerable power and influence, and are well-positioned to 
dispense harsh reputational sanctions to deter infringers. Social 
stigma is especially effective as a tool for policing norm violation.323 
And, to be sure, message boards and social media have greatly con-
tributed to the dissemination of negative gossip as a means of en-
forcing community norms. 
Last but not least, gamers also employ formal self-help reme-
dies. Specifically, they often issue takedown notices324 pursuant to 
 
319 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 57 
(1991) (discussing “negative gossip” as a tool for enforcing social norms). The literature 
on social norms is often traced back to Ellickson’s influential book, which focused on 
ranchers in Shasta County, California. Ellickson found that, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, Shasta County ranchers operated with little attention to formal property law, and 
instead subscribed to a system of extralegal norms. 
320 Keith Stuart, Gamer Communities: The Positive Side, THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/gamesblog/2013/jul/31/gamer-communities-
positive-side-twitter [https://perma.cc/G9RE-UZ6R] (recounting the history of gaming 
communities and discussing a number of examples of sub-communities that arose around 
different games). 
321 See Jayson van Kerckhoven, Casual vs. Competitive Gaming: What Are The 
Differences?, CRITICAL HIT GAMING (July 5, 2018), https://www.criticalhit.net/ 
gaming/casual-vs-competitive-gaming-differences/ [https://perma.cc/QMC5-ZVRD]. 
322 See, e.g., The Fortnite Team, Creative, EPIC GAMES (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.epicgames.com/fortnite/en-US/news/creative [https://perma.cc/YJ7 9-2ZYX] 
(identifying the YouTube channels of “Fortnite’s most imaginative community leaders”); 
Henry Choi, How to Get a Fighting Game Community to Thrive and Grow, EVENT HUBS 
(Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.eventhubs.com/news/2017/dec/02/how-get-fighting-game-
community-thrive-and-grow/ [https://perma.cc/WL72-DGMV] (identifying “community 
leaders” in three subcommunities of popular fighting games). 
323 Fagundes, supra note 133, at 1127 (discussing the centrality of social norms to 
enforcement of derby-name norms); Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 20 (analyzing 
enforcement of the social norms that govern standup comedy). 
324 See text accompanying supra notes 271–272. 
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Section 512 of the Digital Copyright Millennium Act (DMCA),325 
which shields service providers from copyright liability so long as 
they meet a number of statutory requirements. In particular, the ser-
vice provider must act expeditiously to remove infringing content 
upon acquiring actual or “red flag” notice of infringement.326 The 
process for submitting a takedown notice on YouTube is fast and 
simple: in essence, streamers need only fill out a brief online form 
and identify the source material that was allegedly copied.327 
Takedown notices are thus an efficient means of redressing norm 
infraction. But, as will become apparent in the next section, it’s not 
clear what rights, if any, streamers may actually assert in their game-
play streams. Their use of legal self-help tools is therefore question-
able. Streamers seem to believe, in conformity with community 
norms, that gameplay streams are their legal property.328 Yet that is 
debatable, as the remainder of this Part suggests. 
4. Gameplay Streams: The Law 
Community members may leverage any number of legal strate-
gies in asserting legal exclusivity over their gameplay streams. Most 
 
325 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
326 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). Section 512(i) further requires service providers to adopt a 
reasonably implemented policy for terminating repeat infringers “in appropriate 
circumstances.” § 512(i). 
327 Submit a Copyright Takedown Request, YOUTUBE, https://support.google. 
com/youtube/answer/2807622?hl=en [https://perma.cc/88DY-5EMJ]. 
328 It’s worth noting that, at least nominally, Section 512 provides some procedural 
safeguards to prevent misuse. For example, Section 512 mandates that, in issuing a 
takedown notice, copyright holders must have a “good faith belief that the use of the 
material” was at odds with their rights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(v), 512(f) (creating a 
cause of action for bad faith assertion of copyright or fair use). Although the Ninth Circuit 
has held that copyright holders must consider fair use in good faith before submitting a 
takedown notice, courts have often interpreted the good faith clause as requiring only a 
subjectively held state of mind. See Lenz v. Univ. Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 
2015). For that reason, the good faith requirement would be of little use to the vast majority 
of users. Most users are non-sophisticated and risk-averse, and are thus unlikely to avail 
themselves of the safeguards specified in Section 512. But see Sheri Pan, Lenz v. Universal 
Music: Ninth Circuit Amends Opinion to Broaden Fair Use Protections in DMCA 
Takedowns, JOLT DIGEST (Apr. 4, 2016), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/ninth-circuit-
amends-opinion-to-broaden-fair-use-protections-in-dmca-takedowns [https://perma.cc/ 
SY7V-UKPU] (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s revised opinion in Lenz v. Universal Music 
Corp., where the court held that the copyright owner’s assessment of fair use before filing 
a takedown notice must be reasonably extensive). 
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notably, copyright law presents a readily accessible avenue for legal 
protection. Copyright law is likely to extend to two features that are 
common to many Twitch streams: a graphic overlay and the 
streamer’s recorded voiceover. Assuming that it is original, a 
graphic overlay appears to be a protectable graphic work.329 While 
many overlays share common themes with respect to colors and 
standard design elements, they should normally qualify for copy-
right protection under the law’s minimalist originality standard.330 
Similarly, the streamer’s voiceover is also likely to qualify for cop-
yright protection as an original sound recording.331 And while the 
law requires that protected works be fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression, overlays and voice recordings satisfy this standard 
simply by being captured in the streamer’s video.332 
The recording of a streamer’s voiceover could nonetheless be 
challenged on the grounds that it merely embodies an unprotected 
idea rather than a protected expression.333 Streamers do not follow a 
script. They engage with their audience by responding to queries, 
questions, or comments posted in the stream chat.334 In effect, the 
streamer’s comments during the live stream resemble a form of a 
conversation—a conversation between the streamer and her 
 
329 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” as protected 
subject matter). 
330 See Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1990), where Justice 
O’Connor clarified that some degree of creativity is essential to originality. She further 
rejected the “sweat of the brow” doctrine that some lower courts had embraced in holding 
that works of authorship should be protected inasmuch as their authors expended time and 
effort to create them. See id. at 345, 359–60, 362. At the same time, Justice O’Connor made 
clear that the amount of required creativity is minimal, stating that “[t]he requisite level of 
creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works 
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, 
humble or obvious’ it might be.” Id. at 345. 
331 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (defining sound recordings as protectable subject matter). 
332 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a work as “fixed” when it is “sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
more than transitory duration”). 
333 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
334 Engaging Viewers, CREATOR CAMP: TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/creator 
camp/en/level-up/engaging-viewers/ [https://perma.cc/EF5A-TNEZ]. 
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audience.335 And some courts have been hesitant to recognize copy-
rights in interviews and spontaneous conversations, reasoning that 
these forms of spontaneous speech reflect unprotected ideas or oth-
erwise fail to meet the threshold for minimal creativity.336 
Another problem stems from streamers’ use of voice-chat soft-
ware to chat with fellow gamers while streaming. A recorded con-
versation between multiple parties could result in a copyrightable 
sound recording. But who owns the recording? To establish co-au-
thorship under U.S. copyright law, putative co-authors must demon-
strate their mutual intent to create a work of joint authorship.337 The 
requirement of mutual intent presents a substantial challenge.338 In 
the absence of co-authorship, courts may find that a multiparty 
sound recording amounts to a collective work consisting of multiple 
independent contributions.339 In this scenario, each contributor 
holds rights to her separate contribution (provided that it is inde-
pendently copyrightable). If this were the case, streamers would be 
barred from claiming sole ownership over gameplay streams in 
which they interacted audibly with multiple other contributors. Al-
ternatively, the streamer could claim to be the sole author of the en-
tire integrated sound recording. Yet that seems unlikely, because the 
streamer would be required to show that she exercised authority and 
control over the whole work to such an extent that she in fact 
 
335 Of course, when Twitch chats involve hundreds and thousands of participants, a 
traditional conversation is less likely to materialize. See Azadeh Nematzadeh et al., 
Information Overload in Group Communication: From Conversation to Cacophony in the 
Twitch Chat, 6 ROYAL SOC. OPEN SCI. 1 (2019). 
336 See, e.g., Falwell v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1207–09 (W.D. Va. 
1981); Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 808 F.Supp.2d 634, 635–36 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D.D.C. 1980). But 
see Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 349 (N.Y. 1968); Found. 
for Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan, Inc. v. Alcon Entm’t, LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00509-LMM 
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2016). 
337 17 U.S.C. § 201 (defining “joint work” as a work “prepared by two or more authors 
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent 
parts of a unitary whole”). 
338 Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that putative 
coauthors must “make objective manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors”). 
339 17 U.S.C. § 201 (contributions to collective works). 
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“superintended” the work.340 In a casual multiparty conversation 
among friends, it is implausible that the streamer would emerge as 
the single “master mind” behind the entire sound recording. 
Finally, the sound recorded during gameplay streams is often in-
tertwined with the sound emanating from the video game being 
played. The rights to the recorded sounds of a video game rest with 
the game’s rightsholders—typically, the publishing studio. And in 
cases where the sound from the game is intermixed with the record-
ing of the streamer’s voice, the resultant recording may constitute 
an unauthorized—and potentially unprotected—derivative work. 
In short, there are a number of meaningful obstacles to copyright 
protection of sound recordings in gameplay streams . Recordings of 
streamer voiceovers often encompass spontaneous conversations or 
oral statements that might not qualify as copyrightable works. In ad-
dition, these sound recordings often result from a conversation be-
tween multiple potential authors. They thus implicate limited, frag-
mented ownership interests. And the voiceover recording might be 
inseparable from the video game’s sound. As a result, the streamer 
would be ill-positioned to assert copyright ownership over her re-
cordings. 
Apart from the overlay and sound recording embedded in the 
gameplay stream, streamers could attempt to claim ownership over 
the actual gameplay footage. But the copyrightability of the game-
play video itself is contestable. The main problem is that it’s unclear 
whether the streamer is the actual author of the footage. In the lan-
guage of copyright law, the streamer appears to be merely “perform-
ing” the underlying video game. Is gameplay performance a copy-
rightable contribution?  
This point warrants some parsing. One might argue that simply 
playing a video game does not suffice to generate anything expres-
sive enough to qualify for copyright protection. This is because 
streamers seem to simply engage with someone else’s work, rather 
than create an expressive work of their own. Further, the idea that a 
performance constitutes a copyrightable work appears to rest on a 
 
340 Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1234 (holding that the “master mind” of the work is its 
sole creator—the one who conceives, directs, and executes the idea, thus superintending 
the work as a whole). 
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category mistake. The Copyright Act does not treat a performance 
as a type of “work.”341 Rather, a performance is a type of action 
through which one might create or exploit a work of authorship.342 
On this view, although the streamer is performing the relevant work, 
that performance does not give rise to a standalone “work.” It is in-
stead an exploitation of someone else’s work.  
Relatedly, some courts have questioned whether video game 
performance could be copyrightable. In one early case, the Seventh 
Circuit mused that “[p]laying a video game is more like changing 
channels on a television than it is like writing a novel or painting a 
picture.”343 In this telling, because the player is faced with a finite 
menu of pre-defined game sequences, she cannot be the author of 
any creative work that might result from her gameplay.344 And while 
a number of subsequent cases seem to hint at the possibility that 
player contributions could be classified as (copyrightable) deriva-
tive works, these cases largely focus on the status of modifications 
or add-ons generated by players.345 It is a separate question whether 
gameplay performance alone, without in-game modification, can re-
sult in a protected contribution.  
Nevertheless, some courts have recognized that performances 
evincing a minimum quantum of creativity could trigger copyright 
 
341 17 U.S.C. § 101 (to perform a work is “to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either 
directly or by means of any device or process”). 
342 See Brief for Professors of Intellectual Property Law as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
343  See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1982). 
344  Id. Another case pointing in the same direction is Williams Electronics v. Artic Int’l 
685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). There, the Third Circuit dismissed the defendants’ argument 
that creative gameplay could render the player a “co-author of what appears on the screen.” 
Id. at 874. Instead, the court emphasized that, “[a]lthough there is player interaction with 
the machine during the play mode,” the game relies on a “repetitive sequence […] and 
many aspects of the display remain constant from game to game regardless of how the 
player operates the controls.” Id. See also Dan L. Burk, Electronic Gaming and the Ethics 
of Information Ownership, 4 INT'L REV. INFO. ETHICS 39, 42 (2005) (pointing out that “the 
law has been slow to recognize the contributions of participants in [gaming scenaria]”); 
Dan L. Burk, Owning E-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1545–46 (2013). 
345  See, e.g., Micro Star v. FormGen, Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998).  
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protection.346 In particular, courts have occasionally taken the posi-
tion that sports performances—that is, movements by professional 
athletes—meet the threshold for copyrightable subject matter.347 
Performances of video games, the argument goes, may therefore 
prove sufficiently creative for the purpose of copyright protection. 
And, indeed, the idea that gameplay performance is copyrightable 
has recently found favor with a number of commentators.348 
Still, a mounting wave of critical commentary has pushed back 
against the view that unscripted performances constitute expressive 
works of authorship under copyright law, even when sufficiently 
original.349 It thus remains unclear whether streamers hold any rights 
 
346 Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1 
(2019) (concluding that dramatic performances by actors are protected under American 
copyright law). 
347 Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 669 (7th Cir. 1986). The 
Seventh Circuit suggested, in a lengthy footnote, that players’ performances—that is, their 
movements while playing the game—were original enough to trigger copyright protection 
once fixed. Id. at 669, n.7. See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12.1, 
at 2-142 (3d ed. 2018). Goldstein opines that “movements of players on the field, if 
original, constitute copyrightable expression.” Id. 
348  Tyler T. Ochoa, Who Owns an Avatar? Copyright, Creativity, and Virtual Worlds, 14 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 959 (2012); W. Joss Nichols, Painting Through Pixels: The Case 
for a Copyright in Videogame Play, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101 (2007). 
349 Playing a game—either a sports game or a video game—does not necessarily give rise 
to a protected “work” in the sense captured by modern copyright law. The question here is 
whether the performer is creating a protected expression. Are such performances 
expressive in the sense recognized by copyright law? Some courts have declined to extend 
protection to sports performances on the grounds that these performances do not qualify as 
expressive subject matter. See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that basketball games do not reflect “original works of authorship” under the 1976 
Copyright Act). But this approach is vulnerable to criticism; after all, copyright law already 
protects different categories of unscripted performances that could be described as non-
expressive in the sense referenced above. The law extends to the unscripted movements 
and postures of a dancer—although one can similarly call into question the expressive 
nature of a choreographic performance. To be sure, part of the problem is that performance 
is not recognized as an independent category of protectable subject matter. David Nimmer 
posits that performance should only be recognized as “an element of works potentially 
subject to copyright protection, but not as a stand-alone category that itself deserves 
recognition.” DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12(B)(3), at 2-178 (2018). Do 
gameplay performances actually reflect the type of expressive endeavor meant to be 
protected under copyright—and, if so, can they be protected under an independent, 
standalone category of copyrightable subject matter? A full exploration of these questions 
is beyond the scope of this Article. For a thoughtful discussion of similar concerns in the 
context of dramatic performances by actors, see Hughes, supra note 346, at 3.  
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to their performance of video games, not least because courts have 
not yet recognized gameplay as copyrightable subject matter. 
To further complicate matters, even if the gameplay perfor-
mance is itself copyrightable, the resulting stream may constitute an 
unlawful derivative work.350 The streamer does not own the rights 
to the underlying work; the publishing studio does. In other words, 
the underlying video game remains the property of the publishing 
studio. Whether the stream in question is an unauthorized derivative 
work depends on the terms of service that govern the underlying 
video game. Some developers explicitly disallow streaming.351 Oth-
ers permit only non-commercial streaming.352 And some developers 
allow players to stream only parts of the game,353 while others seem 
to have no policy in place at all.354 In many cases, then, the resulting 
stream would amount to an illegal derivative work. And, because 
gameplay streams are (potentially unauthorized) derivative works, 
streamers may be precluded from asserting copyright in their 
streams. 
To conclude, copyright law appears to provide some measure of 
legal protection, though potentially contested, to gameplay stream-
ers. But despite the availability of these legal tools, streamers rarely 
 
350 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“[P]rotection for a work employing preexisting material in which 
copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been 
used unlawfully.”). Although some courts  
351 See End User Licensing Agreement for Doom Eternal, BETHESDA, 
https://bethesda.net/en/eulas/doom-eternal [https://perma.cc/99J6-WCCG]. Section 3.4 
(titled Limitations and Restrictions) bars users from publicly displaying or performing any 
part of the game. 
352 Fortnite’s terms of service are instructive. See Fan Content Policy, EPIC GAMES, 
https://www.epicgames.com/site/en-US/fan-art-policy [https://perma.cc/EG77-FARD] 
(“Fan Content must have no commercial (i.e., monetary) objective. As an exception to this, 
fans are permitted to monetize web videos (such as YouTube) with advertisements.”).  
If enforced, this policy would outlaw Twitch streaming almost entirely: streamers on 
Twitch rely not only on ads, but also on subscription fees and channel donations. 
353 Megan Farokhmanesh, Persona 5 Developers Updated Their Streaming Guidelines, 
But Didn’t Fix the Big Problem, THE VERGE (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/27/15442580/persona-5-streaming-atlus-screenshots-
social [https://perma.cc/4H7Y-6RLU]. 
354 For example, the publishing studio Bungie, which develops the popular game Halo, 
appears to generally approve of streaming so long as donations or monetary support are 
not sought. See Help: Intellectual Property and Trademarks, BUNGIE (Jan. 26, 2021), 
https://www.bungie.net/en/Help/Article/45842 [https://perma.cc/UGG2-AZ6M].  
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pursue litigation. What could explain the reluctance of streamers to 
avail themselves of copyright law?  
Several reasons come to mind. First, litigation is costly.355 In the 
age of fast-paced digital consumption, it’s practically impossible to 
police every single incident of norm violation. Second, community 
members likely have a limited understanding of copyright law, as 
do most laypeople.356 So while streamers seem to command a rea-
sonable understanding of the technical process for submitting 
takedown notices, this surely does not mean they understand the in-
tricacies of the law. Third, as explained above, gameplay streams 
are protected to a limited extent—primarily with respect to their ac-
companying elements, such as the streamer’s voiceover and the sur-
rounding overlay. Putative infringers can thus avoid liability by ed-
iting out these protected elements. One way to do so, as I noted, is 
to extract gameplay recordings directly from the game’s servers. 
Fourth, and most importantly, streamers need not resort to liti-
gation. They can instead enforce their rights through the DMCA no-
tice-and-takedown system. This system enables streamers to swiftly 
remove unauthorized contents. And while the DMCA provides 
some (faint) safeguards against misuse—including a counter-notice 
procedure357—streamers rarely face any meaningful resistance from 
alleged infringers. This is because infringers are ill-informed about 
the law and, crucially, because they might also subscribe to commu-
nity norms regarding stream ownership. It’s likely that norm infring-
ers assume, like other community members, that streamers own their 
streams and are acting well within their rights in issuing takedown 
notices. 
Indeed, while streamers often submit takedown notices to ward 
against unauthorized copying of their gameplay streams, they fre-
quently fail to identify what elements of their streams are in fact 
 
355 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 44 (2017) 
(reporting that the average cost of copyright litigation ranges from $200,000 to $1 
million). See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2277, 2277–80 (2013) (noting that “[l]itigating a copyright claim is 
no longer an affordable prospect”). 
356 Gregory N. Mandel, What Is IP For? Experiments in Lay and Expert Perceptions, 
90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 659, 667–69 (2016). 
357 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(g)(2), 512(g)(3). 
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protected under copyright law. This points to a broader issue, one 
that is persistent but largely endemic to copyright law—the diffi-
culty of distinguishing protected from nonprotected elements.358 
5. Explaining Anti-Appropriation 
The anti-appropriation norm crystalized in this subpart is driven 
primarily by an idea of labor. Streamers believe that rights to their 
video streams result from the labor they poured into creating these 
streams. Doug Martin, famous Call of Duty streamer, has recently 
recalled: 
[The] biggest difference between YouTube and 
streaming is that [ . . . ] streaming is more hours; 
streaming is easier but it’s more time-consuming. 
You have to be very strict with your schedule. You 
have to be streaming every single day, 5-6-7 hours a 
day, whereas [on] YouTube, some of your best vid-
eos can literally take you 30 minutes [to make], and 
they can get a [lot] of views, and you don’t have to 
do anything for the rest of the day.359 
As this excerpt makes clear, streaming is hard work. Narrowly 
understood, work means time—and streaming is particularly time-
consuming. The most popular streamer in the world, Richard 
Blevins, spent no less than 3,800 hours streaming Fortnite in 
2018.360 These figures are staggering: they translate, roughly, to 11 
hours of streaming per day, including weekends. This is why many 
 
358 Christopher J. Sprigman & Samantha Fink Hedrick, The Filtration Problem in 
Copyright’s “Substantial Similarity” Infringement Test, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 571, 
579 (2019) (arguing that substantive similarity tests under U.S. law are ill-suited to 
distinguish protected from nonprotected elements). 
359 See Faze Censor, Quitting YouTube?, YOUTUBE (May 22, 2019), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OrXWEoQJKx8&t=173s [https://perma.cc/K3HL-
2LUV] (starting at 2:05). 
360 James Loke Hale, Ninja’s Spent 3,800 Hours Streaming ‘Fortnite’ This Year. That’s 
the Equivalent of 95 40-Hour Workweeks, TUBE FILTER (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.tubefilter.com/2018/12/04/ninja-how-many-hours-streaming-twitch-earnings 
[https://perma.cc/YG6G-HGDR]. 
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streamers advocate a minimum of four hours of streaming a day.361 
The assumption here is that, in essence, Twitch viewership picks up 
momentum over time. Extended streaming is therefore a necessity 
under Twitch’s viewership system. And the consequences can be 
dire. One streamer, for instance, penned a scathing jeremiad observ-
ing that the long hours of streaming had nearly cost him his life.362 
As he put it, “[y]ou need[] to spend a minimum of eight hours a day, 
at least six days a week, to get anywhere.”363 His streaming sched-
ule, he said, was so demanding that he could barely spare time to do 
anything save for streaming and eating.364 
In brief, streaming involves exceptionally long hours. And while 
streamers typically stream from the comfort of their homes, they are 
nonetheless shackled to a ruthless work schedule that requires long 
work hours and incredible day-to-day consistency. 
But for streamers, gameplay streaming involves more than just 
long hours; it also turns on expertise and skill. Fighting games offer 
a good example. These games are remarkably complex, and players 
spend thousands of hours studying these games in a scientific-like 
fashion, memorizing the frame data of each game. Building on the 
game’s under-the-hood mechanics, players resourcefully craft crea-
tive strategies that allow them to specialize in playing particular 
characters and effectively countering other characters.365 
A brief primer on frame data might prove useful. A frame is the 
basic unit of time in a video game; a still frame of graphics is dis-
played every 1/60th of a second.366 Thus, if a particular in-game 
 
361 Harry Lyles, Jr., Twitch Streaming Is a Job That’s Harder than It Looks. Here’s How 
Gamers Stay Balanced, SB NATION (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.sbnation.com/ 
2019/10/8/20897184/twitch-streamers-gamers-self-care [https://perma.cc/XC9W-7JBG] 
(“Most streamers are live for anywhere between four and 10 [sic] hours a day (sometimes 
longer!)….”). 
362 Joe Marino, Trying to ‘Make It’ as a Twitch Streamer Almost Killed Me, KOTAKU 




365    Id.  
366 David Sirlin, A Fighting Game First: Showing Frame Advantage, SIRLIN ON GAME 
DESIGN (Oct. 4, 2018), http://www.sirlin.net/posts/a-fighting-game-first-showing-frame-
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move launches within 4 frames, it starts in 4/60ths of a second. Each 
character in a fighting game is typically equipped with 15 to 30 
moves. Every move is broken down into numerous different frame 
data points, reflecting the various phases of the move (e.g., startup, 
recovery, etc.).367 Faster moves—that is, moves whose execution in-
volves fewer frames—are advantageous. A five-frame kick move, 
for example, is superior to a seven-frame kick move, because the 
former is faster. 
Analyzing the full roster of characters featured in the game, 
players must memorize hundreds, even thousands, of minute data 
points. They study the frame data underlying thousands of different 
in-game moves. Indeed, players pour a great deal of talent, ambition, 
and creativity into these games. To hone their skills, gamers must 
forge an understanding of the ways in which the game can and 
should be played. As one streamer pithily explained, “I put 2437 
hours on [the video game]…This is my life.”368 The streamer further 
noted that he deserves recognition because this is “something [he 
had] worked for.”369 Some video games require thousands of hours 
to learn and truly master. In assessing the effort that goes into 
streaming, players routinely factor in the time spent studying the 
game. Their conception of labor thus applies to the hours spent 
streaming as well as the time spent mastering the game. 
Moreover, aside from the raw effort associated with streaming 
and studying the game, streamers also believe they deserve rewards 
for the way in which they uniquely execute their vision of the game. 
One streamer observed: 
I feel like playing video games at the highest profes-
sional level is an art in and out of itself. You have to 
 
advantage [https://perma.cc/ZG87-4G9Y]; Wesley Yin-Poole, For the First Time, a 
Fighting Game Has Turned Frame Advantage into a Visual Effect, EUROGAMER (Oct. 5, 
2018), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2018-10-05-for-the-first-time-a-fighting-game 
-has-turned-frame-advantage-into-a-visual-effect [https://perma.cc/ST9X-Y77K]. 
367 Sirlin, supra note 366. 
368 Tommy Tweedy (@TweedyIN), TWITTER (Feb. 18, 2019, 12:22 PM), 
https://twitter.com/TweedyIN/status/1097546925178540032 [https://perma.cc/SS7C-
TFW8]. 
369 Tommy Tweedy (@TweedyIN), TWITTER (Feb. 18, 2019, 12:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/TweedyIN/status/1097546775722975232 [https://perma.cc/95RT-
6MHB]. 
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put your own creativity, mindset, and uniqueness 
into whatever character/environment that [you’re] in, 
and nobody else can play the way you can!370 
The idea here is that players do more than simply execute game 
commands in a technical fashion. Instead, they engage in a creative 
enterprise that reflects both their talent and creative vision. While 
video games are built on software code, and while the range of avail-
able in-game options is technically finite, no two high-level gamers 
play alike. Each develops her own unique style based on her under-
standing of the way in which the game should be played from a cre-
ative vantage point. 
Accordingly, streamers have a threefold understanding of labor. 
Depending on the context, labor is associated with (1) the time spent 
streaming the game; (2) the time required to study the game and ac-
quire expertise; and (3) the value that results from one’s execution 
of her creative vision of the game. This involuted understanding of 
labor animates streamers’ idea of ownership. As one streamer noted, 
he simply deserves the recognition he “[has] worked for.”371 And 
this understanding is not limited to streamers alone. Community 
members overwhelmingly endorse similar ideas based on the notion 
that streamers work hard to produce “content,” and thus merit a 
measure of protection over the intangible assets they had created.  
This tune will sound strikingly familiar to those versed in copy-
right theory—it brings to mind the Lockean labor theory, which 
holds that people deserve to own goods that they had created through 
productive labor.372 In Part IV.B. below, I revisit the labor theory 
and explain why, as the gaming case study shows, this theory is 
poorly tailored to inform copyright law. 
D. Taking Stock 
This Part elaborated at length on the concept of fairness in the 
gaming world. It sorted out three norms of fairness that dominate 
 
370 Dominique McLean (@SonicFox), TWITTER (Apr. 23, 2019, 9:40 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SonicFox/status/1120864944705220608 [https://perma.cc/68TA-
KE9T]. 
371 See supra note 362. 
372 See infra Section I.B. 
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the video game industry. First, I showed that players largely eschew 
in-game microtransactions to the extent that they provide competi-
tive, rather than cosmetic, enhancements. Second, I explained that 
the secret sauce to Fortnite’s success is partly rooted in the concept 
of wealth sharing: gamers are positively inclined to support free-
mium games because they view these games as facilitating wealth 
sharing on the part of game creators. Third, I explored gameplay 
streaming through the lens of the labor theory, suggesting that play-
ers guard against perceived misappropriations of their streams given 
the amount of labor—time, effort, skill, and vision—that they put 
into producing these streams. 
 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The preceding analysis identified a complex mosaic of fairness 
norms in the gaming community. I now draw on this descriptive ac-
count in mounting a normative case against strong IP protections. I 
argue that norms of fairness can produce insights relevant to the jus-
tificatory framework of copyright law. More specifically, these 
norms can minimize the risks associated with content production, 
and thus undermine the need for strong copyright protection. I sim-
ilarly cast doubt over the veracity of the labor theory: I show that 
the concept of intellectual “labor” is tied to a number of different 
ideas in the gaming community. These ideas vary by context and fail 
to provide a compelling justification for IP law. 
A. Revisiting Copyright Incentives 
The prevailing justification for copyright law is utilitarian. On 
this account, copyright law is concerned with striking a balance be-
tween two conflicting interests: the interest in providing incentives 
to creators on the one hand, and the interest in ensuring that intel-
lectual works are ultimately disseminated to the public on the 
other.373 This account turns on the observation that intellectual 
 
373 For an overview of the economic approach to copyright law, see Wendy J. Gordon & 
Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 189 
(Boudewijn, Bouckaert, & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. 
Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. 
PERS. 3, 11–18 (1991). 
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creations are both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous, thus resembling 
public goods.374 As a result, absent exclusive rights, creators 
wouldn’t be able to prevent others from making cheap copies of their 
works and undercutting their profits.375 And if the creator cannot re-
coup the costs of her initial investment, she would presumably 
choose not to create at all. Copyright law attends to this market fail-
ure by providing authors with time-limited, exclusive entitlements 
in their creations. This scheme is thought to cohere with the promise 
of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, namely to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”376 
At the same time, “the goal of intellectual property law is only 
to provide the ‘optimal incentive,’ not the largest incentive possi-
ble.”377 Copyright exacts a heavy toll: it allows creators to charge 
supracompetitive prices, thereby pricing some consumers out of the 
market. But the costs associated with a heavy-handed copyright re-
gime run deeper. By denying access to some consumers, copyright 
risks hampering the spread of knowledge and impeding the creation  
of new works. The process of creation is often referential or cumu-
lative.378 Authors work within a certain genre or field and draw in-
spiration from previous work in that field. It’s often the case, then, 
that authors build on preexisting works in creating new ones.379 And 
because copyright law limits access to existing works, it may impair 
the ability of future authors to produce new works. For this reason, 
 
374 David W. Barnes, Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods, 9 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 533, 533 (2011). 
375 See Paula Samuelson, Should Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy, 1 
U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 3–4 (2004); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 326 (1989); see also Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215 (2003) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement 
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the 
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts’Arts.’” (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954))). 
376 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
377 Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property 
Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 125 (1999). 
378 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997) (“[K]nowledge is cumulative—authors and inventors must 
necessarily build on what came before them.”). 
379 Id. 
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copyright law purports to provide creators with limited incentives 
that would encourage creativity while at once facilitating the dis-
semination of “information for the public benefit.”380 
U.S. copyright law is largely premised on this utilitarian ap-
proach.381 But commentators widely agree that the underlying bal-
ance between incentives and access is misaligned. Copyright law, 
many believe, is too protective of copyright holders. And the law 
consequently fails to safeguard the interests of consumers and sub-
sequent authors in accessing protected works. For decades, scholars 
have advanced arguments to this effect.382 Pamela Samuelson, for 
 
380 Marshall Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information 
Marketplace, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 851 (2001). 
381 See, e.g., Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 
433, 433 (2007) (noting that “[n]othing is more fundamental to copyright law than the 
concept of incentives”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright 
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1576–77 (2009) (“[C]opyright law in the United 
States has undeniably come to be understood almost entirely in utilitarian, incentive-driven 
terms.”); Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 513, 524 (1999) (“The fundamental premise of our copyright 
law is that the best way to encourage the creation of valuable works is to let authors capture 
the market value of those works.”). See generally Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (recognizing that “[b]y establishing a marketable right 
to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas”); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 
(2003); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 
1203 (1996); Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mills 
Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 187 (1985); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) 
(“The economic philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause]…is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public 
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors….”); Am. Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[C]opyright law celebrates the profit 
motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will 
redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.…The profit 
motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.”). 
382 See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, 
PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT (2004); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX (2008); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 
(2008); Jane C. Ginsburg, Can Copyright Become User-Friendly, 25 COLUM.  J. L. & ARTS 
71 (2001); Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Really Created a 
New Exclusive Right of Access? Attempting to Reach a Balance Between Users’ and 
Content Providers’ Rights, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 277 (2001); Niva Elkin-Koren, 
Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User Right Approach, in EXCEPTIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS 132 (Ruth Okediji ed., 2017); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement 
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example, famously argued that the law has trended toward a “maxi-
malist” construction of copyright.383 Modern copyright law is more 
robust and sweeping than ever before: copyright owners possess 
more rights, these rights are interpreted broadly, and they last 
longer.384 The needle has moved decidedly toward copyright owners 
and away from users. And though this trend is not entirely unidirec-
tional,385 the overall picture is at best contestable. Is this expansive 
vision of copyright law desirable from a policy perspective? On a 
utilitarian account, IP can only be justified to the extent that it pro-
duces a net positive effect. This doesn’t mean that we’d necessarily 
be better off with no IP, but it should at least give us pause. And it 
should provoke a measured reflection on the merits of IP across a 
wide range of creative industries. 
While the evidence is incomplete, the limited glossary presented 
in Part II can offer a few clues. It shows that numerous creative in-
dustries have been doing just fine without formal IP—communities 
of French chefs, comedians, drag queens, and even fashion design-
ers386 have managed to sustain relatively high levels of innovation 
despite the absence of formal IP. These studies appear to support the 
proposition that the law should be limited in scope: we simply don’t 
need to shoulder the burden associated with a heavy-handed IP re-
gime where it is unnecessary. 
Along the same lines, this Article cautions against strong IP. It 
suggests that strong IP may be undesirable in communities where 
 
and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003); Richard 
A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 123 (2002). 
383 Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED (Jan. 1, 1996), 
https://www.wired.com/1996/01/white-paper/ [https://perma.cc/K3WY-RVTX]. 
384 See generally supra note 382. 
385 Most prominently, courts have relied on the fair use doctrine to facilitate public access 
to protected works. An instructive example is the Google Books Project. Google sought to 
create a universal body of human knowledge by scanning, indexing, and storing millions 
of books. The Authors’ Guild brought action for copyright infringement, and Google 
countered that the scanning of these books—a large majority of which were not in the 
public domain—amounts to fair use. After a legal dispute that spanned nearly eight years, 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York sided with Google, holding that 
its use of the books was fair. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
386 See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 19. 
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fairness norms are prevalent. Specifically, fairness can reduce the 
risks that innovators face. Innovation is linked to two principal risks: 
the risk of commercial failure and the risk of commercial success.387 
If the copyrighted work proves commercially unviable—say, if con-
sumers simply do not want to purchase the author’s book or engage 
with it—then no amount of IP protection could salvage it. By con-
trast, if the work fares well in the market, the author faces a different 
potential risk: she might have to rely on IP to prevent competitors 
from copying the work and infusing the market with cheap copies. 
Subsequent copies are often costless and easy to mass-produce. The 
author might spend two years writing a book, but, once released, 
copies of the book can be made and digitally distributed at virtually 
no cost. The author would then be unable to recoup the costs of writ-
ing the book. IP protection may thus be necessary to ensure a return 
on the author’s initial investment. 
Norms of fairness, this Article suggests, can address both risks 
at once. First, fairness can reduce the risk of commercial failure. It 
can diminish the risks surrounding content production so long as 
consumers regard as “fair” the content provider’s business model. 
Freemium games present a striking example. To the extent that con-
tent providers steer clear from competitive enhancements, micro-
transactions can work wonders to boost profits.388 Freemium games 
can also give rise to communities of dedicated fans. One commen-
tator has made a similar argument in the context of jambands,389 and 
this Article extends and applies these insights to the massive gaming 
industry. In particular, it contends that ideas of wealth sharing can 
be conducive to sustaining communities of devoted fans, thus mini-
mizing the risk of consumer defection to potential market competi-
tors. Fairness, in short, is a markedly powerful tool, and content 
 
387 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Second Digital 
Disruption: Streaming & the Dawn of Data-Driven Creativity, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1555, 
1604 (2019) (explaining that authors face two main risks: “[T]he risk of failure. This is the 
risk that no one wants to read, watch, or listen to the work that the author creates…[and] 
the risk of success. This is the risk that a work in fact proves to be popular, and that 
popularity attracts pirates whose unauthorized copies steal away potential customers….”). 
388 See supra text accompanying notes 72–73. 
389 See generally Schultz, supra note 16; see also supra text accompanying notes 259–
262. 
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providers would be well-served by embracing principles of fairness 
in their business dealings. 
In addition, fairness norms hold the promise of addressing the 
second principal risk that creators face: the risk of commercial suc-
cess, i.e. that the product would be copied by competitors or con-
sumers. This Article shows that microtransactions, executed cor-
rectly, can largely cancel out the risk of piracy. This is because, 
simply put, there’s nothing left to copy. The game itself is freely 
available. When the content is offered at zero cost, consumers have 
little incentive to pirate.  
Of course, free-to-pay games also offer premium in-game pur-
chases; primarily, cosmetic enhancements released on a periodic ba-
sis. But these enhancements are hard to copy. First, copying in-game 
designs requires expertise, time, and resources. As opposed to file-
sharing in the music industry, copying in-game digital goods would 
require, in effect, using software code to manipulate the game’s un-
derlying executing code. Second, and most importantly, copying in-
game designs is impractical. Cosmetic in-game designs are hot com-
modities the minute they are released, but rapidly decrease in value. 
In many freemium games, such as Fortnite, in-game designs are re-
leased weekly. Players rush to purchase designs shortly after release: 
they want their characters to don the latest-and-greatest design, but 
are likely to lose interest as soon as a new design comes out. By the 
time copiers might get around to copying the latest in-game design, 
that design may no longer be in demand. Because in-game designs 
are held out as popular for only a fleeting moment, copying is un-
likely to flourish.390 The value of in-game designs stems from their 
 
390 The rationale for this, as explained above, is simple: copying is not always easy. This 
is especially true in the context of video games, where copying in-game digital goods 
requires a great deal of expertise, resources and, most importantly, time. But time is in 
short supply when in-game designs go out of style, so to speak, in a matter of days. Under 
these time constraints, piracy is unlikely to present much of a threat. Interestingly, in-game 
designs seem to differ from the cyclical pattern that engulfs fashion designs. Copying in 
the fashion industry is rampant, but some argue that piracy supports (rather than arrests) 
innovation in designs. This is because copying helps to cement fashion “trends.” In turn, 
trends communicate to consumers what designs are presently en vogue and thus drive 
increased consumption. However, at some point, there’s simply too much copying—the 
trend becomes overused, and consumers move on to the next trend (facilitated by 
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relative novelty and timely popularity. As a result, they are rarely 
the subject of widespread copying. This business structure is driven 
by fairness: for microtransactions to function properly, and for con-
sumers to remain engaged with the game over time, consumers have 
to regard the game as fair as a matter of competitive integrity and 
wealth sharing. 
Further, in the video game industry, copyright law is rarely used 
to guard against consumer piracy. In a free-to-play world driven by 
fairness, the threat of piracy is insubstantial. Instead, game develop-
ers invoke IP law to enforce norms of competitive integrity; namely, 
to prevent players from using various “hacks” or “cheats” to gain an 
unfair in-game advantage. In one recent high-profile case, the devel-
opers of Fortnite brought legal action against a fourteen-year-old 
boy accused of selling “cheats” for the game.391 The complaint al-
leged that the defendant infringed the developers’ rights by “in-
ject[ing] unauthorized computer code into [the plaintiffs’] copyright 
protected Fortnite code to allow its users to cheat.”392 To be sure, 
players care profoundly about perceptions of competitive integrity. 
And developers, ever attuned to these perceptions, seem increas-
ingly poised to enforce ideas of competitive integrity. 
The legal landscape has therefore shifted. Rightsholders wield 
copyright law not as a means of preventing copying, but rather as a 
mechanism for promoting perceptions of fairness. Still, game devel-
opers have alternative means of enforcement—they can rely on con-
tractual tools to ban players or revoke their accounts when they use 
“bots” or “hacks” to cheat their way into obtaining an in-game ad-
vantage.393 So while the use of IP tools may send a strong message, 
it’s not strictly necessary. And, more importantly, that is not what 
copyright law is about. The law is fundamentally about incentives. 
It provides creators with time-limited market exclusivity in order to 
 
widespread copying of the new, latest-and-greatest design). See generally Raustiala & 
Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 19. 
391 Corinne Reichert, Epic Games Settles with 14-Year-Old Over Selling Fortnite Cheats, 
CNET (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/epic-settles-with-14-year-old-over-
selling-fortnite-cheats/ [https://perma.cc/A3QF-D3XE]. 
392 Complaint at 3, Epic Games, Inc. v. C.B., No. 5:19-cv-250, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
167416 (E.D.N.C. June 18, 2019). 
393 See sources cited in supra note 56. 
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incentivize innovation. But if no such incentives are necessary, and 
if competitive integrity can be enforced via non-IP means, then IP 
law may be at least partly superfluous. 
Business strategy has also been key to combating piracy and mit-
igating production risks in other industries. A prime example is the 
music industry. For decades, music was predominantly consumed 
through the sale and purchase of physical albums.394 The industry 
then pivoted toward the “iTunes pricing model,” where consumers 
could pay a modest fee to purchase a single song instead of an entire 
album.395 And the music industry today is principally driven by dig-
ital streaming—large music aggregators (such as Spotify) provide 
consumers with access to enormous libraries of music in return for 
a monthly fee.396 This latest model has created an equilibrium in 
which piracy is simply futile. Through a “clever combination of pre-
mium and paid services[,]”397 content providers have been able to 
effectively counteract music piracy. 
A recent study by Christopher Sprigman and Kal Raustiala 
meshes comfortably with these observations. Sprigman and Rausti-
ala explore the emergence of data-driven creativity; that is, creative 
content that is informed by the data that content creators collect 
about consumers’ tastes and preferences.398 Netflix, for example, 
curates data about the consumers who use its service. 399 It tracks 
 
394  Christopher Sprigman, The 99 Cent Question, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 87, 
90 (2006) (“In the not-so-long-ago world before downloads, songs were almost always 
sold as part of a larger bundle—i.e., individual tracks were packaged with other songs on 
an album, and marketed together in a variety of formats, including vinyl records, cassettes, 
and, latterly, CDs.”). 
395  Id. 
396  See Tyler Laurence, “Wake Up, Mr. West!”: Distinguishing Albums and 
Compilations for Statutory Damages in Copyright within a Streaming–Centric Music 
Economy, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 85, 89–90 (2018) (noting that the music industry 
recently shifted to a “direct-to-consumer streaming model”). 
397 See Jérôme Hergueux & Dariusz Jemielniak, Should Digital Files be Considered a 
Commons? Copyright Infringement in the Eyes of Lawyers, 35 INFO. SOC’Y 198, 198 
(2019). Spotify and other music streaming services have adapted to digital piracy by 
building “a sustainable competitive advantage based on intuitive usability and an excellent 
understanding of customers’ need.” Id. 
398 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 387, at 1594 (observing that “information about 
consumer preferences…flows in to the distributor. When coupled to rapid advances in data 
analysis techniques, this…becomes a very powerful tool for shaping content.”). 
399 Id. at 1584–90. 
2021] FAIRNESS, COPYRIGHT, AND VIDEO GAMES 781 
 
what consumers watch and for how long.400 Netflix can then draw 
on these data in creating content that is best calibrated to satisfy the 
specific tastes of consumers, thus reducing the risk of commercial 
failure.401 Combined with an all-you-can-eat pricing model, where 
consumers are offered access to a large catalogue of contents in ex-
change for a monthly fee, Netflix can extinguish or greatly reduce 
both the risk of commercial failure and the risk of commercial suc-
cess. Given the rise of data-driven creativity, Sprigman and Rausti-
ala inveigh against strong IP protections. They conclude that, in a 
world where creators can pin down consumer preferences while de-
ploying pricing models that appeal to consumers across the board, 
the scope of IP should be narrowed or at least recalibrated.402 
In line with this model of data-driven creativity, this Article 
chalks out a model of fairness-driven creativity—namely, a form of 
content creation that is informed by, and responsive to, ideas of fair-
ness. Consumers are more hospitable to business practices that cor-
respond to ideas of wealth sharing and competitive integrity. When 
perceptions of fairness hold, consumers may even assist content cre-
ators in detecting and policing pirated contents.403 At bottom, fair-
ness gives rise to notions of reciprocity and loyalty. Fairness there-
fore fuels consumer dedication and reduces the risk of defection to 
competitors, while at once lending legitimacy to the content pro-
vider’s pricing model. 
Are these insights generalizable to other industries? Fairness is 
a central feature of human interaction: people are meaningfully mo-
tivated, if only implicitly, by ideas of reciprocity and fairness. And 
much of the research suggests that the juxtaposition of a smart pric-
ing model (freemium games, Netflix, Spotify) with a fairness-induc-
ing business strategy (no competitive enhancements in video games, 
 
400 Id. at 1587–88. 
401 Id. at 1587.  
402 Id. at 1614 (noting that “[i]n this world, copyright protection is far less central, 
because content is far less central,” hence concluding that “data-driven creativity pushes in 
the direction of less copyright, and possibly substantially less”). 
403 Mark Schultz’s study on the jamband community provides one example. It shows that 
fans of jambands internalize the bands’ preferences as their own, and then police other 
community members in enforcing these preferences. They do so specifically with respect 
to the norm against unauthorized distribution of studio recordings. See generally Schultz, 
supra note 16. 
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limited enforcement of rights in jamband recordings) can yield ef-
fective results in different contexts. 
Finally, a note on the scope of this Article. I do not mean to sug-
gest that copyright is wholly redundant. Instead, my argument cuts 
only against strong IP protections while recognizing that some (ar-
guably modest) measure of IP remains necessary to combat whole-
sale copying by market competitors. For example, competitors 
should not be allowed to make exact copies of the game Fortnite 
and market them under a different title. In other words, some degree 
of IP protection remains necessary to stave off literal copying by 
market rivals (or new entrants) attempting to capitalize on the suc-
cess of others’ content. And while consumer piracy is less likely to 
thrive in a world that brims with data-driven or fairness-driven cre-
ativity, copying by market competitors remains a steady, though not 
always significant, risk. The net result is that some degree of copy-
right protection would nevertheless be warranted. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to properly assess what 
level of IP protection would be desirable in this new world. The most 
trivial challenge is to recalibrate the length of the copyright term. 
Today, copyrights typically last for 70 years after the death of the 
author. That means that some works may be protected for well over 
a century. But in practice, few works carry market value, and most 
are only commercially viable for short periods of time.404 Indeed, 
the law’s protective umbrella—extending a century into the future—
 
404 See, e.g., Kristelia García & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term, 
71 ALA. L. REV. 351 (2019). García and McCrary analyze sales data in the music industry 
to find that “the vast majority of copyrightable information goods never reach the point of 
commercial viability.” Id. at 383. They also find that even for commercially successful 
musical works, the drop-off in sales “is extraordinarily rapid, falling to one tenth of initial 
levels well within a year.” Id. at 391. See also Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing 
Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004). Sprigman discusses the now-abolished 
requirement that copyright holders renew their rights after a relatively short initial term by 
reregistering their copyright. Sprigman finds that, at a time when authors had to renew their 
rights to maintain them, many failed to do so. He points out that, historically, 
approximately 15% of works were renewed, while 85% of works entered the public domain 
after a relatively short term of protection. Id. at 519–21. This suggests that many works 
were not commercially viable, explaining why owners would rather forgo their rights rather 
than expend unnecessary resources to renew them. Sprigman therefore concludes that 
“[t]he majority of creative works have little or no commercial value, and the value of many 
initially successful works is quickly exhausted.” Id. at 489. 
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seems fallaciously excessive and would likely need to be cabined 
substantially. 
Another potential reform might involve the scope of the repro-
duction right. The Copyright Act grants copyright owners the exclu-
sive right to reproduce their work.405 The reproduction right sweeps 
far and wide. It applies to both literal and nonliteral (partial) copy-
ing,406 and it covers both commercial and personal copying, though 
the latter is more likely to qualify as fair use.407 Nonetheless, this 
Article shows that game developers rarely use their rights to prevent 
private copying by consumers. And while some scholars have called 
for eliminating the reproduction right altogether,408 I suggest that we 
might benefit from narrowing its scope. More to the point, we 
should consider excluding cases of personal use—private copying 
by consumers—from copyright’s reach, especially in circumstances 
where widespread distribution of infringing copies is unlikely to fol-
low. After all, private copying is a vanishingly small threat in a 
world driven by fairness.  
This Article advances a rather bold argument about the relation-
ship between copyright law and norms of fairness. One possible ob-
jection is that this account of fairness leans too heavily on big-title 
games like Fortnite. It thus papers over other, non-freemium games. 
Different types of pricing schemes, unlike free-to-play games, actu-
ally depend on a strong copyright system. And so my proposal, 
which seeks to scale back the scope of copyright law, would deliver 
a death blow to much of the video game industry; it would privilege 
free-to-play games at the expense of every other pricing scheme. Or 
so the argument goes. 
But this objection is misguided, for two reasons. First, the exist-
ence of multiple business models—some of which are supported by 
strong copyright protections—is not an unalloyed blessing. As this 
 
405 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
406 See Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (2013). 
407 The first fair use factor rests on an assessment of whether the infringing use is “of a 
commercial nature.” 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
408 See, e.g., Christina Mulligan, Copyright Without Copying, 27 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y. 469, 470 (2017); Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 899, 928 (2007). 
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discussion makes clear, copyright law has a price. It limits access to 
copyrighted works and can effectively frustrate future creativity. So 
as we think about the scope of copyright law, we should consider 
the benefits and costs of a multifaceted industry. Second, it is im-
portant to reiterate that I am not suggesting we eliminate copyright 
law. Rather, I argue that we should adjust the law to better address 
the realities of modern content industries. 
Another possible objection is that my analysis fails to properly 
confront anticompetitive concerns. Games like Fortnite have built a 
massive fan base and the developers behind these games exploit 
norms of fairness to sustain and expand their consumer base. A re-
cent study similarly finds that the video game industry, like other 
content industries, is trending toward market concentration.409 It is 
certainly true that norms of fairness play a role in facilitating these 
shifts. That said, it is also true that IP law is poorly equipped to ad-
dress anticompetitive concerns. In fact, rightsholders have often 
weaponized IP law to achieve the opposite end—to stunt competi-
tion by preventing market entrants from challenging incumbents.410 
And while I am sympathetic to competitive concerns, an analysis of 
how we might best tackle them is beyond the purview of this project. 
B. Decoding Labor 
Although copyright law is thought to rest on utilitarian grounds, 
some commentators view IP through the lens of a “natural rights” 
framework, building on John Locke’s theory of property.411 They 
suggest that intellectual property rights constitute a deserved reward 
for the labor expended in creating a work: by laboring upon other-
wise commonly held assets, creators acquire natural rights to these 
assets.412 This theory, particularly pervasive in continental Europe, 
draws from the premise that people are entitled to the fruits of their 
 
409 See Glynn Lunney, Copyright and the 1%, 23 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2020). 
410 See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 100 B.U. L. REV. 71, 
71 (2020). 
411 See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL 
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 170 (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001); Jeanne C. Fromer, 
Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1753 (2012); Wendy 
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540–83 (1993). 
412 Gordon, supra note 411, at 1544. 
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labor. Still other observers, inspired by the writings of Hegel and 
Kant, contend that the author’s personality is reflected in—and so 
constituted by—her creation. On this account, works of authorship 
mirror their authors’ ongoing personality interests and justify their 
rights in such works.413 
Some critics argue that moral rights theories advance an expan-
sive vision of intellectual property, potentially resulting in a more 
robust grant of rights.414 This is because the moral rights framework 
seems to eschew the utilitarian concern for striking a careful balance 
between incentives and access. And while this expansive view of 
natural rights is somewhat simplistic,415 it nonetheless animates con-
cerns over the application of moral rights theories. Critics worry that 
an embrace of moral rights would result in an imbalanced IP regime 
that predominantly privileges rightsholders at the expense of users 
and society at large. Perhaps more damning is Mark Lemley’s ob-
jection that those who support IP on moral grounds are engaging in 
a faith-like practice, insulated from facts or reason.416 The law, Lem-
ley observes, is neither informed by nor comports with a moral 
 
413 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330 (1988) 
[hereinafter Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property]; Alice Haemmerli, Whose 
Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383 (1999); Margaret J. 
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971–78 (1982); Justin Hughes, 
The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998). 
414  Plamondon Bair, supra note 31, at 1495 (“Because moral rights theorists justify 
intellectual property on very different grounds than utilitarians, they generally tend to favor 
a broader grant of rights.”). 
415 On Locke’s theory of labor, for example, the grant of rights is subject to the “enough 
and as good” proviso, barring the grant of rights where the remaining commons for others 
are not “enough and as good.” Another limiting principle finds expression in the waste 
proviso, which prevents the spoilage of property. These provisos have often been 
interpreted to suggest that rights should not arise when doing so risks harm to the public 
domain. See Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, supra note 413, at 313–14; 
Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 77–
78 (1997). 
416 Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1337–
38 (2015) (“The adherents of this new religion believe in IP. They don’t believe it is better 
for the world than other systems, or that it encourages more innovation. Rather, they 
believe in IP as an end in itself—that IP is some kind of prepolitical right to which inventors 
and creators are entitled.”). Robert Merges, the principal subject of Lemley’s critique, has 
responded by asserting that Lemley mischaracterized his positions. See generally Robert 
P. Merges, Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 681 (2016). 
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vision of IP.417 Lemley is primarily troubled by the prospect that 
champions of natural rights would support a maximalist vision of 
intellectual property even where the empirical evidence clearly 
shows that intellectual property fails to promote, and might even sti-
fle, innovation.418 
Despite these concerns, moral intuitions shape the way people 
think about intellectual property. Jeanne Fromer adduces evidence 
showing that creators are motivated by a concern for labor and per-
sonhood.419 In a similar vein, some studies find that authors bring 
infringement suits because they believe their moral, rather than eco-
nomic, interests have been compromised.420 Similarly, a recent 
study by Stephanie Plamondon Bair bears witness to the utility of 
fairness as a vehicle for spurring innovation.421 She presents evi-
dence showing that (i) perceptions of fairness in the workplace trig-
ger enhanced creativity; (ii) fairness leads to more creative results 
or products; and (iii) ideas of fairness accord with the way people 
think about copyright law.422 Moreover, although courts remain re-
luctant to expressly invoke moral theories of IP,423 these theories 
sometimes drive their decisions.424 
 
417 Lemley, supra note 416, at 1340 (“IP turns out not to map particularly well to a labor-
reward instinct. We grant extremely valuable patents to accidental discoverers and 
extremely valuable copyrights to photographers who happened to be in the right place at 
the right time. Further, we allow those rights to be enforced even against people who put 
more productive work into the final product than the IP owner—the companies who 
actually make products based on an idea sketched out by a patent troll and the artists who 
remake a photo into an iconic image.”). 
418 Id. at 1345 (drawing a line between “theories of IP that are responsive to evidence and 
those that are impervious to it” and arguing that moral theories fall into the latter category). 
419 Fromer, supra note 411, at 1764–81. 
420 See Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 313, at 2436–37. 
421 Plamondon Bair, supra note 31, at 1509. 
422 Id. at 1502–08. 
423 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 89–91 (2011). 
424 Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137 
(2010). Lemley and McKenna show that courts are often motivated by concerns grounded 
in ideas of free-riding: courts tend to intuitively assume that it is wrong, or unfair, for 
competitors to use the owner’s mark even in cases where the competitor’s use clearly does 
not risk consumer confusion. Lemley and McKenna accordingly identify what they 
describe as a “free-riding impulse” that underwrites courts’ decisions in trademark cases. 
Id. at 146–56. See also Daniel Gervais, Improper Appropriation, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 599, 610 (2019) (“A jury might also be tempted to follow an impulse that copying 
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The evidence suggests that fairness—in particular, labor—
looms large in people’s conception of IP. This Article corroborates 
these insights. It shows that perceptions of fairness are robust and 
omnipresent in the world’s largest content industry. It finds that cre-
ators often deploy community norms to vindicate their labor inter-
ests. And they devise creative ways to promote notions of fairness 
without resort to legal action. But more fundamentally, I suggest that 
labor theories, despite their pervasiveness in various creative spaces, 
are ill-suited to inform legal rules. 
In exploring this labor-driven conception of fairness, I build on 
William Fisher’s sophisticated exposition of the labor theory.425 In 
his influential essay on theories of intellectual property, Fisher re-
counts some of the challenges that have long dogged the labor the-
ory, focusing on the question of what actually qualifies as intellec-
tual labor.426 As Fisher points out, labor can implicate four different 
concepts. First, labor can mean time and effort—the hours spent cre-
ating the work, or the physical and mental effort associated with 
producing intellectual goods. Second, labor can be understood as re-
ferring to an undesirable activity, namely, one “in which [a person] 
would rather not engage.”427 Third, labor can be viewed through the 
prism of its resultant value—the social benefits it confers upon so-
ciety (think, for example, of valuable inventions in the realm of pa-
tents). Fourth, labor can refer to creative activities that yield new 
ideas. 
These conceptions of labor bear a striking resemblance to the 
way streamers think about their gameplay streams. The picture 
sketched above shows that, for streamers, labor embodies at least 
three different concepts: (1) the time spent streaming or playing the 
game; (2) the time spent acquiring expertise and studying the game; 
 
that appears as free-riding should be illegal, even though free-riding is not per se illegal.”); 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 288 (2014) 
(“[T]he law could embrace the reality that moral intuitions relating to labor and free-riding 
directly influence the assessment of similarity, which in turn serves as a simple proxy  
for wrongfulness.”). Similar trends pervade copyright cases, as illustrated in Sterk, supra  
note 381. 
425 See Fisher, supra note 411, at 185–86. 
426 Id. 
427 Id. at 185. 
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and (3) the value that results from one’s execution of her creative 
vision of the game.428 
Ideas (1) and (2) correspond to Fisher’s first definition, where 
labor centers on time and effort. Streamers put time and effort into 
streaming (and mastering the game), and therefore believe they are 
entitled to claim ownership over their recorded streams. Idea (2) can 
also align with Fisher’s second articulation of labor—the process of 
acquiring expertise can amount to a laborious activity that is unde-
sirable, surely in terms of scope: players spend thousands of hours 
studying games, and view that process as necessary though taxing. 
Idea (3) can plausibly attach to the last two variations on labor—
the notion that labor is linked to value, and the belief that labor is 
associated with a creative, novel process. Indeed, video games are 
about more than just a mechanical execution of in-game commands. 
Players view their playing style as unique and creative. They believe 
that one’s playing style reflects her creative voice. For them, labor 
implicates one’s novel, creative vision. And players are often cred-
ited with generating value, say, by fleshing out a character; that is, 
by crafting a particular playing style that utilizes a certain in-game 
character in a creative, unique way. The upshot is that creative play-
ers can forge a path forward, showing other players how the game 
can and should be played. 
In sum, streamers’ ever-shifting conception of labor conforms 
neatly to the different notions of labor explored by Fisher. Streamers 
view labor as an incident of time and effort. At times, they also be-
lieve labor is associated with an unpleasant activity. And, on other 
occasions, they view labor through the lens of added value or crea-
tive novelty: for streamers, labor might therefore refer to the 
streamer’s creative vision or innovative in-game strategy. 
The choice among the different conceptions of labor has practi-
cal implications. Our conception of labor determines if, and to what 
extent, the labor theory can in fact justify or ground copyright law. 
If one insists that labor is reducible to value or meaningful utility, 
much of copyright law seems out of place. This is because the law’s 
bar for originality is fairly modest: qualifying works need not 
 
428 See supra Section III.C.5. 
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provide any distinct social benefits. Similarly, if one takes the posi-
tion that labor boils down to time and effort, copyright law remains 
a poor fit. Although authors often put some minimal amount of ef-
fort into their creations, no amount of labor is required to qualify for 
legal protection. The sweat-of-the-brow doctrine, which required a 
showing of effort as a condition for copyright protection, was jetti-
soned by the Supreme Court in Feist.429 
Moreover, if professional streamers actually like their work—if 
they enjoy playing video games—one would be hard-pressed to jus-
tify the grant of rights in gaming streams under the second interpre-
tation of labor, i.e., the idea that labor refers to an undesirable activ-
ity. Finally, if one accepts the fourth construction of labor, it is sim-
ilarly hard to justify copyright law. The law requires only a modest 
amount of creativity. It does not demand that qualifying works be 
novel in any serious sense. Indeed, one might question whether, and 
to what extent, the streamers’ work spawns something truly novel in 
the traditional sense. After all, streamers are essentially engaging 
with someone else’s work (the underlying video game), and do not 
seem to be creating anything new from the vantage point of copy-
right law. 
The type of labor at stake is therefore central to our assessment 
of the theory. But the amount of labor is also crucial. This becomes 
relevant when one tries to apply the labor theory to gameplay 
streams against the backdrop of the labor performed by the creators 
of the underlying video game. Robert Nozick was the first to identify 
the difficulty of distilling a property right that would award the la-
borer a property interest proportional to her labor.430 Depending on 
one’s idea of labor, streamers can be viewed as having expended 
only a modest amount of labor. If we think of labor in terms of time 
or effort, or in terms of an undesirable activity, it then follows that 
streamers put only a trivial amount of labor into their streams. The 
creators of the underlying video game have put, on balance, much 
more time, effort, and resources into producing the game. Big video 
games cost hundreds of millions of dollars to make, take years to 
create, and involve a collaborative enterprise encompassing 
 
429 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345, 359–60, 362 (rejecting the “sweat of the brow” doctrine). 
430 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174–75 (1974). 
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hundreds of developers, programmers, and designers. The amount 
of labor that streamers put in, on the other hand, is proportionately 
miniscule. Thus, if we take Locke’s theory of labor seriously, one 
might struggle to justify property interests in gameplay streams. 
In fact, it is equally difficult to justify rights in gameplay streams 
even if one takes a more expansive view of streamers’ labor: 
namely, if one accepts that streamers produce something creative 
and socially valuable. How should the streamers’ subsequent con-
tribution be measured in relation to the value or novelty of the un-
derlying video game? In other words, even if we are willing to con-
cede (as I am) that streamers generate goods of value, these goods 
largely pale in comparison to the grandiose project undertaken by 
the creators of the underlying game. Many video games are played 
by hundreds of millions of players around the world and are the 
products of massive collaborative projects that culminate in beauti-
ful, complex audiovisual works. Gameplay streams, by comparison, 
fare rather poorly. The value they generate is marginal relative to 
the underlying video game on which they build. For these reasons, 
the Lockean labor theory is of little use to those who seek to lay 
claim to their gameplay streams. 
The gaming case study illuminates the fraught foundations of the 
labor theory. It does so by underscoring the difficulty of pinpointing 
what labor actually means. Streamers invoke different conceptions 
of labor in different contexts. This divergence, in turn, constricts our 
understanding of what labor means and how it might justify the 
grant of property rights in different cases. Similar concerns arise 
when one attempts to calibrate the size of the reward given to the 
laborer against the proportional value of her labor. When considered 
in relation to the amount (qualitative or quantitative) of labor gener-
ated by the laborer, the Lockean theory fails to provide a strong jus-
tification for property rights in gameplay streams. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Bridging the divide between business strategy and copyright 
law, this project joins the burgeoning literature on norms-based gov-
ernance of intellectual property. And while previous research has 
focused on discrete, small-scale creative communities, this study 
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focuses on the largest content industry in the world: the video game 
industry. It provides insights into the workings of intellectual prop-
erty in a world driven by fairness, data, and popular culture. To do 
so, it unpacks three extralegal norms of fairness that underlie content 
creation in the gaming context: (1) norms of competitive integrity 
prevalent among video game players; (2) norms of wealth sharing 
arising out of communities of loyal consumers; and (3) labor-based 
norms that allow gameplay streamers to claim ownership over their 
recorded streams. 
At bottom, this Article bears witness to the utility of fairness in 
the overarching framework of copyright. Given the rise of fairness-
driven creativity, this analysis presents a cautionary tale militating 
against strong IP protections. It shows that norms of fairness mini-
mize the need for strong legal interventions in areas where fair-
ness—rather than the law—drives creativity. And it suggests that 
the labor theory is ill-fitted to inform or otherwise shape copyright 
law, despite its pervasiveness in the gaming industry.   
